

THE PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC

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PREFACE

THE present volume is, in a general way, a study of the Philippine revolution, using that term to mean the armed conflict which began as a revolt against Spain and ended as an act of resistance to the United States. More particularly, however, it is an attempt to present the history of a *de facto* government, often referred to under the name of the Philippine Republic.

In this study the writer has tried to present his subject objectively, and to approach it from the social, rather than the biographical, standpoint. When discussing personalities he has sought to explain why certain men thought and acted in the way they did, instead of praising or condemning them. Above all he has tried to be "fair without ceasing to be truthful", and has refrained from pointing to any of the so-called "lessons" of history.

Since the history of the Philippine Republic is enveloped in so much controversial literature the writer has endeavored to draw from original sources, in preference to following the opinions of the few who have blazed, or tried to blaze, the way. In doing so his task has been rendered less difficult by the unfailing courtesy of those who have the needed documents in their keeping, both in the Philippines and the United States, particularly of the officials of the Philippine Library and Museum, Manila, and of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, Washington, D. C. The work has been greatly facilitated also by the kindness of Mr. Epifanio de los Santos, who graciously allowed the writer to consult some of the documents in his collection, Professor Maximo

M. Kalaw, who loaned him others, from his own private library and that of his brother, and Messrs. Eliseo Hervas and Honorio Poblador, who placed at his disposal certain manuscript materials bearing on the revolution on Panay island. To all of them the writer acknowledges his great indebtedness.

The writer is especially grateful to Professor William R. Shepherd, under whose careful guidance and with whose constant interest this work has been undertaken. The author alone is responsible for all possible errors in facts and judgment.

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CHAPTER I

ORIGINS OF THE PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC

THE REFORM MOVEMENT

PRIOR to 1892 the maximum aspiration of the leading Filipinos, so far as it had become articulate, was the implantation of liberal reforms in the Archipelago. From the middle of the nineteenth century, when the campaign for the filipinization of the curacies reached its climax,¹ to the closing years of the eighties, when the reform propaganda conducted in Spain by a group of Filipinos and a few of their Spanish friends became alarmingly intense,² there was no perceptible movement of importance that could be characterized properly as revolutionary, much less separatistic. The great leaders of that long period of forty years, among whom were Father Peláez (1812-1861), Father Burgos (1837-1872), Joaquin Pardo de Tavera (1829-1883), José

¹ The Spanish viewpoint of the religious controversy is set forth by Father Eladio Zamora in his *Las Corporaciones religiosas en Filipinas*, Valladolid, 1901. Zamora was an Augustinian friar. An able defense of the Filipino clergy is made by another Augustinian, Father Salvador Pons y Torres, in his *Defensa del clero filipino*, Manila, 1900. But see also José Montero y Vidal, *Historia general de Filipinas*, Madrid, 1895, vol. iii, pp. 305 *et seq.*; Manuel Artigas, *Los Sucesos de 1872*, Manila, 1913, *passim*.

² A brief account of the liberal propaganda is given by Mariano Ponce, one of its promoters, under the title *Sobre Filipinas* in M. M. Norton, *Builders of a Nation*, Manila, 1914, pp. 17 *et seq.* See also James A. LeRoy, *The Americans in the Philippines*, Boston, 1914, vol. i, pp. 63-78. This work is generally considered the most scholarly of the kind by an American.

Rizal (1861-1896), Marcelo H. del Pilar (1850-1896) and Graciano López Jaena (1856-1896) can not correctly be called revolutionists.¹ These men labored hard to obtain such reforms as they considered necessary for the welfare and progress of the Philippines,² and in so doing ran counter to the reactionary Spanish clergy and its adherents in the population, both military and civilian, at home and in the colony; but they never ceased to be loyal to Spain and certainly never openly advocated political separation.³

¹ Peláez and Burgos were both educated in the *Universidad de Santo Tomás*, Manila; the first was vicar capitular of the Archdiocese of Manila for a brief period, while the second was one of the curates of the Manila Cathedral. Joaquín Pardo de Tavera, educated in the same school, was a lawyer and served as Councillor of Administration. He was a conspicuous figure during the liberal administration of Governor-General Carlos de la Torre. José Rizal, foremost among his contemporaries and now considered by his countrymen the greatest Filipino that ever lived, studied medicine in the *Universidad Central* of Madrid, and after graduation, visited several countries in Europe and also the United States. He was a writer of note and his novels—*Noli Me Tángere* and *El Filibusterismo*—contributed largely to the provocation of the uprising in 1896. W. E. Retana, *Vida y escritos del Doctor José Rizal*, Madrid, 1907 and Austin Craig, *Lineage, Life and Labors of José Rizal*, Manila, 1913 are among the best biographies of him written. Del Pilar, a law graduate of the *Universidad de Santo Tomás*, was a noted propagandist, considered second only to Rizal. Among his works the best known are *La Soberanía monacal en Filipinas*, Barcelona, 1888, and *La Frailocracia filipina*, Barcelona, 1889. A good biography of him is that by Epifanio de los Santos, entitled "Marcelo H. del Pilar" in *The Philippine Review*, Manila, October, November and December, 1918. López Jaena, a companion of Rizal and Del Pilar in Spain, was a noted orator.

² A brief statement of the reforms demanded is contained in a speech of López Jaena, April 27, 1883. See his *Discursos y artículos varios*, Barcelona, 1891, pp. 32-35.

³ Marcelo H. del Pilar, seeing all their efforts to secure reforms by peaceful means altogether fruitless, despaired of further peaceful methods and, it is said, before his death was ready to resort to violence. He is credited with having suggested the idea of the *Katipunan*. However,

Neither *El Católico Filipino*, a bi-weekly paper founded by Father Peláez in collaboration with others, nor *La Solidaridad*, organ of the Filipino propagandists in Spain, could be justly considered seditious. The two societies, *Asociación Hispano-Filipina*, founded in 1888 by Filipinos and liberal Spaniards in Madrid, and the *Liga Filipina*, established in 1892 by Dr. Rizal in Manila, worked for the union of all Filipinos and for reforms, but advocated neither an armed revolt nor the severance of political ties with the mother country.¹ In fact the rallying-cry of the propagandists was "assimilation" with Spain, believing as they did that with the Philippines more closely integrated with the mother country, its inhabitants would necessarily be entitled to the enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of Spanish nationals.

Coincident with the reform propaganda conducted in Spain by Rizal, Del Pilar, López Jaena and their Spanish co-workers, some attempts were made by the Madrid government to introduce a few changes in the administration of the Philippines; but these measures, aside from being altogether too timid, were not the ones asked for, and they did not satisfy the more intelligent leaders. The fact is that the Filipinos had progressed, in spite of the hindrances they had to overcome, much more than the rulers realized or were willing to admit; consequently, they aspired to a better and freer condition of affairs for their native land, and de-

in the beginning, if not throughout his career, he was a loyalist like the rest. See his *Soberanía monacal*, *passim*; but see also Santos, "Marcelo H. del Pilar," *loc. cit.*, pp. 868 *et seq.*

¹ For a statement of the aims and purposes of the *Asociación Hispano-Filipina*, see Graciano López Jaena, *Discursos y artículos varios*, pp. 43-49, 235-237; also Del Pilar's editorial in *La Solidaridad*, October 31, 1890. The constitution of the *Liga Filipina* is printed in English in Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*, Cleveland, 1907, vol. lli, pp. 217 *et seq.*

manded certain changes that were more thorough-going and fundamental than the concessions made.¹ The campaign therefore continued. Rizal and his associates did not cease to expose the evil effects of Spain's oppressive rule in the Islands and warned that country that the situation could easily lead to a revolution. Thus he wrote in December 1889:

. . . the Philippines will remain Spanish, if they enter upon the life of law and civilization, if the rights of their inhabitants are respected, if the other rights due them are granted, if the liberal policy of the government is carried out without trickery or meanness, without subterfuges or false interpretations.

Otherwise, if an attempt is made to see in the Islands a lode to be exploited, a resource to satisfy ambitions, thus to relieve the sovereign country of taxes, killing the goose that lays the golden eggs and shutting its (*sic*) ears to all cries of reason, then, however great may be the loyalty of the Filipinos, it will be impossible to hinder the operations of the inexorable laws of history. Colonies established to subserve the policy and the commerce of the sovereign country, all eventually become independent. . . .²

But Spain chose to listen to none of these warnings. In the words of Apolinario Mabini, "the Spaniards turned deaf ears to these demands under the pretext that they were the work of some few 'idealists' and saying, always at the instigation of the friars interested in maintaining the *status*

¹ LeRoy, "The Philippines, 1860-1898: Some Comments and Bibliographical Notes" in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, vol. lii, pp. 149 *et seq.*

² Rizal, *Filipinas dentro de cien años*, in W. E. Retana, *Archivo del bibliófilo filipino*, Madrid, 1905, vol. v, pp. 299 *et seq.* The quotation given is taken from Charles Derbyshire's translation entitled *The Philippines A Century Hence*, Manila, 1912, pp. 85-86. *Filipinas dentro de cien años* was originally published as a serial in *La Solidaridad* from September, 1889, to January, 1890.

quo, that the people were still in a savage state. . . .”¹ “What could we have done”, exclaimed, later in 1897, one of the companions of Rizal, “if the gold of the monastic orders had been stronger than our clamors?”² The result was as foreseen by these men. The more radical element of the population managed to seize control, plunged the country into a revolution and openly advocated political independence; for, as in the case of the Latin-American countries, “from revolution in behalf of liberal rule to revolution in behalf of independence, was an easy and natural step”.³

THE KATIPUNAN

The leaders of the radical group, to spread their beliefs and coordinate their acts, established a secret society which has come to be known as the *Katipunan*.⁴ Patterned some-

¹ Quoted in *Harper's History of the War in the Philippines*, edited by Marrion Wilcox, New York, 1900, p. 28. This work is a compilation of articles on the Philippines written by various newspaper correspondents.

Apolinario Mabini, a lawyer by profession, was a prominent member of the *Liga Filipina*. Later he became the trusted adviser of General Aguinaldo and rose to the position of President of the Council of Secretaries of the Republic. Most of the organic measures of Aguinaldo were his work. He stood unqualifiedly for independence to the end.

² Mariano Ponce to Ferdinand Blumentritt, Hongkong, May 11, 1897. A copy of this letter is in the collection of Teodoro M. Kalaw, Manila.

³ William R. Shepherd, *Latin America*, New York, 1914, p. 74.

⁴ The Tagalog word *Katipunan* means league or association. In Philippine history, however, it has come to mean a particular association founded in 1892 for the purpose of overthrowing Spanish rule in the Philippines. The Spanish word *katipunero* and the English verb “katipunize” are both derived from it, and are used with the same restriction in meaning as the parent word. The full name of the society is *Kataastaasan Kagalang-galang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan* or Highest and Most Respectable Association of the Sons of the People, but is generally shortened into the *Katipunan*, or the more symbolic K. K. K. See Retana, *Archivo*, vol. iii, pp. 409 *et seq.*; Artigas, *Andrés Bonifacio y el Katipunan*, Manila, 1911, pp. 22-23.

what after Rizal's *Liga Filipina*, though with an entirely different purpose, it was founded at Tondo, a suburb of Manila, on July 7th, 1892, the same day that the decree of Rizal's banishment to Dapitan was made public by Governor-General Despujol.¹ Marcelo H. Del Pilar, the companion and co-worker of Rizal in Spain, is generally credited with having directly inspired its establishment.² In fact one of the founders of the *Katipunan* was Del Pilar's brother-in-law Deodato Arellano, who became its first president. From the beginning, however, it was the organizing ability and tenacity of purpose of Andrés Bonifacio that saved the society from an untimely death. He became its third president and as such was known to all members as the *Supremo* or the Supreme One.

Being a secret society, a good deal of mystery enveloped the early history of the *Katipunan*. Until a comparatively recent time, there was more misinformation than actual knowledge regarding its purposes and organization. A Spanish parish priest, Fray Mariano Gil, who "discovered" its existence, declared its object to be "the general massacre of all Spaniards living in the Archipelago";³ a Filipino

¹ Epifanio de los Santos, "Andrés Bonifacio" in *The Philippine Review*, Manila, January-February, 1918, p. 38. For a slightly different date, see Artigas, *Andrés Bonifacio*, p. 12. The decree of Rizal's deportation is printed in the *Gaceta de Manila*, July 7, 1892.

Santos' "Andrés Bonifacio" is undoubtedly the best life of Bonifacio so far attempted. It really is more than a biography, inasmuch as in its columns several letters of Bonifacio are printed for the first time, together with Bonifacio's *Katungkulang gagawin ng mga Z. LL. B.* (Duties to be performed by the Sons of the People). The letters *Z. LL. B.* stand for *A. N. B.* (Anak ng Bayan, or Sons of the People), the *katipuneros* having rearranged the letters of the alphabet to escape ready detection. This work of Bonifacio is generally cited by Filipino writers as Bonifacio's *Decalogue*, and it will be so cited hereafter.

* Santos, "Marcelo H. del Pilar," *loc. cit.*, pp. 868-869, 879.

³ Retana, *Archivo*, vol. iii, p. 92.

writer, on the other hand, advanced the theory that the *summun* of *Katipunan* aspirations was a communistic republic.¹ So inaccurate was the information about it that even after its "discovery", it was generally confused with Freemasonry, and, for a long time thereafter, its centers in the provinces were invariably spoken of as "lodges". In the language of James A. Le Roy,² "more ridiculous, exaggerated, and often willfully false things have been written" about the *Katipunan* than any other feature of Philippine history.

Opinions to the contrary notwithstanding, it is possible to make a statement as to what constituted the main object of the society. Barring certain subsidiary aims, the primary purpose was two-fold: (1) the union of all Filipinos, and (2) the separation from Spain by means of a revolution. The society from the beginning was undoubtedly both a patriotic and a seditious organization.

The union of all Filipinos as an aim of the *Katipunan* is shown in the second paragraph of Jacinto's *Primer* which was generally looked upon by the early *katipuneros* as their guide.³ It reads as follows: "The object pursued by this association is great and precious: to unite in ideas and purposes all Filipinos by means of a strong oath, and from this union derive force with which to tear the dense veil that obscures the intelligence and thus find the true path of Reason and Light". Andrés Bonifacio, early in 1896, ex-

¹ Isabelo de los Reyes, *La Religión del Katipunan*, Madrid, 1910, p. 37.

² *The Americans in the Philippines*, vol. i, p. 79.

³ A pamphlet in Tagalog entitled *Katipunan ng mga A. N. B.* (Association of the Sons of the People), without date or place of imprint. It is generally cited by Filipino writers as Jacinto's *Kartilla ng Katipunan* (*Katipunan Primer*). For a study of the aims and nature of the *Katipunan*, the *Primer* and Bonifacio's *Decalogue*, already referred to, are indispensable.

pressed the same thought when he wrote: "Reason teaches us to be united in sentiment, thought and purpose, so that we may acquire the strength necessary to crush the evil that is afflicting our people".¹ This position of the *katipuneros* was dictated not only by the apparent necessity for greater unity, but also by the natural tendency to follow in the footsteps of Rizal and Del Pilar, the two great apostles of Filipino union. It was therefore a heritage from the preceding generation.

With respect to the idea of separation by means of a revolution, there appears nothing absolutely definite in the writings of the founders of the association which have been preserved. The omission was probably not accidental; it may well have been dictated by prudence. By this omission the leaders of the association could hope to gain the sympathy at least, if not the support, of those who would naturally recoil from the violence of a revolution and the uncertainty of political separation, and, at the same time, lessen the risk of furnishing documentary proofs of sedition in case of discovery. Thus Jacinto only vaguely suggests in his *Primer* that, as a fitting recompense for those who willingly suffered, liberty would soon dawn, bringing happiness for all. Bonifacio mentions neither separation nor revolution in the *Decalogue*. Dr. Valenzuela, on the other hand, testified that, according to Bonifacio, the society proposed to bring about the union of all Filipinos and to demand for the Philippines equal rights with the Spanish provinces, including the sending of delegates to the Cortes; and, in case of refusal on the part of Spain to grant such demands, to provoke a revolution and declare the independence of the Archipelago under the protection of Japan.² What these men really had in

¹ Retana, *Archivo*, vol. iii, p. 201.

² Santos, "Andrés Bonifacio," *loc. cit.*, p. 39.

mind, however, is revealed in the articles they wrote and published in 1896 in the paper *Kalayaan* (Liberty), organ of the *Katipunan*.¹ One of these articles, written jointly by Bonifacio and Dr. Valenzuela, says in part:

. . . We raise our heads long accustomed to bow low, and summoning up all our strength . . . boldly tell them [the Spaniards] that the expression "Mother Spain" is but a piece of adulation . . . that they are nought but a race that robs, a people that fattens on what is not its own; that there is another people [the Filipinos] tired of that which gives it neither strength nor life, and that there is no longer any hope except in our own forces and means of defense.²

In a country already greatly perturbed as the Philippines then was, there can be little doubt regarding the real intention of the authors of these articles. Certainly the men who were initiated into the *Katipunan* from 1894 on, if not from the outset, understood the society to stand not only for revolution but for separation as well. Thus in 1894 the initiates of a section in a district in Manila boldly announced in a document signed in blood that they would "not take a backward step in the revolution against the Spanish enemy".³ The document bears a stamp with these words:

¹ The *Kalayaan* was a Tagalog paper which began publication early in 1896 in Manila, although it bore the address Yokohama in its date line. It printed two numbers but the second issue was never distributed, due to the sudden betrayal of the society by one of its members. Some of the articles appearing in the first number are reproduced in Spanish in Retana's *Archivo*, vol. iii, pp. 134-148; while two of Bonifacio's articles are reproduced in English in Santos' "Andrés Bonifacio," *loc. cit.*, pp. 39 *et seq.*

² Retana, *Archivo*, vol. iii, p. 136.

³ John R. M. Taylor, *Philippine Insurgent Records*, vol. i, exhibit 11a, 74 FZ. This work, printed in galley proofs but never published, is probably the most important single collection of documents of this period of Philippine history. Copies of it are kept in the Bureau of Insular Affairs in Washington, D. C., in the Library of Congress and

" Philippine Republic, Concepcion, Manila ". Another document dated in 1896 states the object of the society to be " the independence of the Filipino people, and the total destruction of Spanish rule ".¹ Apolinario Mabini, who knew Bonifacio and with him sat as a member of the directorate of the *Liga Filipina*, was undoubtedly right when he said that the *Katipunan* was founded with " separatist " aims.²

The idea of having a definite program of government beyond the organization prescribed by the *Katipunan*, once separation was attained, did not seem greatly to have pre-occupied at that time the thought of the leaders. Yet the *Katipunan* was undoubtedly a patriotic society, and at heart the leaders presumably wished the country's good.³ The *katiipuneros* were bent on destroying the Spanish rule which they felt had already become unbearable,⁴ but their constructive program did not go beyond a plan, generally accepted, to found a republic on the ruins of the decaying colonial system. Whether this form of government would be the most suitable under the given conditions, and just what kind

in the Bureau of Constabulary in Manila. It is available only to those who have permission to use it. It consists of a historical account of the revolution from its inception in 1896 to the American occupation, and of exhibits made up of important documents consulted. The historical account is unfortunately biassed, but the exhibits, of which there are 1430, are extremely valuable in spite of certain errors in translation. Mr. Taylor had intended to have the whole work arranged in two volumes, but as actually put together it consists of five. It will be cited hereafter simply as Taylor.

¹ Retana, *Archivo*, vol. iii, p. 154.

² Apolinario Mabini, *La Revolución filipina*, ch. vii. This work was written by Mabini while he was in exile in Guam. The original, written by him both in Spanish and in English, has never been published. However, a translation into English from the original Spanish was published sometime ago in Japan by Austin Craig. A copy of the English original is found in the collection of Teodoro M. Kalaw.

³ Jacinto, *Primer*, *passim*.

⁴ *Supra*, p. 17.

of a republic they intended to establish, did not appear seriously to have hampered the pursuit of their immediate objective. A republic they wanted, and a republic they must have. All else, it was taken for granted, would surely follow. In this respect, they were no different from other revolutionists at the inception of their work.

Aside from the main object it strove to accomplish, the association had certain subsidiary aims. It preached the love of and service to country. "The life that is not consecrated to a lofty and reasonable purpose is a tree without shade, if not a poisonous weed", says the *Primer*. It proclaimed, moreover, the equality of all men, a precept that was undoubtedly stressed and at times, either willfully or through ignorance, distorted into some sort of communism. It urged cooperation, a genuine mutuality of effort. "Defend the oppressed", commands the *Primer*, "and fight the oppressor". It extolled the chastity of women, and iterated the golden rule. These principles of conduct¹ it sought to inculcate among its members on behalf of social betterment, so as to accentuate their community of interests and purposes and strengthen their bonds of union.

Neither Bonifacio in his *Decalogue* nor Jacinto in his *Primer* said anything about the "massacre" of Spaniards. There may be stray bits of evidence to show that "massacre" was in the minds of some members of the *Katipunan*; but certain documents generally cited by rabid Spanish writers² in this connection must be viewed with suspicion, since their source has never been given and their authenticity is still unproven.³ With an association like the *Kati-*

¹ Jacinto, *Primer*, *passim*.

² José M. del Castillo y Jiménez, *El Katipunan o el filibusterismo en Filipinas*, Madrid, 1897, pp. 114-123. See also Manuel Sastrón, *La Insurrección en Filipinas*, Madrid, 1897, vol. i, pp. 146-148.

³ Santos, "Andrés Bonifacio," *loc. cit.*, p. 55.

punan, however, whose members were largely recruited from the lower classes, it was inevitable that some of its principles would be misunderstood and even misconstrued. Indeed, after that body had become successful, there came "an influx of spurious elements, of false *katipuneros*, whose excesses brought discredit upon the society".¹ Nevertheless, what the leaders wanted was to steel the hearts of their associates and prepare them for a long struggle against their rulers. This seemed necessary in view of the traditional deference the majority of natives then showed the ruling race, particularly the clergy. To combat it, the *Katipunan* leaders appealed not only to the Filipino's love of country but also to his religious instinct.² "Believe", says Bonifacio, "that the aims of the K. K. K. are God-given, and the desires of thy country are therefore also the desires of God."³

There is no original document that describes completely the organization of the *Katipunan*. Jacinto's unpublished work on the "katipunization" of Laguna province,⁴ though not written till early in 1898, throws much light on the subject, but, like all works of local character, does not describe the organization as a whole. Of the secondary sources, the testimonies of Dr. Valenzuela and others,⁵ the reminis-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

² Jacinto, *Primer*, *passim*.

³ Bonifacio, *Decalogue*, *loc. cit.*, p. 39.

⁴ This work is entitled *Pagkatatag ng pamahalaan sa hukuman ng silangan*, but is generally referred to by Filipino writers as the *Sangguniang hukuman* which may be freely rendered in English as the *Regional Council*. It was written in February, 1898, and therefore belongs to a much later period. The original manuscript is in the collection of the historian Epifanio de los Santos, Malolos, Bulacan, who kindly allowed the writer to consult it and to retain a copy.

⁵ Retana, *Archivo*, vol. iii, pp. 199 *et seq.*

cences of Artemio Ricarte,¹ a *katipunero*, and L. de los Reyes' *La Religión del katipunan* (*Katipunan Religion*) are very useful, but much care should be exercised in consulting them. Fortunately, however, there are no fundamental differences in the views expressed by these men and by others regarding the society's organization.

It seems reasonably certain that the *Katipunan* had three distinct units of control; namely, (a) the supreme council, for the whole Archipelago; (b) the provincial council, for each province or district; and (c) the popular council, for each town. Sometimes, however, a province had two such councils, thus constituting itself into two *Katipunan* provinces, while a popular council might have under its direction two or more sections. Each council had its own set of officials generally consisting of a president, a secretary, a fiscal (attorney) and a treasurer. But besides these officials, the supreme council, to which all councils owed obedience, had several councillors and for some time a medical adviser. In August, 1896, the supreme council, according to Dr. Valenzuela, was composed of Andrés Bonifacio, president; Emilio Jacinto, secretary; Teodoro Plata, fiscal; Enrique Pacheco, treasurer; Pio Valenzuela, medical adviser; and several councillors.² After the establishment of the supreme council, the founders slowly and carefully began to make "converts" in the suburbs of Manila and in some of the towns near the capital. With great secrecy, subordinate councils were established in an ever-widening area. Although at first, quite inactive, leading only a somewhat precarious existence to the end of 1893, the *Katipunan* took on a new lease of life early in 1894. A year later there were

¹ Artemio Ricarte, *Apuntes históricos de la insurrección*, secs. 2-3. This work is still unpublished. The author's copy was made from that in the Philippine Library in Manila.

² Retana, *Archivo*, vol. iii, p. 211.

already established in Manila City alone four "popular councils" with several sections.¹ The province of Manila and the near-by provinces of Morong,² Cavite, Batangas, Laguna and Bulacan, and even the more distant provinces of Nueva Écija and Tayabas felt the silent campaign conducted by Bonifacio and his enthusiastic followers. By the middle of 1896, the society was already well established in central Luzon.

Various estimates regarding the probable number of those affiliated are given by different authorities. They vary between 20,000³ and 123,500.⁴ The actual number of members was probably not exactly known even by the *katipuneros* themselves. However, the membership must have been large, probably nearer the latter figure than the former,⁵ although it represented only a small portion of the entire population.⁶ In central Luzon alone was the society's influence felt in any appreciable degree.

As the association grew and its membership increased, rumors regarding its existence were bound to arise. Early in July, 1896, a lieutenant of the Civil Guard, writing at the town of Pasig, to the Civil Governor of the province of Manila reported that he had reason to suspect that "something abnormal was going on", that he had been informed of the existence of a secret society whose members were constantly holding gatherings at different places near Manila

¹ Reyes, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

² The present province of Rizal is made up approximately of the former province of Morong and some parts of the former province of Manila.

³ Valenzuela's estimate. See Retana, *Archivo*, vol. iii, p. 203.

⁴ Sastrón's estimate. See Manuel Sastrón, *La Insurrección en Filipinas*, vol. i, p. 141.

⁵ LeRoy, *The Americans in the Philippines*, vol. i, p. 85.

⁶ *El Archipiélago filipino*, Washington, Govt. Printing Office, 1900, vol. i, p. 260 gives the Christian population of the Philippines in 1896

and raising money to buy arms.¹ On August 13, a Spanish friar-curate of a town near Manila wrote to the same authority a letter wherein he spoke of "masons" and "separatists" and, after asserting that what the country needed was some "blood-letting", advised the "disappearance of two or three of the more prominent citizens".² All sorts of rumors were therefore in the air when, on August 19, the society was betrayed by Teodoro Patiño to Fray Mariano Gil, friar-curate of the suburb of Tondo.³

THE REVOLUTION, 1896-1897

At the time the *Katipunan* was betrayed, a decision had almost been reached by the members of the society, though not without a dissenting element, that the time to strike had come. On August 17, two days before the fateful discovery in the printing establishment of the *Diario de Manila* of the lithographic stone used by the *katipuneros* to print their receipts.⁴ Andrés Bonifacio and his associates had agreed, in a large meeting held in a village of the town of Kalookan, to begin the revolt. On August 20 another meeting held in Balintawak, definitely decided the matter and with the cry of "Long live the Philippine Republic" set August 30 as the date for a general assault on the capital.⁵ But the conflict began sooner. The first encounter was reported on the 23rd; another, on the 26th. On August 30, a large force under Bonifacio himself attempted to capture the powder magazine at San Juan del Monte, a town near Manila, and, undaunted by their failure to do so, proceeded

¹ Retana, *Archivo*, vol. iii, pp. 159 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*, pp. 168-169.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 171 *et seq.*

⁴ See affidavit of Fray Mariano Gil in Retana, *Archivo*, vol. iii, pp. 171 *et seq.*

⁵ Artigas, *Andrés Bonifacio y el Katipunan*, pp. 54-56.

to attack the Spanish detachment at Santa Mesa, a suburb of the capital.¹ Simultaneously, unmistakable signs of impending revolt manifested themselves in the neighboring provinces, and Governor-General Blanco immediately declared Manila, Bulacan, Pampanga, Nueva Écija, Tarlac, Laguna, Cavite, and Batangas under martial law.² The revolution was on.

Within the brief period of a month, the situation in central Luzon became extremely dangerous. After the first encounters in the province of Manila, the rebellion quickly spread to the nearby provinces. One after another, Cavite, Nueva Écija, Batangas, Laguna, Bataan, Bulacan and Morong raised the standard of revolt.³ Significant occurrences were going on at the same time in some of the more distant provinces where, though far from the seat of active *Katipunan* propaganda, popular discontent existed, due to the "reign of terror" inaugurated by the friar-curates and other Spanish residents to rid themselves of their influential enemies and rivals.⁴ There occurred, moreover, an outbreak in Passi, near Iloilo, and mutinies by native troops in Mindanao and Joló where *katipuneros* deported from Luzon had been at work. These events, however, appeared to be separate incidents;⁵ the real danger lay in the provinces of central Luzon.

The revolt was most successful in the province of Cavite, where Emilio Aguinaldo and his associates gained control of nearly the entire province from the start.⁶ It soon became apparent that, to stamp out the rebellion, Cavite must

¹ Taylor, vol. i, 27 FZ.

² *Gaceta de Manila*, August 30, 1896, p. 965.

³ Sastrón, *La Insurrección en Filipinas*, pp. 230, 238, 244, 252, 285.

⁴ LeRoy, *The Americans in the Philippines*, vol. i, p. 91.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 91-92.

⁶ Sastrón, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

be retaken. Both sides, as if by mutual consent, prepared for the impending conflict. Aguinaldo not only organized his followers into an army where nearly every one, according to Taylor, of the 141,250 inhabitants of Cavite had a place,¹ but also turned the province into an entrenched camp.² Governor-General Blanco, on the other hand, ordered all the available troops in the southern islands of the Philippines to concentrate in Manila, asked reinforcements from Spain and called for volunteers to defend the country. By the end of September, he had in Manila and in the town of Cavite some 6,000 men, and on October 1 decided to begin an offensive campaign.³ His forces were opposed "not by an army but by a people in arms", and his campaign was a failure. His enemies, who had been chafing under the restraint of his relatively humane policy toward the natives⁴—Blanco being really a liberal at heart—took advantage of his failure to pacify Cavite and procured his recall.

It is useless to theorize as to whether Blanco would have succeeded or not in conciliating the insurgents and bringing them back into the fold, had he been allowed to remain in office long enough to give his "policy of attraction"⁵ a thorough trial. It is probable that he really underestimated the seriousness of the situation; yet it is also quite probable that his comparative moderation, in the long run, would have been effective in holding the less radical element, then the more numerous portion of the population, from supporting the rebellion in any form. But surrounded as he

¹ Taylor, vol. i, 28 FZ.

² *Ibid.*, 27 FZ.

³ *Ibid.*, 29 FZ.

⁴ Ramón Blanco, *Memoria que al senado dirige... acerca los últimos sucesos ocurridos en la Isla de Luzon*, Madrid, 1897, p. 68.

⁵ *Gaceta de Manila*, October 20, 1896, p. 2062.

was by his reactionary countrymen, clerical and lay alike, he was not permitted to work out an independent line of action. His coolness exasperated the more temperamental among them, and it may have been just as well that his services were dispensed with, since any effort on his part would undoubtedly have been frustrated by the unrelenting opposition of his enemies.¹

Camilo G. de Polavieja, who relieved Blanco on December 13, was an entirely different man from his predecessor. His policy was essentially the reverse. He was "the chosen Messiah of the friars". On his assumption of the government, he said: "For those who are loyal, I have nothing but sentiments of affection and protection; for the traitors, the greatest energy appears to me insufficient, the greatest rigor out of proportion to the magnitude of the crime which they have committed against their King and fatherland. . . ." ² His rule was a veritable "reign of terror".

The toll of arrest and executions under Blanco was large enough; under Polavieja it became much larger. The execution by the former of fifty-seven insurgents in Manila on August 31, and of thirteen innocent men in Cavite in September, pales into insignificance when compared with Polavieja's savagery. The capital city resembled "a huge Inquisition". "There came a time in Manila", says Le Roy, "when executions on the Luneta³ had grown so numerous and were felt, even by Polavieja, to be so demoralizing . . . that he put forth a special decree authorizing courts-martial under the brigade commanders." ⁴ One of his numerous victims was José Rizal.

With the exception of the introduction of reconcentra-

¹ LeRoy, *The Americans in the Philippines*, vol. i, pp. 94 et seq.

² *Gaceta de Manila*, December 14, 1896, p. 2286.

³ A fashionable promenade in Manila.

⁴ *The Americans in the Philippines*, vol. i, p. 99.

tion in the seven provinces surrounding Manila, General Polavieja's military plan was essentially the same as his predecessor's. Like Blanco, he tried to segregate Cavite from the rest of the provinces, and there give the rebellion its death blow.¹ He had at his disposal an army considerably larger,² and the advantage, moreover, of the dry season. He began the offensive against Cavite on February 14, 1897, a campaign which lasted fifty-two days, with a loss to the operating division of 15 officers and 168 men killed, and 56 officers and 910 men wounded.³ On the whole the offensive was well conducted and the insurgent position badly shaken, but it did not succeed in stamping out the rebellion. Polavieja's successor, Primo de Rivera, says that when he came to assume command about two thirds of the territory of Cavite province were still in insurgent hands, to say nothing of their strength in other provinces.⁴ Polavieja returned to Spain on April 15 broken in health, leaving behind him the Archipelago far from peaceful.

So far, the revolution was largely a *Katipunan* affair. It is true that, in Cavite and elsewhere, thousands of men who had never been initiated into the society had joined the fighting ranks, but it is also true that direction and leadership had remained thus far in *Katipunan* hands. Andrés Bonifacio was still the *Supremo*. But other leaders had gained prominence in the provinces through valor or military exploits, and after the first flush of success, it was felt

¹ Taylor, vol. i, 30 FZ.

² Foreman gives the number of men available as 28,000 Europeans, to say nothing of native auxiliaries. See John Foreman, *The Philippine Islands*, Shanghai, 1906, p. 378.

³ Federico de Monteverde, *Campaña de Filipinas, la división de Lachambre*, Madrid, 1898, pp. 580-581.

⁴ F. Primo de Rivera, *Memoria dirigida al Senado... acerca de su gestión en Filipinas*, Madrid, 1898, pp. 21 et seq.

that a more thorough organization was needed, one not only better but broader and more comprehensive than the existing machinery, one that could bring about a more perfect union and prevent the various provincial councils from wrangling with one another, and more effectively meet the ever increasing needs of the revolution. In other words, the movement was beginning to take on a new phase; it was fast outgrowing its *Katipunan* mould.

The first attempt to break away from the authority of the *Katipunan* occurred as early as October 31, 1896, just nine weeks after the outbreak, when Emilio Aguinaldo, himself a *katipunero*, issued a manifesto¹ entitled "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity" in which he outlined a proposed revolutionary government, republican in form and "similar to that of the U. S. A.", and invited all good men to support it. The second attempt took place toward the end of December, when a *Katipunan* convention was held in the town of Imus, in the province of Cavite, for the purpose of uniting the two provincial councils of that province and checking thereby the rivalry between them, and of adopting a proposed constitution.² Nothing definite, however, was accomplished beyond the adoption of an agreement that another convention invested with power to decide this question should be held at some later time.³ The third step was taken on March 22, 1897, when a second convention, presumably

¹Text in Teodoro M. Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales sobre Filipinas*, pt. ii, pp. 8-9. This work, though unpublished, is in convenient, mimeographed form. It was undertaken in 1915 and 1916 with the help of the late Mariano Ponce for the Philippine Assembly of which Mr. Kalaw was then secretary.

²Ricarte, *Apuntes históricos*, sec. 31.

³*Ibid.*, sec. 31. E. de los Santos, however, believes that a constitution was adopted in the convention of Imus, and that the subsequent convention at Tejeros was held for the election of officers in accordance with the provision of that constitution. See his "Andrés Bonifacio," *loc. cit.*, p. 53.

larger and more representative than the preceding one, was held in Tejeros,¹ San Francisco de Malabon, under the presidency of Andrés Bonifacio. It was here that an agreement was reached, in spite of the opposition of certain elements, to create a revolutionary organization that would replace the *Katipunan* supreme council and take charge of general affairs. In the election of officers that followed, the following were chosen: President, Emilio Aguinaldo; Vice-President, Mariano Trías; General-in-Chief (*Capitán General*), Artemio Ricarte; Director of War, Emiliano Riego de Dios; and Director of the Interior, Andrés Bonifacio. The remaining officials, namely, a Director of State, a Director of Finance (*Hacienda*), and a Director of Grace and Justice were chosen at another election, held in the town of Naik a month later.² A new Director of the Interior was elected on the same occasion, for Andrés Bonifacio refused to accept the office and to recognize the new authority.³

The transition from the *Katipunan* to the revolutionary organization was not accomplished without difficulties. Andrés Bonifacio "believed in the vindicating virtue of

¹ Ricarte, *op. cit.*, sec. 34. Mabini in his *Revolución filipina*, ch. viii, gives the date of the convention at Tejeros as of March 12, but a written agreement signed the day following by many of those present and printed by Santos in his "Andrés Bonifacio," *loc. cit.*, pp. 46-47, shows that March 22 is the correct one.

² See letter giving full list of elected officials, in Taylor, vol. i, exhibit 28, 95 FZ. The same list is found in Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, pp. 14, 16; but see a slightly different list in Ricarte, *op. cit.*, sec. 35.

³ See *Philippine Insurgent Records*, A4, for signed testimony of Andrés Bonifacio before the investigating judge (*juez instructor*). The *Philippine Insurgent Records* are a documentary collection composed of the records of the defunct Philippine Republic and other Philippine papers acquired by the United States Army and deposited in the archives of the Bureau of Insular Affairs. To prevent confusion with Taylor's *Philippine Insurgent Records*, this collection will hereafter be designated, whenever cited, as simply the *P. I. R.*

the association he had founded, and his mission was one of defending and propagating it and leading it to victory".¹ Emilio Jacinto had much the same opinion; for as late as February, 1898, he was still laboring to further the interests of the society in Laguna.² There were many who, in deference to Bonifacio, opposed a change; but they were in the minority, and in the end yielded to the wishes of the stronger party. The new organization was acclaimed apparently by all. Then Bonifacio, who had agreed with the rest to abide by the decision of the majority and who presided over the convention at Tejeros, refused to recognize the validity of the elections held under its auspices and the authority of the government set up. He was arrested by order of Aguinaldo, and tried before a court-martial presided over by General Mariano Noriel.³ Convicted of sedition, the court-martial sentenced him to be shot, but Aguinaldo commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life. This act of grace, however, proved ineffective, for he was finally executed at Mount Buntis on May 10, just as Primo de Rivera's victorious forces were making themselves masters of Cavite province.

Opinions differ as to how far Aguinaldo was responsible for the death of Bonifacio. Apolinario Mabini, who thinks the execution unjustifiable, lays the entire blame on Aguinaldo's "personal ambition".⁴ Epifanio de los Santos, on the other hand, believes that it was not only justified but inevitable, because of Bonifacio's plan to head a counter-revolution, of "the pressure of the enemy, who was then

¹ Santos, "Andrés Bonifacio," *loc. cit.*, p. 56.

² See Emilio Jacinto's *Sangguniang Hukuman* already referred to.

³ The complete record of the proceedings of the courtmartial of Bonifacio is reproduced in English in Taylor, vol. i, exhibit 30, 95 FZ-99 FZ, 1 LY-2 LY.

⁴ *La Revolución filipina*, ch. viii.

sweeping Cavite with a broom of lead and steel, the pressure of those outside, among them Zulueta and Jocson" (insurgent leaders from Manila); and, more than all, the terrible general panic.¹ All these factors undoubtedly operated to bring about his death, and it is not easy to state categorically which of them was dominant.

Although the establishment of the revolutionary government meant actually the dissolution of the *Katipunan*, the spirit of the association did not vanish until after the death of Bonifacio. The society was kept up merely as a matter of form, and appealed to only whenever it could serve some useful purpose. Its supreme authority had been taken over by the revolutionary government and its unifying force replaced by another, more subtle but no less effective, namely, the growing consciousness of nationality. This new factor which had begun to take form soon after the middle of the 19th century,² enabled Emilio Aguinaldo and his associates to continue the revolution, as Andrés Bonifacio and Emilio Jacinto had succeeded in launching it.

Meanwhile General Primo de Rivera had assumed the office vacated by Polavieja. Like his immediate predecessors, he sought to end the rebellion by dealing the mortal blow at Cavite. On April 30, 1897, he began a campaign of twenty days, after which he considered himself master of the province.³ He was, and the insurgent leaders from elsewhere left the province and returned to their own, there to continue the struggle. Aguinaldo himself, on June 10, eluded the Spanish forces, and with a small band of devoted

¹ "Andrés Bonifacio," *loc. cit.*, p. 54.

² Leandro H. Fernández, "The Formation of Filipino Nationality," in *Celebración del cuarto centenario del descubrimiento de Filipinas por Fernando Magallanes*, Manila, Bureau of Printing, 1921, pp. 37-48; LeRoy, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 33-78.

³ Primo de Rivera, *Memoria*, pp. 35-54.

followers passed "within sight and hearing of Manila" and went on to the mountains of San Mateo, and thence to Biacnabato in Bulacan.¹

Organized resistance in Cavite was broken at last, but contrary to a long-standing expectation this did not end the rebellion. Had this achievement been accomplished earlier, during Blanco's rule, the effect might have been different. But taking place as it did after the rebellion has had time to organize in a fashion in the provinces of central Luzon and after Aguinaldo had been acclaimed by the chief leaders,² the loss of Cavite, although greatly felt, did not put an end to the revolutionary forces. There was a brief lull, as if between two storms, during which time the forces formerly concentrated in Cavite were being redistributed in other provinces and joined with other commands. July and August were comparatively peaceful months. But Primo de Rivera himself, who had a tendency to underrate the strength of the insurrection after his successful drive in Cavite, was not altogether insensible to the actual conditions.³ In September, the conflict was renewed, and engagements took place in Laguna, Batangas, Tayabas, Pampanga and Nueva Écija. By October, guerrilla warfare had extended to Príncipe, Tarlac and Pangasinan,⁴ and Primo de Rivera confessed that without the help of the Filipinos themselves it would be quite impossible to suppress it and restore peace.⁵

The Spanish victory in Cavite and the vigorous policy kept up by Primo de Rivera thereafter made nevertheless

¹ Santos, "Andrés Bonifacio," *loc. cit.*, p. 54. See also Manuel Sastrón, *La Insurrección en Filipinas y guerra hispano-americana en el Archipiélago*, Madrid, 1901, p. 280.

² Santos, "Andrés Bonifacio," *loc. cit.*, *passim*.

³ Primo de Rivera, *Memoria*, p. 65.

⁴ Taylor, vol. i, 33 FZ.

⁵ Primo de Rivera, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

a profound impression on the revolutionary leaders. The Spanish offensive did not dishearten them completely, but it made them hesitate and extremely cautious. Thereafter they thought it wise to fortify themselves in inaccessible retreats and resort to guerrilla tactics. "In this manner", says Aguinaldo in his proclamation of September 6, "we can fight Spain for an indefinite period, wear out her resources and oblige her to give up through sheer weakness. . . . It is absolutely necessary to prolong the war and give the strongest possible evidence of our strength, so that Spain will be forced to concede what we desire."¹ Accordingly, each military commander established himself with his men in some safe retreat within the province or region of his command. Aguinaldo himself, surrounded by some of the most distinguished revolutionary leaders, selected the mountain fastness of Biacnabato as the seat of the revolutionary government. From this place he issued orders to his officers from time to time and directed the campaign. Bulacan, therefore, became the center of resistance and the theater of operations was shifted from Cavite to that province. General Polavieja well said before leaving for home: "Cavite is the scandal, but Bulacan is the danger."²

That Aguinaldo and his companions in arms had no intention to surrender is shown, not only by the determined spirit of the proclamation just referred to, but by other evidence. In July, 1897, a further proclamation issued from Biacnabato with Aguinaldo's signature contained a general appeal to support the revolution, and was directed to all—"Filipinos, Asiatics, Americans and Europeans"—who made their home in the Philippines. It condemned the Spanish rule as oppressive, corrupt and tyrannical. "The

¹ Taylor, vol. i, exhibit 44, 11 LY.

² Quoted in LeRoy, *The Americans in the Philippines*, vol. i, p. 122.

protests of the natives and the petitions sent through peaceful channels," it says, "produced only silence and contempt. All who had dared to address the Spanish Government were answered with insult, ridicule, deportation and confiscation of property." "Enough of scandals," it continued, "to arms, Sons of the Nation. Impelled by the common good, we aspire to Liberty and Independence."¹ Moreover, in a large gathering of revolutionary leaders, held at Biacnabato toward the end of October,² a decision was reached to continue the war. On November 1 a constitution was adopted, bearing the following preamble:

The separation of the Philippines from the Spanish Monarchy, Constituting itself an independent and sovereign State with its own government, under the name of the Republic of the Philippines, is the end pursued by the revolution in its present war which began on August 24, 1896. In its name and in representation of the Filipino people, the representatives of the revolution, interpreting faithfully its wishes and aspirations, and convoked in a constituent assembly at Biacnabato on the first of November, 1897, have voted unanimously the following articles of the Constitution of the State.³

In accordance with the instrument, generally known as the "constitution of Biacnabato", a supreme council of government was installed as follows: Emilio Aguinaldo, President; Mariano Trias, Vice-President; Isabelo Artacho, Secretary of the Interior; Antonio Montenegro, Secretary of Foreign Affairs; Baldomero Aguinaldo (a cousin of Emilio and one

¹ Text in T. M. Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 4 *et seq.*

² Pedro A. Paterno, *El Pacto de Biacnabato*, Manila, 1910, pp. 111-113; Taylor, vol. i, 36 FZ.

³ Text in T. M. Kalaw, *op. cit.*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 13 *et seq.*

of the prominent insurgent leaders), Secretary of the Treasury; and Emilio Riego de Dios, Secretary of War.¹

Thus the struggle dragged on. December came, but there appeared little prospect for the country's pacification. The situation was well described by Primo de Rivera himself in a speech in the Cortes on June 11, 1898. He said (Taylor's translation) :

I felt certain that in a short time after the opening of the dry season . . . I should capture Biacnabato, where they had their principal stronghold, their military headquarters and extensive fortifications. This may be taken for granted, as Biacnabato could have been taken by any general of the army with the means then at my disposal. But I could not be held responsible, if the flag in the hands of Aguinaldo should slip away through the mountains and be raised in some other place. . . .

The worthy Minister of War said to me like a soldier: "If there could be any certainty of ending the war by force of arms," and I answered him loyally: "I can take Biacnabato, why should I not? Any military man can take it. That which I can not answer for is there crush the rebellion."²

TRUCE OF BIACNABATO

Attempts to bring about a cessation of hostilities and the restoration of peace, not by force of arms but on the basis of mutual concessions, had been made by certain Spaniards as early as March, 1897.³ Nothing substantial, however, was accomplished until Pedro A. Paterno, a prominent citi-

¹ *P. I. R.*, Pa. 306.

² Taylor, vol. i, exhibit 37, 8 LY. Though the English of Taylor's translation is occasionally poor, the substance is fairly correct.

³ Felipe G. Calderón, *Mis Memorias sobre la revolución filipina*, Manila, 1907, pp. 10-11. Mr. Calderón was a prominent Manila attorney who later in September, 1898, became a member of the Filipino Congress, and was largely the author of the constitution adopted in Malolos.

zen of Manila, a lawyer and former propagandist, decided to play the part of intermediary. This gentleman, with the consent of Primo de Rivera, journeyed to Biacnabato in the first week of August, and appeared on the ninth of that month before Emilio Aguinaldo, presenting to the latter a letter signed by himself, in which he urged the termination of the war and the negotiation of a treaty of peace on the basis of reforms and actual pardon.¹ In the months that followed, Paterno worked hard to win the insurgent leaders over to his peace program, visiting them individually in their hiding places and journeying back and forth between Manila and Biacnabato with proposals and counter-proposals.² The negotiations dragged on for over four months without apparent success. At least two preliminary proposals, one dated August 9, and another dated November 14 and 15, had been made³ before the final agreement was reached. What amounted to the final pact, was signed on December 14 and 15⁴ and ratified by a revolutionary assembly on December 20.

The proposal of August 9 sets forth the conditions under which the revolutionary leaders would be willing to lay down their arms. Briefly speaking, they may be classified under two heads, namely, money payment, and reforms. The sum of three million dollars (Mexican)⁵ was asked as an in-

¹ Text in Taylor, vol. i, exhibit 38, 8 LY.

² Paterno, *El Pacto de Biacnabato*, *passim*.

³ The texts of the proposals of August 9 and November 14 and 15 are printed in Paterno, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-48, 139-149. See also Taylor, vol. i, exhibit 39, 9 LY-10 LY, exhibit 51, 15 LY-16 LY, and exhibit 53, 16 LY-17 LY.

⁴ The final papers, of which there were three, are printed in Taylor, vol. i, exhibit 59, 19 LY-20 LY, and exhibit 55, 17 LY-18 LY. Two of them are also in Paterno, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-188 but not the third one.

⁵ All sums mentioned in connection with the pact of Biacnabato, unless otherwise stated, are in Mexican dollars.

demnity for those in arms and those who, though not in arms, had made common cause with the combatants and were therefore suffering the consequences of war.¹ The insurgent leaders, moreover, were to have the option, after laying down their arms, of establishing their residence either in the Philippines or in some foreign country. On their part, the revolutionists promised to cease fighting and to guarantee peace for a period of three years, during which time the introduction of certain reforms was to take place. The main reforms asked for were:

I. Expulsion of the religious orders, or at least dissolution of the monasteries.

II. Representation of the Philippines in the Spanish Cortes.

III. Application of actual justice in the Philippines, equally for natives and Spaniards. Identity (*unidad*) of laws between Spain and the Philippines. Participation of Filipinos in the chief positions of the civil administration.

IV. Readjustment of property, of the parishes and of taxation in favor of the native.

V. Proclamation of the individual rights of the native, of freedom of assembly and of the press.²

On August 13, Paterno saw the Governor-General. According to Paterno, that official, on reading the terms demanded by Aguinaldo, treated the document as if it had not been received, declaring that he had no power to grant such reforms, which the Cortes alone could authorize. Primo de Rivera, moreover, stated that the sum asked was too large.³ To save the negotiation from failure, Paterno exerted his influence with the revolutionary leaders to the breaking point in an attempt to have them drop extreme

¹ Paterno, *El Pacto de Biacnabato*, pp. 43-45.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47.

³ Primo de Rivera, *Memoria*, pp. 130-131; Paterno, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-96.

claims. This move was fraught with dangers, as many of the insurgents were decidedly against peace.¹ But Paterno persisted and finally, on November 14, succeeded in obtaining from Aguinaldo another proposal.

The new proposal appeared in two documents: one in which Paterno was named arbitrator for the insurgents, and another denominated "program". The content of the first document is quite similar to that of the proposal of August 9, and couched in much the same language; but it does not specify the amount demanded and omits the enumeration of the principal reforms asked. It does state, however, that the revolutionary leaders were consenting to lay down their arms in expectation that the Spanish Government would grant reforms and actual pardon, and a sum of money for the purposes mentioned in the previous proposal.² The "program" makes it clear that the sum in question for those in arms was 800,000 dollars.³

Primo de Rivera, who had been seen by Paterno in San Fernando, Pampanga, and there informed of the latest development, gave the new proposal instant consideration. On November 18, an act of agreement, based on it was drawn up. Paterno then returned to Biacnabato for further consultation with Aguinaldo, and Primo de Rivera cabled Madrid for authority. On November 20, the Governor-General was authorized "to conclude negotiations at once".⁴ On December 12, Paterno, accompanied by two insurgent leaders from Biacnabato, returned to Manila with instructions from Aguinaldo and the supreme council of the revolutionary government to enter upon the agreement.⁵ The

¹ *Supra*, p. 33.

² Paterno, *El Pacto de Biacnabato*, pp. 139 *et seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 146 *et seq.*

⁴ *Vide* telegram in Taylor, vol. i, exhibit 36, 6 LY.

⁵ *Vide* article written by José Barroso, a Spanish journalist, in Taylor, vol. i, exhibit 65, 22 LY.

following day, the Governor-General received another telegram from Madrid, authorizing him "to accept the surrender of the rebels and their Government. . . ." ¹ The final papers, then, three in all, were signed on December 14 and 15, by Primo de Rivera for the Spanish Government, and Paterno for the insurgents. They consisted of a "program", different from the "program" of the November proposal, the act of agreement drafted on November 18 (both documents were signed on December 14), and a third document signed on December 15.

According to Paterno, who does not mention the act of agreement, another paper embodying the reforms asked in the proposal of August 9, was signed also by Primo de Rivera.² Singularly enough, he does not print the text of this document as he does with the rest, but after listing what apparently are pertinent portions of the proposal of August 9, contents himself with the bare statement that the paper had been turned over to General Aguinaldo. It might be that he was referring to the act of agreement. If this be so, it should be stated that that document does not reproduce the portions of the August proposal which deal with reforms. If his reference, however, was to an altogether different document, until such a paper is produced the evidence is decidedly against his assertion, which is contradicted by both Primo de Rivera³ and Aguinaldo.⁴

Examination of the papers signed on December 14 and 15 reveals at once the fact that the three documents were meant to be complementary to one another. Contrary to a prevailing belief, there is, strictly speaking, no single docu-

¹ See telegram in Foreman, *The Philippine Islands*, ed., 1906, p. 415.

² Paterno, *El Pacto de Biacnabato*, pp. 177-178.

³ *Memoria*, p. 142.

⁴ Emilio Aguinaldo, *Reseña verídica de la revolución filipina*, Tarlac, 1899, sec. ii.

ment that can be called the "pact". The terms that made possible the temporary cessation of hostilities are found in no single document, but in all three together; hence, to understand these terms, the three must be considered.

From the first document, i. e. the "program", it is clear that Primo de Rivera conceded the payment of 800,000 dollars to those in arms, and agreed to let Aguinaldo and some of his companions go into voluntary exile in Hong-kong. The payment was to be made in three instalments, as follows: (1) 400,000 dollars on the departure of Aguinaldo and his companions from Biacnabato; (2) 200,000 when the number of arms surrendered exceeded 700, one half of which must be modern; and (3) the remaining 200,000 when the *Te Deum* was sung and general amnesty proclaimed. No mention is made of the sum destined for the indemnification of those not in arms, nor of the reforms asked for by the insurgents.

The second document, i. e. the act of agreement, iterates the pledge made "to grant an ample and general amnesty" to those who lay down their arms, and the privilege freely to fix their residence "in any portion of Spanish territory or abroad". It repeats the financial stipulation made in the "program" without, however, fixing the sum. Again, no mention is made of the intended indemnification of those not in arms. The document alludes, in two different places, to the desire of the Filipinos for reforms; but neither allusion can be construed as an agreement on the part of the Spanish Government to grant them.

The third document, i. e. that signed on December 15, is brief and to the point. It deals principally with the question of indemnity, stated as 1,700,000 dollars, of which sum 800,000 was to be paid to those in arms in the manner already described, and the rest to be distributed to others who, though not in arms, were suffering from the effects

of the war.¹ This document also makes no mention of reforms.

From the conditions expressly laid down in these papers, it is evident that no promise to grant reforms was made formally by Primo de Rivera. But was a verbal promise made? Dismissing Paterno's allegation as unproven,² Aguinaldo and Primo de Rivera's conflicting testimonies remain. According to Aguinaldo, Primo de Rivera did promise on his honor as a gentleman and a soldier to suppress the religious corporations and to establish political and administrative autonomy, but requested to have this agreement unrecorded as to do otherwise would be most humiliating to the Spanish Government.³ On the other hand, Primo de Rivera says: "Money, only money and the security of their persons were discussed; the reforms were abandoned from the beginning. No one, not even Paterno, spoke of reforms, after they had been told that Her Majesty's Government would introduce such reforms as it deemed wise."⁴ The truth of the matter will probably never be definitely known. But it is well to state that, whereas Aguinaldo's position has never been proven right (though it is quite possible that Paterno had led him to believe this), Primo de Rivera's assertion is certainly wrong; for it was not true that "the reforms were abandoned from the beginning." On the contrary, the Filipinos talked of reforms to the very end of the negotiations. The peace

¹ It is curious that this document was not signed on December 14 with the other two. Moreover, it is rather unusual that neither Aguinaldo (in the *Reseña*) nor Ricarte (in the *Apuntes*) speaks of the sum of 900,000 dollars herewith set aside "for the families of those who were not rebels in arms . . . who likewise have suffered the evils of war . . ."

² *Supra*, p. 39.

³ *Reseña verídica*, sec. ii.

⁴ *Memoria*, p. 142.

proposal of August 9, that of November 14, and the act of agreement signed on December 14, all in one form or another spoke of reforms.

Indeed, there is every reason to believe that the insurgent leaders, in laying down their arms, did so confident that the Spanish Government in return would undertake seriously the introduction of reforms. Primo de Rivera knew it. How far he was responsible for this confidence on the part of the insurgents is hard to tell; but it is significant to note in this connection that he was personally in favor of introducing reforms,¹ and was anxious to conclude the pact on the ground, as elsewhere pointed out, that peace could not be secured by force of arms alone. Then, too, he allowed Paterno in representation of Aguinaldo and his associates to declare formally, over his signature and that of the latter, in the act of agreement, that the Filipinos expected "with confidence from the far-seeing Government of His Majesty that the latter will take into consideration the aspirations of the Filipino people in order to assure it peace and well-being. . . ." ² Moreover, did he not say himself that "Her Majesty's Government would introduce such reforms as it deemed wise"? It is significant that this fond hope for reforms finds expression in Aguinaldo's parting message to Primo de Rivera, sent as the vessel that was to take him and his companions into exile weighed anchor. The message says in part:

Those who were Filipino rebels, on leaving the land of their birth, send their farewell greetings, not without profound emotion and with tears in their eyes, leaving in the hands of Your Excellency the guardianship of their homes and the protection of the soil where first they saw the light of day. All are confident that Spain, impelled by right and justice, will grant

¹ Primo de Rivera, *Memoria*, pp. 169 *et seq.*

² *Vide* last paragraph of act of agreement already cited.

reforms without bloodshed or combat, since so much blood has already stained the soil of Luzon . . . ¹

The papers having been properly signed and ratified by the revolutionary leaders gathered in an assembly *ad hoc*,² the peace was now considered an accomplished fact. In the evening of December 23, Generals Celestino Tejeiro and Ricardo Monet arrived in Biacnabato, there to remain as hostages as provided for in the "program" of the "pact". On December 27, Aguinaldo and twenty-five others, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Miguel Primo de Rivera, a nephew of the Governor-General, and Captain Celestino Espinosa, left for Hongkong on the steamer "Uranus". Several insurgent officials remained behind at Biacnabato charged by the supreme council of the revolutionary government with the execution of the agreement.³ On December 28, Primo de Rivera cabled Madrid that "the program has been carried out precisely". The surrender of arms began on December 31, and continued throughout January and the early part of February following. An inventory of the arms and munitions surrendered shows that there were turned in 458 rifles, mostly Remingtons and Mausers; 724 muskets and other firearms; 120 *lantakas* (small native cannon); 20 revolvers and pistols; 796 sabers, bolos and spears; and 13,992 rounds of ammunition.⁴ In the morning of January 23, 1898, a solemn *Te Deum* was sung in the Cathedral at Manila; moreover, the Governor-General proclaimed January 30, 31, and February 1 holidays to enable all to

¹ Taylor, vol. i, exhibit 65, 23 LY; T. M. Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, p. 19.

² *Vide* act of ratification in Paterno, *op. cit.*, pp. 189 *et seq.*

³ Taylor, vol. i, exhibit 61, 20 LY.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. i, exhibit 79, 32 LY.

participate in the celebrations.¹ The long looked-for peace was apparently at hand, and the revolution, on the surface at least, over.

RECRUDESCENCE OF THE REVOLUTION, 1898

January, a month of jubilation and general rejoicing, and February, a month of "peace", soon passed away. March came, and Primo de Rivera, a recipient of the Grand Cross of St. Ferdinand from a grateful government, prepared to return to Spain. But hardly was the first week of March over when fresh disturbances occurred in the provinces of Zambales and Pangasinan, and thereafter unmistakable signs of impending danger showed themselves. The outward calm was broken and disorders were reported in place after place. Primo de Rivera, for whose benefit a subscription had been raised in Manila, felt himself obliged, before leaving for the homeland, to decline the gift. Given the prevailing conditions, it was vain to expect peace. The hopelessness of the situation forced itself even on the most enthusiastic optimists. Referring to this period, Manuel Sastrón sarcastically says: *Pax, pax, et non erat pax.*²

Several factors combined to bring about this unfortunate state of affairs. In the first place, the Spanish government in the Philippines failed to pay the full indemnity stipulated in the agreement of Biacnabato. Of the sum of 800,000 dollars promised "for the rebels in arms", only 600,000 were ever paid at all,³ when, according to the pact, the whole

¹ *Gaceta de Manila*, January 23, 1898 (special number).

² Sastrón, *La Insurrección en Filipinas, y guerra hispano-americana*, p. 311.

³ The first installment of 400,000 dollars was paid to Aguinaldo before his departure for Hongkong—the whole sum was deposited by him on January 2 with the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank (see Aguinaldo's account book in *P. I. R.* 54-9); the second installment of 200,000 was paid in varying sums to Paterno and certain insurgent leaders throughout the month of January and after (see *P. I. R.* Pa. 306); the third installment—another sum of 200,000 dollars—was not paid, but Primo de Rivera says that he turned the amount over to his successor.

sum should have been paid by January 23, the day the *Te Deum* was sung in the Manila Cathedral. Of the remaining 900,000 dollars, the sum intended "for the families of those who were not rebels in arms", not a dollar was paid. The whole transaction may have been "a demoralizing one from beginning to end", but it is hard to see how a failure to carry out the stipulations could have been expected to improve a bad bargain. In the second place, the "general amnesty" promised in the pact was not rigorously carried out. On the contrary, "persons who had been implicated in the rebellion were rearrested on trivial trumped-up charges and imprisoned, whilst others were openly treated as seditious suspects. The priests started a furious campaign of persecution, and sought, by all manner of intrigue, to destroy the compact, which they feared would operate against themselves."¹ In the third place, the failure of the administration to introduce reforms greatly aggravated the situation. As already pointed out, Aguinaldo and his associates, rightly or wrongly, expected that some changes were forthcoming; indeed, there were many, insurgents and otherwise, who thought that the introduction of reforms was one of the concessions definitely granted in the pact of Biacnabato. A feeling of sullen anger, therefore, grew as it became more and more apparent that the old régime was meant to continue, together with its sinister practices of clerical denunciations and summary trials.

In this connection, it is well to state that Spain, by stubbornly refusing to mend its decaying colonial system, lost a great opportunity to reentrench itself in the affection and good will of the natives. It should be remembered that the revolution had remained to the close of the year 1897 a local movement and that even in central Luzon, the region most greatly affected, there was a strong conservative element.

¹ Foreman, *The Philippine Islands*, ed., 1906, pp. 399-400.

that asked nothing beyond the introduction of certain reforms. For example, as late as February 10, 1898, a group of influential Filipinos, resident in Madrid, in a manifesto.¹ addressed to the Queen significantly pointed out that "the conservative class of the Archipelago" were "lovers of Spain from motives of purest affection and even selfishness". The manifesto enumerates certain reforms considered necessary by the petitioners, among which were: (a) freedom of speech, press and association; (b) separation of the civil from the military authority; (c) participation of Filipinos in the more responsible positions of the administration, and improvement of the civil service by the adoption of competitive examinations; (d) expulsion of the religious orders; (e) representation of the Archipelago in the Spanish Cortes; and (f) extension of higher education and secularization of secondary and advanced instruction in all its branches. None of these changes was incompatible with the full exercise of Spanish sovereignty; and had the mother-country chosen to meet its wards half-way at least as Primo de Rivera himself recommended,² the result might have been different. But those in authority preferred to accomplish the harder task, namely, to return to *ante bellum* conditions, and paid no attention to the warning given in the manifesto just mentioned, which says: "the maltreatment of colonies has caused many nations their loss; but the concession of liberties of the amplest sort, never."

Moreover, it is not clear just what motive or motives animated the revolutionary leaders in accepting the pact of

¹ Text headed *A la nación, manifiesto-programa de la colonia filipina reformista residente en Madrid, 10 de Febrero de 1898* and signed by thirteen names representing twelve different provinces, in T. M. Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 28 et seq.

² Primo de Rivera, *Memoria*, pp. 169 et seq.

Biacnabato; neither is it certain that in agreeing to lay down their arms they sincerely abandoned all hopes of a future rising. In fact, there are indications that seem to point to a different conclusion. These may be taken up *seriatim*.

In the first place, the insurgent leaders laid down their arms, not as vanquished rebels, "begging for their lives, and craving the means of existence," but as unconquered revolutionists, who were, according to the pact itself, actuated by a consideration of the country's welfare; again, the agreement of Biacnabato, far from being concluded on a basis of unconditional surrender, had all the appearance of a deal between equals. There was, of course, no formal recognition of the insurgent government, but acts are sometimes as significant as documents. For example, the insurgents demanded and obtained an indemnity; they demanded and obtained two hostages from the Spanish Government as a guarantee against treachery; they designated certain persons and invested them with powers to represent the insurgent government after Aguinaldo's departure, and the Manila government actually treated with these men. Indeed, Aguinaldo, referring to this transaction later, spoke of it as a deal between the Spanish Government and an "internal sovereignty established at Biacnabato."¹

Second, according to the official inventory signed by Baldomero Aguinaldo, Pío del Pilar and Urbano Lacuna for the insurgents, and Miguel Primo de Rivera for the Spanish Government, the total number of firearms (rifles, muskets, etc., but excluding *lantakas*, revolvers and pistols) surrendered was 1,182.² But even the most conservative estimate upon which reliance may be placed fixes the number of firearms the insurgents had at a much higher figure. For ex-

¹ P. I. R. 54-59.

² Taylor, vol. i, exhibit 79, 32 LY.

ample, Primo de Rivera puts the number at 1,500;¹ Federico de Monteverde, at 15,000;² whereas Taylor thinks that the first estimate is too low, and the second too high.³ Taking Primo de Rivera's estimate, which is probably as nearly correct as any, why were not all the firearms surrendered?

* Third, what was the real intention of the insurgent leaders in accepting the money indemnity? The agreement stipulates that "His Excellency . . . shall provide the necessary means of subsistence to those who surrender . . . in view of the painful condition to which they have been reduced by the war, dealing for that purpose only with Emilio Aguinaldo, through the intermediary. . . ." and setting aside the sum of 800,000 dollars "for the rebels in arms."⁴ But, according to Aguinaldo, "the revolutionists at Biacnabato" agreed that, "in case the Spaniards did not live up to the agreement, the money received would not be divided but would be destined for the purchase of arms to renew the war."⁵ Whatever their real intention had been, Aguinaldo certainly deposited the entire sum, first in the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, and part of it later in the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China.⁶ Subsequently, as portions of the funds were withdrawn from the banks, he set aside a good deal of the money for the pur-

¹ *Memoria*, p. 24.

² *Campaña de Filipinas*, p. 78.

³ Taylor, vol. i, 28 FZ.

⁴ See documents signed on December 14 and 15, already cited

⁵ *Reseña verídica*, sec. iii.

⁶ *Vide* Aguinaldo's account book already cited in *P. I. R.* 54-59; also Taylor, vol. i, 40 FZ-41 FZ. Of the 400,000 dollars deposited in the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank for one year at 2% interest, 200,000 was withdrawn by Aguinaldo on January 4 and redeposited in the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China for one year at 4% interest, but with the privilege of withdrawing 50,000 every quarter.

chase of arms and war supplies.¹ Isabelo Artacho, a high functionary in the Biacnabato organization, it is true, tried to force a division of the money early in April, and for this purpose subsequently filed a suit against Aguinaldo in the Supreme Court of Hongkong; but this attempt failed, his act being generally condemned by his associates, and the funds continued under Aguinaldo's discretionary control.²

Fourth, with the formal declaration by both parties that the rebellion was over, the so-called "internal sovereignty" came to an end. But something akin to it was kept up by the exiles in Hongkong where formal meetings were held by them from time to time. One such meeting was held on February 14; another on March 20; and still another on May 4.³ Moreover, subsequent events show that the exiles followed with eagerness the developments in their native land, and kept themselves ready to rejoin their former comrades in arms whenever the opportune moment came.

Under such conditions, it was manifestly difficult, if not impossible, to maintain peace. On the contrary, as already pointed out, hardly was the first week of March over, when the outward calm was broken and disorders recommenced. The standard of revolt was first raised in northern Zambales, where the natives besieged the cable station at Bolinao and seized the telegraph line between this town and Manila, hold-

¹ *Infra*, pp. 53, 73.

² Artacho filed the suit in the Supreme Court of Hongkong against Aguinaldo and the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, asking for an injunction to restrain Aguinaldo and the two banks from dealing with the funds deposited or from parting with any portion thereof. Later, on the advice of his former associates, Artacho agreed to a compromise and promised to withdraw the suit for the sum of 5,000 dollars. See Taylor, vol. i, exhibit 80, 33 LY, and exhibit 92, 45 LY.

³ *Ibid.*, exhibit 73, 28 LY *et seq.*, exhibit 77, 30 LY, and exhibit 91, 44 LY *et seq.*

ing their position successfully until reenforcements arrived from the capital. Simultaneously disorders were taking place in western Pangasinan. On March 25 another serious outbreak was reported at the town of Candon in Ilocos Sur. On April 3 over 5,000 men revolted in Cebu, and for over three weeks harassed the government forces sent against them. About the same time similar disorders were going on in other provinces of central Luzon, and restlessness was apparent even in more distant regions—in Camarines Norte, Panay and Bohol.¹

The truth is that the pact of Biacnabato, which only temporarily halted organized warfare, did not remove the causes of discontent; and, as subsequent events show, several other provinces in Luzon and the Bisayas were, in the spring of 1898, on the verge of making common cause with the provinces of central Luzon.

The disorders just described lacked a commonly recognized leader and did not constitute a united movement; hence they were regarded by the government as mere bandit operations, and did not invalidate the pact. Nevertheless, two contemporary documents now prove that these disturbances were more than mere bandit operations. The first of these is Jacinto's *Sangguniang Hukuman*,² written in February, 1898, which reveals the fact that Bonifacio's former secretary was busy "katipunizing" Laguna province. The incident may perhaps be dismissed as insignificant, had it not been for the fact that Jacinto was really "the brains" of the *Katipunan* and therefore an experienced organizer. The

¹ LeRoy, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 138-140; Taylor, vol. ii, 50 LY; Foreman, *op. cit.*, pp. 401-408. Óscar F. Williams, American Consul in Manila, describes these disturbed conditions in his dispatches to the Department of State for February and March; but his description is somewhat exaggerated. His dispatches are printed in *Senate Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 62, pt. ii, pp. 319 *et seq.*

² *Supra*, p. 20 (note 4).

second document is the so-called "constitution of the general executive committee of central Luzon,"¹ adopted in April, 1898, and signed by forty-five persons, among whom were Francisco Macabulos Soliman, a former officer under Aguinaldo, and Valentin Díaz, one of the six founders of the supreme council of the *Katipunan*. This document establishes a "government" which attempted to operate in the provinces of Tarlac, Pampanga, Pangasinan, Union, and Nueva Ecija.²

Now enters a factor that was destined to effect a radical change in the situation—war between the United States and Spain. The exiles at Hongkong were not slow to realize the possibilities afforded by this new turn of events, knowing as they did how well disposed some of the American officials in the East were toward an understanding with Aguinaldo and his companions. As early as November, 1897, Rounseville Wildman, American consul at Hongkong, had been approached by Felipe Agoncillo, Aguinaldo's "foreign agent", whom Wildman described as "a very earnest and attentive diplomat and a great admirer of the United States", and offered an "alliance offensive and defensive", in case war should break out between the United States and Spain.³ Indeed, before war between the two countries be-

¹ *P. I. R.* 55-1; Taylor, vol. i, exhibit 81, 33 LY.

² Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 130, 50 MG.

³ *Vide* letter of Rounseville Wildman to Secretary Day dated November 3, 1897, in *Senate Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 62, pt. ii, p. 333; also in Taylor, vol. i, exhibit 82, 34 LY, and in C. S. Olcott, *Life of William McKinley*, New York, 1916, vol. ii, pp. 142-143. Another attempt to secure the friendship and help of the United States had been made in January, 1897, by a group of Filipinos resident in Hongkong. These Filipinos, who constituted the Hongkong *Junta*, presented to the United States consul general at Hongkong, Mr. Wildman's predecessor, a memorial, printed in pamphlet form, in which their countrymen's grievances against the Spanish government, particularly against the

gan, conferences between Admiral (then Commodore) Dewey and the Filipino exiles had been held at Hongkong on the initiative, according to Aguinaldo, of a representative of Commander Edward P. Wood of the American gunboat "Petrel".² These conferences were halted on April 7, when Aguinaldo, accompanied by two other Filipinos, left Hongkong in order to escape Artacho's threatened suit, and went to Singapore, arriving at this port on the 21st. When war was declared, therefore, Aguinaldo was at Singapore, where E. Spencer Pratt, the American consul general at that city, sought him out,² and had two (three, according to Aguinaldo) secret interviews with him and his companions in the presence of H. W. Bray, an Englishman, who acted as interpreter. On the advice of Pratt and with the full knowledge and approval of Admiral Dewey, Aguinaldo returned to Hongkong in order to—as Pratt's telegraphic dispatch phrased it—"arrange with commodore for general cooperation insurgents Manila if desired." By the time he arrived, however, the commodore had already left for Manila, and he was obliged to remain in Hongkong for over two weeks, awaiting developments.

The fortnight and more was a very busy as well as anxious period for the Filipino insurgents in the British port. They held prolonged meetings and heated debates. One of the questions that engaged their attention was the expediency of Aguinaldo's return to Manila and cooperation with the

friars, were set forth, and an appeal was made to the United States imploring help, so that "their liberty and independence be restored to the Philippine Islands . . ." The document was signed by Doroteo Cortes, José M. Basa and A. G. Medina; a copy is found in *P. I. R.* 792-3.

¹ *Reseña verídica*, sec. iii. See also Dewey's testimony before the Senate Committee in *Senate Documents*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., no. 311, pt. iii, pp. 2926 *et seq.*

² *Senate Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 62, pt. ii, pp. 341 *et seq.*

United States forces in the absence of a formal, written agreement with the latter. This question, they decided on May 4 in the affirmative, though not altogether without some misgivings.¹ They concluded that Aguinaldo should at once place himself at the head of the revolution, discipline an army and be prepared to make the most out of the difficult situation. Another matter that demanded their close attention was the purchase of arms and ammunition. In this they were aided by Consul Wildman whose apparent friendliness to the insurgents and sympathy with their cause so won Aguinaldo's confidence that the latter entrusted him with the sum of 117,000 dollars with which to purchase war supplies. Although Wildman, according to Aguinaldo, failed to account for more than one half of this sum, he did try to accomplish in a measure at least the task confided to him, as is shown by a telegram he sent Secretary Day under date of May 19, urging that a "large supply of rifles should be taken for insurgent allies," and by the actual purchase and delivery of 2000 Mauser rifles and 200,000 cartridges.² Moreover, it was felt that the constructive work of the revolution could be more effectively carried on if a practicable plan of government were devised at the outset; hence, a *Constitución provisional de Filipinas*, which declared the Archipelago to be a federal republic, was prepared. Though brought by Aguinaldo to Manila, it was never put into effect.³ Finally, more conferences were held between the insurgents and Consul Wildman.

Just exactly what transpired in the several conferences, first in Hongkong both before and after Aguinaldo's brief

¹ *Vide* minutes of the meeting of May 4, 1898, in Taylor, vol. i, exhibit 91, 44 LY-45 LY.

² Aguinaldo, *Relación verídica*, sec. iii; LeRoy, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 183, 192.

³ Text in T. M. Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 68 *et seq.*

sojourn in Singapore, then in Singapore and later in Manila Bay, is not easy to state with absolute certainty. One thing is clear: the American Government authorized no one to enter into an agreement with the insurgents on the basis of recognition of a native government or of independence. But what were the precise conditions upon which Aguinaldo agreed to cooperate with the American navy? What advantages were he and his followers to gain from this cooperation? These and similar pertinent questions suggest themselves to the impartial student.

The principals in the conferences give conflicting testimony. Admiral Dewey denies having made any promise of independence or entered into an alliance with Aguinaldo, stating in a letter written to the late Senator Lodge under date of January 30, 1900: "I never promised, directly or indirectly, independence for the Filipinos."¹ Consul-General Wildman makes a similar denial.² Consul-General Pratt, in his dispatches to the State Department, dated April

¹ *Vide* Dewey's cables to Navy Department dated June 3 (Cavite), and June 27, 1898, printed in *Autobiography of George Dewey*, New York, 1913, pp. 311-312; also, his letter to Senator Lodge in the *Congressional Record*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1329, or in George A. Malcolm, *The Government of the Philippine Islands*, Rochester (N. Y.), 1916, p. 121.

² See Wildman's communication to Moore dated August 8, 1898, in *Senate Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 62, pt. ii, p. 338. But see Teodoro Sandico's letter to M. Tinio, Jan. 26, 1900, in which he makes this statement: "In Hongkong, in various conferences which our worthy leader (Aguinaldo) held with Wildman, the American consul at that port, and with Mr. Williams, the American consul in Manila, they made the same representations as faithful interpreters of the beautiful intentions of their Government, all of which I had the high honor of witnessing in person as interpréter and secretary of our honorable President, and I still remember at this moment the language of Consul Williams in speaking of the Philippines: 'We are not a grasping people; we are not going to take your land' which in Spanish means 'We are not an ambitious people; we have not come to take your country'". *P. I. R.*, 509.6; Taylor, vol. i, exhibit 89, 41 LY.

28 and 30, says that he explained to Aguinaldo in their interviews that he "had no authority to speak for the (U. S.) Government" and "to discuss" questions pertaining to the future government of the Philippines.¹ On the other hand, General Aguinaldo quotes Consul-General Pratt as having declared to him in the name of Admiral Dewey "that the United States would, at least, recognize the independence of the Philippines under a naval protectorate", and asserts that the admiral confirmed the statement on board the Olympia in Manila Bay.² Aguinaldo's version of the understanding arrived at in Singapore between him and Pratt indeed is supported by a declaration made to Senator Hoar by H. W. Bray, the interpreter, in a letter written by the latter on January 12, 1899, which reads in part: "I frankly state that the conditions under which Aguinaldo promised to cooperate with Dewey were independence under a protectorate. I am prepared to swear to this."³ Discarding Bray's testimony as not altogether reliable,⁴ the situation is not materially changed. Neither Judge Blount's defense of Aguinaldo⁵ nor Professor Worcester's condemnation of him⁶ is absolutely conclusive on the point. Aguinaldo and his closest associates were certainly very friendly to the Americans and acted the rôle of "allies"; but, at times, they appeared to be laboring under the fear that the United

¹ *Senate Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 62, pt. ii, pp. 341 *et seq.*

² *Reseña verídica*, sec. iii.

³ Taylor, vol. i, exhibit 84, 38 LY.

⁴ See St. Clair's letter to Bray, charging the latter with bad faith, in *ibid.*, vol. i, exhibit 83, 38 LY.

⁵ James H. Blount, *The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912*, New York, 1912, pp. 51 *et seq.*

⁶ Dean C. Worcester, *The Philippines Past and Present*, New York, 1921, ch. ii.

States might after all retain the Archipelago.¹ This would seem to indicate that no definite promise of recognition or of independence had been made. On the other hand, there are strong evidences to show that assurances were given to Aguinaldo by Pratt and Wildman.² In fact, while Dewey's

¹*Vide* letter of Agoncillo to Aguinaldo dated May 27, 1898, in Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 135, 54 MG. The letter says in part: "You should therefore be watchful and try to find out the real intentions of the Americans toward our unfortunate country.... We have duly informed them that we will aid them for the sake of our independence; hence, if they obtain victory through our assistance and, as an early result of the negotiations, they refuse to give us independence and they show intentions of either enslaving us or selling our country, we have then the right in the eyes of the world to fight against them for the welfare of our country."

² On June 8, 1898, to celebrate the early victories of their countrymen, the Filipino residents of Singapore, led by Dr. Santos, serenaded Mr. Pratt. The serenade developed into some sort of informal reception, in which Dr. Santos spoke in French for the Filipinos and Mr. Pratt made a response. Dr. Santos said in part: "Our countrymen at home, and those of us residing here, refugees from Spanish misrule and tyranny in our beloved native land, hope that the United States, your nation, persevering in its humane policy, will efficaciously second the programme arranged between you, sir, and General Aguinaldo in this port of Singapore, and secure to us our independence under the protection of the United States. Our warmest thanks are especially due to you, sir, personally, for having been the first to cultivate relations with General Aguinaldo and arrange for his cooperation with Admiral Dewey, thus supporting our aspirations which time and subsequent actions have developed and caused to meet with the applause and approbations of your nation". Mr. Pratt's response, which according to him was extemporaneous, was reproduced in the *Singapore Free Press* and *The Straits Times*. The accuracy of the reproduced speech was testified to by Pratt himself. He said: "You have just reason to be proud of what has been and is being accomplished by General Aguinaldo and your fellow-countrymen under his command. When six weeks ago I learned that General Aguinaldo had arrived *incognito* in Singapore, I immediately sought him out. An hour's interview convinced me that he was the man for the occasion, and having communicated with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly arranged for him to join the latter, which he did at Cavite. The rest you know. I am thankful to have been the means, though merely the accidental means, of bringing about the arrangement

between General Aguinaldo and Admiral Dewey, which has resulted so happily. I can only hope that the eventual outcome will be all that can be desired for the happiness and welfare of the Filipinos". On June 9, Mr. Pratt reported to the State Department what had taken place, forwarding at the same time clippings from the two papers mentioned which described the affair and reproduced the speech. In response to this communication, Mr. Day, on July 20, wrote Mr. Pratt, saying in part: "The extract now communicated by you from the *Straits Times* of the ninth of June has occasioned a feeling of disquietude and a doubt as to whether some of your acts may not have borne a significance and produced an impression which this Government would be compelled to regret. The address presented to you by the twenty-five or thirty Filipinos who gathered about the consulate discloses an understanding on their part that the object of Admiral Dewey was to support the cause of General Aguinaldo, and that the ultimate object of our action is to secure the independence of the Philippines 'under the protection of the United States'. Your address does not repeat this implication, and it moreover represents that General Aguinaldo was 'sought by you', whereas it had been the understanding of the Department that you received him only upon the request of a British subject named Bray, who formerly lived in the Philippines. Your further reference to General Aguinaldo as 'the man for the occasion', and to your 'bringing about' the 'arrangement' between 'General Aguinaldo and Admiral Dewey which has resulted so happily' also represents the matter in a light which causes apprehension lest your action may have laid the ground of future misunderstandings and complications. For these reasons the Department has not caused the articles to be given to the press, lest it might seem thereby to lend a sanction to views the expression of which it had not authorized." The documents regarding the Singapore "serenade" are in *Senate Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 62, pt. ii, pp. 347-357.

On June 25, 1898, Consul-General Wildman wrote General Aguinaldo a letter in which he says in part: "If you stand shoulder to shoulder with our forces and do not allow any small differences of opinion and fancied slight to keep you from the one set purpose of freeing your Islands from the cruelties and robberies under which it has been groaning for so many hundred years, your name in history will be a glorious one and your reward from my own great country will be sure and lasting. The latest Telegraphic Despatches assert that all the great powers of Europe, except Great Britain, have arrived at an agreement that the Philippines can not become a part of the United States, but will be divided up among themselves as has been the case with China. Should this prove to be true, you have a greater battle on your hands than you have already had, and it will require all the power of the United States and Great Britain to keep your Islands intact and to hold you as the first man in them.

explanation of his relations with Aguinaldo satisfied the Department of State,¹ those of Pratt and Wildman did not, and these two gentlemen ultimately received what amounted to an official reprimand from that quarter. As to the Aguinaldo-Pratt phase of the question, Taylor gives the following explanation:

Aguinaldo knew but little English, Pratt knew no Spanish, so in their interview Bray acted as interpreter. An interpreter who is interested in the subject of the discussion may be a dangerous man. It is impossible to say what he told Aguinaldo. Certainly Pratt did not know; but whatever was said during these conversations, it is within the limits of possibility that Pratt may have been made to say by the interpreter more than he intended, and that his statements of what would probably be granted by the United States Government and his expression of good wishes—for the cause of Filipino independence may have been translated as assurances and as promises. Bray, who according to his Filipino former friends, was apt to talk too much, may have talked too much on this occasion, and so the myth of the formal agreement between Aguinaldo on behalf of the Filipino insurgents and Pratt on behalf of the United

I have vouched for your honesty and earnestness of purpose to the President of the United States and to our people, and they are ready to extend their hands to you as a brother and aid you in every laudable ambition. There are greater prizes in the world than being the mere Chief of a revolution. . . . Do not forget that the United States undertook this war for the sole purpose of relieving the Cubans from the cruelties under which they were suffering, and not for the love of conquest or the hope of gain. They are actuated by precisely the same feelings towards the Philippines". See Taylor, vol. iv, exhibit 739, 64 GR-65 GR. On August 6, the Department of State sent Consul-General Wildman the following communication: "If you wrote Aguinaldo, as reported by Hongkong correspondent *Daily Mail*, your action is disapproved, and you are forbidden to make pledges or discuss policy." See *Senate Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 62, pt. ii, p. 338.

¹ *Vide* correspondence between Long and Dewey on May 26 and June 3, 1898, in Dewey's *Autobiography*, p. 311.

States grew up, a fiction which Bray himself, with a natural desire to add to his own importance, did his best to circulate.¹

In attempting to unravel this unfortunate tangle in Filipino-American relations, it is well to remember that the official attitude of the United States towards the Philippines at the time was vague and undefined, and that Dewey, Pratt and Wildman were personally in sympathy with the insurgents and their cause. It is well to remember also that, both before and immediately after the battle of Manila Bay, Dewey had no army to back his operations up and he wanted to secure Aguinaldo's help. Such a situation could easily lead to an indulgence in making assurances of friendship and sympathy, to say the least. On the other hand, it should also be pointed out that the insurgent leaders, who had been waiting for an opportunity to return to their country and resume the war, were most anxious to have some sort of alliance with the United States, and it is hard to say in this instance just how much the wish became father to the thought. Aside from the fact, therefore, that the interviews between the Filipinos and Americans were held through interpreters, and were quite possibly productive of erroneous impressions on both sides, there were other potent causes that undoubtedly helped to produce the consequent misunderstanding.

The truth as to the promise of independence alleged to have been given by American officials is obviously of the utmost importance in determining the good or bad faith of the parties concerned. More significant still is the fact that the Filipinos, even though at times they wavered in their belief, certainly assumed, rightly or wrongly, that the United States was their liberator and, sooner or later, would recognize the independence of the Archipelago. Did not the

¹ Taylor, vol. i, 42 FZ-43 FZ.

United States declare war against Spain in order to free Cuba? The Filipinos did not foresee, and no one then could, that it would act differently in regard to the Philippines. In the words of General Anderson:

Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman and Williams did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a Filipino government would be recognized, the Filipinos certainly thought so, probably inferring this from their acts rather than from their statements. If an incipient rebellion was already in progress, what could be inferred from the fact that Aguinaldo and thirteen other banished Tagals were brought down on a naval vessel and landed in Cavite?¹

Or as General Aguinaldo later put it:

I was, moreover, convinced that the American forces would necessarily sympathize with the revolution which they had managed to encourage, and which had saved them much blood and great hardships; and, above all, I had absolute confidence in the history and traditions of a people who fought for its independence and for the abolition of slavery, and, on the strength of being a free nation, posed as the champion liberator of oppressed peoples.²

From the beginning, therefore, it may be said that Filipino-American relations started with a misunderstanding, which was perhaps as inevitable as it was unfortunate. How serious this misunderstanding was and what lamentable consequences it was to have, were not then quite apparent and, for this reason, did not seem greatly to have disturbed the equanimity of either side. What concerned

¹ T. M. Anderson, "Our Rule in the Philippines" in the *North American Review*, vol. 170 (February, 1900), p. 272.

² Aguinaldo's proclamation of January 8, 1899, in T. M. Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 259 *et seq.*

them most was Spain, the common enemy; and, for the moment, both parties, apparently at least, were content to work side by side and to treat each other as helpmates, if not as allies. As Dewey said, he had given Aguinaldo to understand that "he (Dewey) considered the insurgents as friends, being opposed to a common enemy",¹ and the Filipino leaders, on their part, urged their countrymen to attack the Spaniards by land as the American "liberators" attacked by sea, saying: "Wherever you see the American flag, there flock in numbers; they are our redeemers".²

However, it should not be supposed that Aguinaldo prepared to cooperate with Dewey purely on the strength of any alleged promise or assurances of good will on the part of certain American officials. He valued American friendship very highly; in fact, it may be said that he coveted it. But, with his disappointing experience at Biacnabato ever warning him to be cautious, Aguinaldo was certainly not blind to possible difficulties. Though believing, or preferring to believe, that the Americans were their "redeemers", he and his associates obviously saw the risk they were taking, and they discussed at length this phase of the situation in their meeting of May 4.³ But they had no alternative, and they felt that it would be vastly more to their advantage to return to Manila and place themselves once more at the head of the revolution. As Charles B. Elliot says: they "understood the situation and calculated very properly upon taking advantage of Dewey's necessities. . . . They under-

¹ *Vide* Dewey's communication dated June 27, 1898, to the Navy Department in his *Autobiography*, pp. 311-312.

² *Vide* manifesto with the heading "America's Allies..." in *Senate Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 62, pt. ii, p. 346; Foreman, *The Philippine Islands*, ed. 1906, p. 433; Albert G. Robinson, *The Philippines, the War and the People*, New York, 1901, pp. 44-45.

³ *Supra*, p. 53.

stood perfectly that they were relying on their own influence and their skill in turning the situation to their advantage".¹

When Aguinaldo accompanied by thirteen other insurgent leaders arrived in Manila on board the American revenue cutter "McCulloch" on May 19, 1898, the Spanish situation was desperate. Admiral Dewey, who nearly three weeks before had fought and won the naval battle that made him famous, was now master of Manila Bay and, in fact, held the fate of the capital in his hands. * Moreover, an incipient rebellion, as yet unorganized but capable of fuller development under an efficient leadership, had been going on for about two months, giving the Spanish administrators a good deal to worry about. Realizing the difficulties before him, the new Governor-General, Basilio Augustín, whom LeRoy describes as a "dunderheaded old soldier",² as early as April 23, had issued an "allocation"³ to the people, warning them of the Americans whom he painted to them in the blackest colors and represented in the most insulting terms, and hoping in this way to frighten the Filipinos into the Spanish ranks. So as to conciliate the leading citizens, who had ever remained discontented under the administration's reactionary policy, he decreed on May 4 the creation of a consultative assembly (*asamblea consultiva*) in which, a few days later, several leading Filipinos were given seats.⁴ The Governor-General, moreover, appointed several prominent natives, most of whom had been military officers under Aguinaldo, to important commands in the militia.⁵ Then,

¹ Charles B. Elliot, *The Philippines: To the End of the Military Régime*, Indianapolis, 1917, pp. 412 *et seq.*

² LeRoy, *The Americans in the Philippines*, vol. i, p. 140.

³ *Vide* "allocation" in Foreman, *op. cit.*, pp. 425-426; also, a similar proclamation by the Archbishop, pp. 423-424.

⁴ *Gaceta de Manila*, May 4 and May 10, 1898.

⁵ Taylor, vol. i, exhibit 66, 24 LY and vol. iii, exhibit 3, 8 MG.

to be sure that the new "policy of attraction" (*política de atracción*) should not miscarry, he called the consultative assembly together on May 28th and intimated to its members that he was ready to grant the reforms which the Filipinos had been asking for.

But these advances came too late. The die had been cast the day the Hongkong exiles decided to send back Aguinaldo and his military associates in order to head the revolution anew.¹ Very few, if any, took the consultative assembly seriously. The educated class, hitherto loyalist though extremely liberal, was also beginning to turn revolutionary. The Filipino officers of the militia, when their former general and president arrived, forgot their military duty, and, one by one, deserted with their commands. Only Paterno, the negotiator of the pact of Biacnabato, made any attempt to hold his countrymen faithful to Spanish rule. To reach the people, he issued a manifesto² on May 31 outlining the reforms which Spain should immediately grant in exchange for native loyalty and active support; but his manifesto fell on barren soil. The Spaniards and the Filipinos had come to the parting of the ways.

¹ *Supra*, p. 53.

² *Vide* manifesto in Foreman, *op. cit.*, pp. 438-440; *El Comercio*, Manila, June 2, 1898.

CHAPTER II

THE DICTATORSHIP

BEGINNINGS OF THE FILIPINO GOVERNMENT

A few days after his landing at Cavite General Aguinaldo decided that the time was propitious for the establishment of a Filipino Government that should direct the revolution and keep order within the conquered territories. He had, then, as adviser a well known lawyer of Manila, Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista, who apparently persuaded him to abandon all ideas of a constitutional organization and induced him to set up a dictatorship.¹ Consequently on May 24, Aguinaldo issued from Cavite a proclamation announcing the establishment of the new régime. The proclamation reads in part:

. . . I again assume command of all the troops in the struggle for the attainment of our lofty aspirations, inaugurating a dictatorial government to be administered by decrees promulgated under my sole responsibility and with the advice of distinguished persons until the time when these Islands, being under our complete control, may form a constitutional republican assembly

¹ T. M. Kalaw, "The Constitutional Plan of the Philippine Revolution" in the *Philippine Law Journal*, Manila, December, 1914, pp. 206-207. However, according to Aguinaldo, the idea of a dictatorship was suggested to him also by Consul-General Wildman in Hongkong. See *Reseña verídica*, sec. iii.

and appoint a president and cabinet, into whose hands I shall then resign the command of the Islands.¹

As the quoted passage indicates, the Dictatorship was frankly a temporary expedient called into being by the apparent necessity of concentrating all powers, civil and military alike, in one person to enable him, in the words of Rianzares Bautista, "to repress with a strong hand the anarchy which is the inevitable sequel of all revolutions."

Politically, the first significant act under the Dictatorship was the proclamation of the independence of the Philippines, which took place in Cavite (Cavite Viejo) on June 12th. The act was premeditated and was publicly announced in a circular of June 5, which set aside the twelfth day of the month for the proclamation "before the Filipino people and the civilized nations" of "the independence of this country".² The ceremony was presided over by Rianzares Bautista as a "special commissioner" *ad hoc*, and attended by military officers of the government and by a large gathering of residents of various nearby towns. Admiral Dewey was invited to be present, but he politely declined the invitation, sending his secretary ashore to excuse him.³ A feature of the ceremony was the formal unfurling amid acclamations of the Filipino flag. The ceremony terminated with the signing of the "Act of the Declaration of Independence", prepared and certified by Rianzares Bautista. The "Act",

¹ *P. I. R.* 125. 4; Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 6, 9 MG; Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 86 *et seq.*; Retana, *Archivo*, vol. v, pp. 325-333. This proclamation, which Admiral Dewey sent with two other proclamations of May 24 to the Secretary of the Navy on June 12, is also printed in *House Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 3, appendix, p. 103.

² *Vide* decree of June 5 in *P. I. R.* 674; Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 19, 20 MG.

³ LeRoy, *The Americans in the Philippines*, vol. i, pp. 203-204.

a long and rambling document, reads in part like its American predecessor of 1776:

And summoning as witness of the rectitude of our intentions, the Supreme Judge of the Universe, and under the protection of the Mighty and Humane North American Nation, we proclaim and solemnly declare, in the name and by the authority of the inhabitants of all these Philippine Islands, that they are and have a right to be free and independent; that they are released from all obedience to the crown of Spain; that every political tie between the two is and must be completely severed and annulled; and that like all free and independent states, they have complete authority to make war, conclude peace, establish treaties of commerce, enter into alliances, regulate commerce, and execute all other acts and things that independent States have the right to do. Reposing firm confidence in the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge for the support of this declaration our lives, our fortunes, and our most sacred possession, which is our honor.¹

Another significant measure was the governmental reorganization of the municipalities and provinces. The necessity for such a step was early felt as one town after another came under the authority of the Filipino Government. The plan of reorganization was communicated to the people of the Philippines in a decree of June 18² and certain instruc-

¹ *Vide* "Act of the Declaration of Independence" in *P. I. R.* 674.1; Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 28, 24 MG-25 MG. According to LeRoy (*op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 203-204), the formal documentation of the declaration of independence was delayed by the Filipinos for political reasons till Aug. 1. This is an error; either LeRoy confused the "Act of the Declaration" with the proclamation of independence by the municipal presidents on Aug. 1, or he was unaware of the existence of the former document. Curiously enough, among the signers was an American, a certain L. M. Johnson, "Colonel of Artillery".

² *Vide* decree of June 18, 1898, in *Disposiciones del gobierno revolucionario de Filipinas*, Cavite, 1898, pp. 7-13; *P. I. R.* 206.3; Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 35, 27 MG; Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 150 *et seq.*; Retana, *Archivo*, vol. v, pp. 341-346; *Senate Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 62, pt. ii, pp. 432-433.

tions of June 20,¹ prepared by Mabini, who was then beginning to emerge as Aguinaldo's foremost adviser. From these courses of action it was hoped that a robust system of local control could be set up, one that would serve as "the strongest bulwark of public security and the sole means of securing union and discipline".

As provided for in the decree of June 18 and the supplementary instructions, the government of a town (*pueblo*) was to consist of the following officials: (1) a chief (*jefe*), (2) a delegate of police and internal order, (3) a delegate of justice and civil registry, (4) a delegate of taxes and property, and (5) a headman for each village or rural community (*barrio*), considering the town proper (*población*), for this purpose, as a village.² Subject to confirmation by the Central Government, these officials were to be elected by all residents, twenty-one years of age, who were "conspicuous for their intelligence (*ilustración*), social position and upright conduct" and were "lovers of Philippine independence". The chief should be the executive of the town and charged with the strict application of all local laws. The delegate of police and internal order assisted the chief in maintaining peace within the territory, and was the immediate head of the police force. He was, moreover, in charge of local sanitation. The delegate of justice and civil registry kept a record of all the decrees and circulars of the Central Government, and a registry of local births, deaths and marriages. The delegate of taxes and property aided

¹ *Vide* instructions of June 20, 1898, in *Disposiciones del gobierno revolucionario*, pp. 15-31; *P. I. R.* 206.3; Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 36, 27 MG-28 MG; Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 151 *et seq.*; Retana, *Archivo*, vol. v, pp. 347 *et seq.*

² Decree of June 18, arts. 2-3. The town chief was known also as the municipal president; likewise, the provincial chief was known as the provincial president. (*Infra*, p. 69.)

the chief in the collection of taxes¹ and the administration of municipal funds.² He also kept a registry of property and cattle. The headman of the village represented the chief in his community.

As readily seen, these persons were primarily administrative officials, but they also were to meet, at least once a month and whenever called together by the chief, as a body called the "popular council" (*junta popular*). The chief was the president of the board, the headman of the town proper its

¹ All local taxes levied under the Spanish régime were continued, except those derived from cock-fighting and other games of chance. Rules 32 and 33 of the instructions are as follows (Taylor's translation):

"Rule 32. All local taxation established by the Spanish government shall likewise be taken in charge, exception being made of the gaming licenses and taxes on cock-fighting, which are absolutely prohibited, as they cause nothing but ruin to the town, and with scarcely any benefit to the public exchequer."

"Rule 33. Every kind of gambling shall be considered a crime, punishable in the Code, as if it were a game of chance, and the official who tolerates it shall be relieved of his office, and shall pay a fine to be determined by the provincial council, in proportion to the importance of the play, but in no case shall it be less than fifty pesos."

See comment on Taylor's translation *supra*, p. 35 (footnote).

² A plan of budgeting and accounting is provided for in the instructions (Taylor's translation):

"Rule 39. The chief of the town with the commissioner of revenue (delegate of taxes) shall immediately formulate an estimate as to the expenses and needs of the town, and, after submitting it for the approval of the *junta* ('popular council'), shall forward it to the provincial council, which, with its report, shall forward it to this Government for its definite approval. In accordance with this estimate or budget, the chief shall adjust the expenses of the town, and the commissioner of revenue shall make no payment without the written order of the former. Pending this approval, urgent and indispensable payments may be ordered provisionally and in conformity with the same.

"Rule 40. At the end of each quarter, the commissioner of revenue shall draw up the account of all the disbursements made and the statement of receipts, and after examination by the *junta*, he shall forward them to the provincial council for consolidation into a general account, which shall be forwarded to this Government every six months."

vice-president, and the delegate of justice and civil registry its secretary. It was largely an advisory body, but it was also vested with certain judicial functions. In its meetings five votes at least constituted a majority for passing resolutions.¹

The provincial government was to be similar in structure to the town government. It should consist of a chief of the province, as executive, and of three councillors corresponding to, and with duties identical with, those exercised by the three delegates in the municipal administration. These officials were to be "elected" by the town chiefs with the advice of the "popular councils" and subject to the confirmation of the Central Government. As in the case of the municipal officials, the provincial chief and the three councillors formed the provincial council, with the chief of the capital town as a member *ex officio*. The provincial council should meet at least once a month and whenever convened for the transaction of business by its president, the provincial chief,—the chief of the capital town being its vice-president. Like the "popular council", its duties were largely advisory; but it was vested with certain judicial functions and with power to recommend to the Central Government any measure of particular interest to the province. At its meetings three votes at least constituted a majority, which was necessary for the adoption of any resolution.

Besides outlining the machinery of municipal and provincial governments, the decree of June 18 and the supplementary instructions, particularly the latter, attempted to regulate temporarily the administration of justice. When not contrary to any decree of the Dictatorship, the Spanish civil code and penal code were declared provisionally in force. Civil suits were to be heard before the "popular council"

¹ Decree of June 18, art. 5; instructions of June 20, rules 3-11.

sitting as a court of first instance or before the provincial council sitting as a court of appeal; but the decisions rendered by these courts could be reviewed by competent tribunals subsequently to be organized. Criminal cases were to be tried only by the provincial council; but all the necessary preliminary investigations were to be made beforehand by the town chief and the delegate of justice acting as judge (*jues*) and clerk of court (*secretario*) respectively. From the decisions handed down by the provincial council in criminal cases appeal could be made to the Commission of Justice of Congress whenever established. Members of the army and persons accused of military crimes were to be tried by courts-martial.¹

The municipalities and provinces were reorganized as rapidly as possible, with Cavite, Aguinaldo's native province, leading the rest in point of time. From Cavite the plan spread to the adjoining provinces, and later to more distant regions as the army succeeded in liberating them from Spanish domination.² At no time, however, could it be said that the entire territory actually or presumably controlled by the Filipinos was governed uniformly in the manner described; for the exigencies of war made it necessary to place certain provinces under military rule. But wherever instituted and continued, this plan of government remained to the downfall of the Philippine Republic essentially as provided for. It is true that the uppermost portion of the governmental structure changed in form three times in about

¹ Instructions of June 20, rules 18-23; see also a decree of June 6, 1898, in Retana, *Archivo*, vol. v, pp. 337-338; Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 139 *et seq.* More definite rules regarding courts-martial are provided for in the decree of June 23, 1898, articles 25-30. For decree of June 23, see *infra*, p. 81.

² One of the last to be organized in this manner was the island of Samar toward the end of January, 1899.

nine months,¹ but the lower, which constituted the basis of the civil system, continued as first decreed.

Due to the exigencies of war, a military commander² named by the Central Government was assigned to each civilly organized province or a group of such provinces. This dual arrangement may have been indispensable under the conditions then existing; but it was certainly unfortunate, since the military commanders, although they were forbidden by law to "intervene in the government and administration of the province" except when "threatened or occupied by the enemy", often disregarded the prohibition and made themselves troublesome to the civil officials and to the people.

The Dictatorship as such continued till September 15 when the Congress was convened.³ On June 23, however, Aguirre's title was changed to that of "President of the Revolutionary Government"⁴ without affecting the powers assumed by, and generally conceded to, the chief executive. About three weeks later (July 15) the President appointed a provisional cabinet to share with him the executive functions. While, therefore, some attempt was made to have the municipal and provincial governments more or less representative from the beginning through the creation of the popular and provincial councils, the Central Government remained dictatorial in character till the summons of the Congress on September 15. From the outset nevertheless it had been publicly announced that a "republican assembly" was to be convened. So as to prepare the ground, the

¹ The stages through which the central government passed were: (1) Dictatorship, May 24-June 23, 1898; (2) Revolutionary Government, June 24, 1898, to January 21, 1899; (3) "Republic," January 22 on.

² Decree of June 18, arts. 8-9; instructions of June 20, rules 14, 17.

³ *Infra*, p. 91.

⁴ *Infra*, p. 81.

decree of June 18 provided for the "election" of national representatives by the town chiefs according to the following apportionment: (a) three each for the provinces of Manila and Cavite, (b) two each for all the provinces classified under the Spanish régime as "terminal" (highest class), and (c) one each for the remaining provinces and the politico-military commands.¹

RESUMPTION OF ORGANIZED WARFARE

Active preparations for a renewal of the struggle against Spanish authority began on the very day that Aguinaldo and his companions arrived in Cavite with the sending out of a proclamation addressed "To the Revolutionary Leaders of the Philippines", and signed by "E. Ag. Magdalo".² The proclamation fixed May 31 as the date for the general uprising, and exhorted the Filipinos to carry on the war humanely by respecting foreigners and their property, and showing all due consideration to the enemy. It is important to notice that in this proclamation Aguinaldo laid great stress on his friendly relations with Dewey, but at the same time openly declared for "the independence of our Archipelago".

Within a short time, volunteers began pouring into Aguinaldo's headquarters which had been established first in the Spanish arsenal in Cavite, and later in a building in the town. "On the 21st., 22nd. and 23rd. and, in fact, the rest of the month, there was a continuous defile of revolutionists who came to take part in the movement".³ "General

¹ Decree of June 18, art. 6.

² Magdalo was Aguinaldo's *Katipunan* name. *Vide* proclamation in *P. I. R.* 12.1; Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 83 *et seq.*; Sastrón, *La Insurrección en Filipinas y guerra hispano-americana*, pp. 419 *et seq.*

³ Aguinaldo, *Reseña verídica*, sec. iv.

Aguinaldo's headquarters", runs a dispatch from Consul-General Williams to Mr. Day, "were this a. m. at seven o'clock (May 24) surrounded by 500 to 1,000 men eager to enlist. I was there at that hour and saw the men".² The fact was, that his former officers and soldiers acclaimed him and flocked to his standard. Even the Filipino militia of the Spanish Government from which Governor-General Augustín appeared to have hoped much at first, caught the spirit of revolt, and soon deserted with their arms and ammunition.³ There was manifest enthusiasm within the revolutionary ranks and, from the ease and rapidity with which Aguinaldo raised a large army, it would seem that the simple, silent man, in spite of his acceptance of the pact of Biacnabato and of his absence from the country, had lost little or none of his former popularity with the masses and that the desire for emancipation from Spanish rule was, outwardly at least, more deeply rooted and more widely spread than ever.

At this time, as in 1896, the difficulty was in properly equipping, not in raising, an army. Fortunately the first consignment of 2,000 Mauser rifles and 200,000 cartridges purchased by the revolutionists in Hongkong with the help of Consul-General Wildman, arrived at Cavite on May 27 and, with the knowledge and consent of Admiral Dewey, was immediately landed.⁴ Even a few days before, the admiral had allowed General Aguinaldo to take sixty-two Spanish rifles, a few smooth-bore pieces of artillery and considerable

¹ See Williams' dispatch in *Senate Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 62, pt. ii, pp. 328-329.

² LeRoy, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 196 *et seq.*

³ See Dewey's letter dated May 27, 1898, to the Secretary of War in *House Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 3, appendix, p. 101, in which he states erroneously the number of guns to be 3,000; also Aguinaldo, *Reseña verídica*, sec. iii; LeRoy, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 183, 192.

ammunition from the arsenal at Cavite.¹ The militia, moreover, which by the middle of June had deserted almost entirely from the Spanish forces, brought in a considerable number of arms, estimated at about 12,000.² These munitions, together with the number of fire-arms which had not been surrendered after the truce of Biacnabato,³ formed the initial equipment of Aguinaldo's hastily gathered army. As the war progressed, more arms were captured from the Spaniards; more rifles and ammunition were purchased from Asia and secretly introduced; "a large though crude sort of arsenal and cartridge-factory" capable of employing 400 people was established at the town of Imus (Cavite), and another in Bulacan; and some five or six small steam vessels were secured for inter-island communication and transportation of soldiers and supplies.⁴

Organized warfare commenced on May 28 when a detachment of Spanish marines, sent to capture the arms and ammunition which had arrived from Hongkong the previous day for the use of the insurgent army, was engaged by a revolutionary force near Cawit, and, after five hours,

¹ Dewey to Navy Department, June 27, 1898, in his *Autobiography*, pp. 311-312; Aguinaldo, *Reseña verídica*, sec. iv; LeRoy, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 192-193. However, F. D. Millet says that the number of rifles given to Aguinaldo was 2,500 (see article entitled "The Filipino Republic" in *Harper's History of the War in the Philippines*, New York, 1900, pp. 65 *et seq.*) and Major Bell, in a report to General Merritt (see next footnote), gives the same number; but these figures probably included the 2,000 received from Hongkong which many thought also came from the arsenal at Cavite.

² Report of Major Bell to Gen. Merritt, August 29, 1898, in *Senate Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 62, pt. ii, p. 379.

³ Major Bell (*ibid.*, p. 380) estimates the number of arms hidden by the insurgents at 15,000: this estimate is considered by LeRoy altogether too high.

⁴ LeRoy, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 350 *et seq.*

forced to surrender.¹ In the two or three weeks that followed, the fighting became general in the regions near Manila. With surprising rapidity, the Filipino forces made themselves masters of the provinces of Cavite, Batangas, Laguna, Morong, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan, effectively shutting off communication between Manila and the provinces, and preventing General Ricardo Monet, in command north of Manila, and General Leopoldo García-Peña, in command south, from carrying out the governor-general's order to concentrate their forces upon the capital. LeRoy, describing the situation in central Luzon, says: ". . . the territory from Manila to the northern end of the railroad, the great valley of central Luzon, had thus passed almost without opposition from the possession of the panic-stricken Spaniards to that of the Filipinos, who had only to complete their control by the capture of the surrounded garrison at Dagupan".² Consul-General Williams makes essentially the same observation, though in a less careful language, in a communication to the State Department on June 16, 1898, in which he stated that "the insurgents have defeated the Spaniards at all points except at a fort near Malate, and hold not only north (?) Luzon to the suburbs of Manila, but Batanyes (Batangas) province also and the bay coast entire, save the city of Manila".³ What remained of the Spanish forces that became isolated in the provinces fortified themselves in convenient points easily defended and prepared to resist; but, left to their own fate and with little or no hope of succour from the seat of Spanish power, these de-

¹ *Vide* "Act of Declaration of Independence" already cited; also Aguinaldo, *Reseña verídica*, sec. vi.

² *Op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 201. A convenient account of the military activities of the insurgents during the months of May and June is found in *ibid.*, pp. 189-201.

³ *Senate Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 62, pt. ii, pp. 329-330.

tachments were besieged by the Filipinos and one by one forced to capitulate.¹

The most important single objective of the insurgents at this time was, of course, the capture of Manila, which, by May 31, they had actually besieged "up to its suburbs, at all points south of the Pasig river". They spared no efforts to make the siege effective. On June 3, they drove the Spanish outposts south of the city in upon the suburb of Santa Ana,² and, thereafter, according to Calderón, their fire reached as far as Ermita.³ At about the same time, Filipino troopers occupied the town of Kalookan, the first railroad station north of Manila, which the retreating Spanish garrison had abandoned, and toward the end of June, they took possession also of the extremities of the suburbs of Tondo and Santa Cruz.⁴ East of Manila, they held San Juan del Monte and were actually in possession of the water-works at Santolan from which the city drew its water supply. Thus an almost unbroken cordon of armed men was early established around the capital which, in the words of Admiral Dewey, "practically surrounded Manila",⁵ and the Spaniards were kept bottled up within the city till they surrendered on August 13.

With his army surrounding Manila, Aguinaldo had be-

¹ Among the towns early besieged that held out for sometime were Dagupan (Pangasinan) and Santa Cruz (Laguna) which did not surrender till July 22 and August 30 respectively. The acts of capitulation for these two towns are in Luís Moreno Jérez, *Los Prisioneros españoles en poder de los tagalos*, Manila, 1900, pp. 149 *et seq.*

² LeRoy, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 198.

³ *Mis Memorias*, p. 75 (footnote).

⁴ Foreman, *The Philippine Islands*, ed. 1906, p. 456.

⁵ *Vide* Dewey's telegram of June 12, 1898, abstracted in F. E. Chadwick, *The Relations of the United States and Spain: The Spanish-American War*, New York, 1911, vol. ii, p. 367.

lieved that the Spaniards might be persuaded to lay down their arms, if liberal conditions of surrender were offered. On June 6, he sent an agent to Governor-General Augustín to prepare the ground, and, the day following, conferred upon General Artemio Ricarte, in command of the first zone of Cavite, and General Pantaleon García, in command of the fourth zone of Manila, "the most ample power and authority necessary" to enable them "jointly and severally to agree upon and sign with the governor-general and general-in-chief of the Spanish army in Manila the capitulation of Manila".¹ On the same day, June 7, he addressed a letter to Governor-General Augustín which says in part: "If the momentous duty you owe to your country obliges you to use force to hold possession of Manila at the cost of the greatest sacrifices, the sentiments of humanity counsel you to avoid as far as possible the useless shedding of blood; for which reasons I see myself in the necessity of inviting Your Excellency to an honorable capitulation. . . ." ²

It is unnecessary to follow minutely the military history of the period, but it is fair to say that the progress of the revolution under Aguinaldo's leadership was, according to Admiral Dewey, "wonderful". By the end of June, the revolutionists had Manila completely invested, were undisputed masters of central Luzon, and were actually planning the sending of military expeditions to the more distant provinces of the Archipelago.³ They had a constantly growing army, the troops concentrated at the time in the environs

¹ See appointment of Ricarte and García in Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 155, 60 MG.

² See letter in *P. I. R.* Books C-1; Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 154, 60 MG.

³ The expedition to Camarines was planned at this time. *Vide* Calderón, *op. cit.*, p. 107; LeRoy, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 340.

of Manila numbering about 10,000 men,¹ and their position was, without doubt, much stronger then than at any time since 1896.

The reasons for the rapid growth and extension of insurgent control at this time are not hard to find. In the first place, Spain was greatly impeded by the revolution in Cuba and the war with the United States whose navy inspired so much fear that the Spanish Government could not send aid to the revolting colonies in the East.² Also the presence of Admiral Dewey in the waters of Manila redounded to the advantage of the revolutionary cause, both morally and materially. Morally, it benefited the insurgents, because the admiral's open friendliness toward them and his apparent consent to Aguinaldo's activities strengthened the latter's claim of an alliance with the United States. Materially, it enabled the insurgents to come in and go out of Manila Bay without molestation or fear of sudden interception. Then, too, as already stated, the admiral besides allowing Aguinaldo to take rifles and supplies from the Cavite arsenal, promptly turned over to him the first consignment of arms and ammunition purchased in Hongkong.³ Again,

¹ F. D. Millet, "The Filipino Republic," *loc. cit.*, p. 65. It is hard to state positively the number of Aguinaldo's men and rifles at any time. About the end of July, the Filipino forces were estimated by General Merritt to be about 12,000 (*House Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 2, p. 47); General Anderson, following General Aguinaldo's figures, estimated them to be about 14,000 ("Our Rule in the Philippines" in *North American Review*, February, 1900, pp. 272 *et seq.*). But these estimates were based on the troops operating in the vicinity of Manila only. John T. Macleod in an unpublished work entitled *History of the Revolution of the Filipinos Against the United States Government*, pt. i, ch. iv, says that the revolutionists by August 13, 1898, had 40,000 rifles. Aguinaldo, in the "Note to Foreign Governments", issued on Aug. 6, 1898 (Retana, *Archivo*, vol. v, pp. 407-409), says he had then a standing army of 30,000 men.

² Chadwick, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 383 *et seq.*

³ *Supra*, p. 73.

the revolutionary party not only had a better equipped and constantly increasing army but also received the support of a vastly greater number of people and the cooperation of the more intelligent classes of Filipinos, whom the decaying prestige of the mother country could no longer keep within the fold. For example, such prominent men as Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista, Apolinario Mabini, Felipe Buencamino, Mariano Ponce, Felipe Agoncillo and Dr. Galicano Apacible¹ were known, before the end of June, to be laboring actively in behalf of the insurgent cause. The number of such men, whose work made possible the rapid organization of the public service under the Filipino Government, constantly increased as the insurgent army gained more victories, until even Paterno was counted among them. Finally, Aguinaldo's natural aptitude for leadership and his prestige with the natives furnished the necessary bond of union which prevented a division into factions, and directed the movement to the attainment of a common end. It is easy to exaggerate as well as to underestimate a man's qualities, but the following brief character sketch of Aguinaldo by Justice Malcolm of the Philippine Supreme Court is probably as nearly accurate as any:

Analyses of the character of Aguinaldo are as contradictory as they are numerous. There are those who would deify him into more than human. The soldier who captured him writes that "He is a man of many excellent qualities, far and away the

¹ Like Mabini, Rianzares Bautista, Buencamino and Agoncillo were lawyers by training. Agoncillo is at present (1925) Secretary of the Interior. Mariano Ponce, a medical student in one of the Spanish universities, and Aguinaldo's agent to Japan, was elected member of the Philippine Assembly, after the establishment of the American government in the Philippines. Dr. Galicano Apacible, graduate physician of one of the Spanish universities, was president of the revolutionary *junta* in Hongkong. He was Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in the Harrison administration.

best Filipino I ever was brought in contact with". There are others who would make Aguinaldo a mere figurehead, the usual method for whom is to eulogize his compatriots in order to belittle his accomplishments. . . . Certainly full credit should be given to the able men who aided Aguinaldo. . . . Concede all this, and yet when impartial history is written, it must •adjudge that Aguinaldo, although seeking personal aggrandizement, was, as a soldier, brave and sagacious, as a leader, popular with the masses, as a patriot, tenacious to his country's ideal until the last, as the head of the revolution, able to know his own limitations and to choose and have faith in the talents of others.¹

¹ *The Government of the Philippine Islands*, pp. 129-130.

CHAPTER III

THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

THE PRESIDENCY

As already observed, the Dictatorship lasted only about a month. After this brief period, it gave way to the "Revolutionary Government." General Aguinaldo announced the change in a decree of June 23,¹ stating that the chief officer was to be styled "President." The first article defines as the object of the Revolutionary Government: "to struggle for the independence of the Philippines", to work for its recognition by the powers including Spain, and "to prepare the country for the establishment of a real republic." The aim, therefore, was to continue the policy of the Dictatorship.

It is not known who the author was of the presidential plan, if it could be rightly attributed to anyone in particular. Apolinario Mabini is generally considered its framer.² The idea of a presidential system, however, may have been originally inspired by Felipe Agoncillo, who had urged General Aguinaldo, as early as May 27, to establish such a type of government. The letter in which the change in government

¹Text in *Disposiciones del gobierno revolucionario*, pp. 33-46; Retana, *Archivo*, vol. v, pp. 363-375; T. M. Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 163 *et seq.* An English translation is in Foreman, *The Philippine Islands*, ed. 1906, pp. 448-455.

²T. M. Kalaw, "The Constitutional Plan of the Philippine Revolution" in the *Philippine Law Journal*, Manila, Dec., 1914, p. 208.

was suggested reads in part as follows: "I am of the opinion that it would be better still if you had established a provisional government with councillors, the responsibility of which is wholly upon you, so that, notwithstanding your councillors you alone will exercise absolute power".¹ Nevertheless, it was left to Mabini to work out the details.

The new organization was to exercise the functions of government through the President and Departmental Secretaries. The President, as chief executive, was declared to be the personification of the people. Until Congress should meet, he was to enjoy the sole right of legislation by means of "decrees" to be promulgated under his responsibility, but with the signature of the Secretary of the department concerned. The decree created four departments, namely: Foreign Relations, Marine and Commerce; War and Public Works; Police and Internal Order, Justice, Instruction and Hygiene; and Treasury (*Hacienda*), Agriculture and Industry. It provided also that others might be established later. The President had the power to appoint the Secretaries and, with the consent of these, the subordinate personnel of the departments. In countersigning a decree, a Secretary assumed no responsibility for it, except that, if it were issued on his recommendation, he became jointly responsible with the President.

Equally as important as the provisions reorganizing the executive department were those laying down the rules for the organization of the Congress. This body was to be composed of representatives from the various provinces "elected" by the town chiefs according to the provisions of the decree of June 18.² However, in case a province, because of war conditions, failed to elect its representatives,

¹ *Vide* letter in Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 135, 54 MG.

² *Supra*, p. 72.

the government, according to the decree of June 23, was empowered to appoint them provisionally from among "persons most noted for their education and social position" and who were natives of, or for a long time resident in, such province. The latter decree defined the powers of Congress as follows :

. . . to watch over the general interests of the Filipino people and the enforcement of revolutionary laws; to discuss and pass said laws; to discuss and approve treaties and loans before their ratification; to examine and approve the accounts of the general expenses which shall be presented to it annually by the Secretary of the Treasury, as well as the taxes, extraordinary and otherwise, which may be imposed in the future.

Congress, moreover, was to be heard on "all serious and vitally important questions" the determination of which admitted of delay. It was invested with powers to summon and interpellate any of the Secretaries. It was the sole judge of its elections; and its place of assemblage was declared "sacred and inviolable" which no armed force could enter, "unless the president of said body should request it for the purpose of reestablishing internal order". The President could "in no manner whatsoever prevent the assembling of Congress, or interfere in the sessions of the same"; but he shared with it, through the Secretaries, the right to initiate laws and had the power of veto.

Among other matters provided for in the decree of June 23 were the establishment of a revolutionary committee abroad, and the creation of a permanent commission of justice.¹ The latter was to be composed of nine members :

¹For an account of the activities of the revolutionary committee abroad, see *infra*, pp. 115-129. The selection of the seven representatives who composed the permanent commission of justice with the vice-president and one of the secretaries of Congress was made during the morning session of Sept. 17, 1898. See *La República filipina*, Sept. 19, 1898.

the vice-president of Congress as president, one of the secretaries of Congress, and seven representatives chosen by that body. The commission of justice, therefore, was but a committee of Congress. Its duties were to hear and adjudge criminal cases appealed from the provincial councils, and "suits instituted against the Secretaries of the Government, the provincial and popular chiefs, and the provincial councillors."

Such, in brief, were the main features of the Revolutionary Government. In establishing it, no one system was closely followed; modern theories were "adapted to the circumstances and the ideas of the moment to the essential conditions then existing."¹ A creation of the executive, it undoubtedly meant to leave that department supreme. Moreover, both Agoncillo and Mabini believed in a strong executive who, to use Agoncillo's words, "alone will exercise absolute power." Then, too, the exigencies of war would make this imperative. Yet the executive, far from wishing, or wishing to appear, to exercise despotic powers created a legislature which was declared inviolable and in whose sessions no one, not even the President, could interfere, whose members were empowered to summon and interpellate any of the Secretaries, and having one of its committees erected into a permanent commission of justice with exclusive jurisdiction over all suits brought against the Secretaries in question. These powers, plus the overwhelming influence of the men who later composed the Congress, as subsequent developments showed, made that body for a brief period a strong rival of the executive in the control of affairs.

On July 15 the following persons were named Secretaries: Baldomero Aguinaldo, War and Public Works; Leandro

¹ Rafael Palma, "Mabini, político y estadista" in *The Philippine Review*, Manila, April, 1919.

Ibarra, Interior; Mariano Trias, Treasury.¹ The Department of Foreign Relations was taken over temporarily by the President until a suitable appointment could be made.² Later, on September 26, two additional portfolios were created, namely: one of Justice to which Gregorio Araneta, a prominent attorney of Bisayan birth, was appointed; and another of Promotion (*Fomento*) which was filled by Felipe Buencamino.³ At the same time, Cayetano Arellano⁴ was offered the portfolio of Foreign Affairs; but after taking the oath of office he abandoned the post. Strictly speaking, the Secretaries were simply heads of departments and, till the reorganization of the Council on January 2, 1899, did not constitute a cabinet; but they met from time to time (on

¹ *Vide* decree of July 15, 1898, in Retana, *Archivo*, vol. v, pp. 393-403; Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 59, 37 MG; Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 184 *et seq.*

² According to Pablo Tecson, one of the secretaries of Congress, Mabini was Secretary of Foreign Affairs in what he called the first cabinet; but this is evidently an error. His *Observaciones*, or a copy of it, consisting of brief notes apparently hastily written, is in the possession of M. M. Kalaw.

³ Decree of Sept. 26 in *El Heraldo de la revolución*, Malolos, Oct. 2, 1898. A slightly different list, dated also on September 26, is printed by Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 261, 80 MG, but this "decree" probably was not released, or, if released at all, must have been either withdrawn or immediately supplanted by the other.

⁴ Cayetano Arellano was a distinguished Filipino jurist, born in the province of Bataan and educated in the University of Sto. Tomás. According to *El Heraldo*, October 2, 1898, he took the oath of office on October 1, 1898, together with Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, a nephew of the *déporté* of 1872 of that name and a companion of Rizal in Europe, who was sworn in as Director of Diplomacy. However, Arellano never discharged the duties of Secretary of Foreign Relations, as he was not in sympathy with the revolution; and Dr. Pardo de Tavera, according to Pablo Tecson (*op. cit.*), assumed the office as Acting Secretary. In fact, Arellano was among the first few men who early welcomed American rule and became the first Chief Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court under the new régime.

September 26, 1898, they were instructed to meet three times a week) to exchange ideas and agree upon the policy of the administration in general. Aguinaldo seems to have presided over their meetings to the end of the year 1898; certainly when "treating of serious and urgent matters."¹

The Presidency established and both Admiral Dewey and General Anderson informed of its formation,² an opportunity was sought for another formal enunciation of the desire for independence. For this purpose a convention of "local presidents" (town chiefs) was held at Bacoor, then the seat of the Filipino Government, on August 1 and a lengthy

¹ There are indications that point to this conclusion: first, Aguinaldo was empowered to call a meeting of the Secretaries whenever he deemed it necessary (see decree of Sept. 26 cited above), and, second, the content of a telegram from Mabini at Malolos to Aguinaldo at Cawit under date of December 29, 1898, reading: "Most urgent. You must come here immediately. Trias is sick. We can come to no decision in regard to the Tarlac matter. Can not constitute a government without you." For telegram, see Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 346, 1 KU. See also Tecson (*op. cit.*), who avers that Aguinaldo presided over the meetings of what he called the first cabinet.

² Aguinaldo to Dewey, July 15, 1898, in *House Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 3, appendix, pp. III *et seq.* The letter encloses the decree of June 18 and instructions of June 20 regarding the organization of municipal and provincial governments, the decree of June 23 and instructions of June 27 regarding the organization of the Revolutionary Government, and the "Message of the President of the Philippine Revolution" of June 23. In the documentary source cited the instructions of June 20 and of June 27 are only given in briefs. These two instructions are printed in full in Retana, *Archivo*, vol. v, pp. 347-363, 375-381; and also in Kalaw, *Documentos Constitucionales*, appendix, pp. 151-164, 176-181. LeRoy says (*The Americans in the Philippines*, vol. i, p. 206) that the enclosures consisted of the "decrees of June 18 and 27", but this statement is inexact. The letter alone, without the enclosures, is reprinted in full in Chadwick, *The Relations of the United States and Spain: The Spanish-American War*, vol. ii, p. 380.

Aguinaldo's letter to General Anderson, sent on the same day as that to Dewey, has apparently been lost, but an official abstract of it is printed in *Senate Documents*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., no. 208, p. 6.

document drawn up and signed by those attending. A copy of this document, certified to by Aguinaldo and Ibarra (Secretary of the Interior), bears the signatures of one hundred and ninety town chiefs representing presumably as many municipalities in ten different provinces, and a statement that the town chiefs, without specifying their names or numbers, of six other provinces also signed.¹ The document, which acclaims Aguinaldo as President of the Revolutionary Government, contains the following sweeping but significant statement: "In virtue of the foregoing considerations, the undersigned, interpreting the unanimous aspiration of the towns they represent and complying with the instructions received from them and with the duties pertaining to the powers with which they are invested, proclaim solemnly in the face of the world the independence of the Philippines." Copies of this document were sent out on August 6, together with a note addressed "To Foreign Governments",² in which Aguinaldo implored the "civilized world" to recognize the belligerency and the independence of the Archipelago.

SITUATION BEFORE AND AFTER AUGUST 13

Meanwhile the siege of Manila was in progress. The Filipino troops conducting it constantly increased, and rose

¹ Text in Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 163, 62 MG *et seq.*; Retana, *Archivo*, vol. v, pp. 410-417; Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 196 *et seq.*; *Senate Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 62, pt. ii, pp. 438-439.

² Text in Kalaw, *op. cit.*, pp. 202 *et seq.*; Retana, *op. cit.*, pp. 407-409; Foreman, *The Philippine Islands*, ed. 1906, pp. 457-458. What amounted to an official English version is found in a pamphlet entitled *Memorial to the Senate of the United States, accompanying letter from Sr. Felipe Agoncillo to the Secretary of State dated January 30, 1899, with the laws of the Philippine Republic . . .*, appendix, pp. 26-27.

from 10,000 in June to 12,000 or more by the end of July.¹ That the siege was effective was generally admitted;² and the success of the revolutionary forces in Manila and Cavite was, according to Admiral Dewey, "of material importance in isolating our (American) marine force at Cavite from Spanish attack and in preparing a foothold for our troops when they should arrive."³

When the American land forces, numbering nearly 11,000 men in all, finally came on June 30, July 17 and July 31, they found their Spanish antagonists imprisoned within the city and therefore virtually impotent. Coming in three separate expeditions,⁴ they disembarked without opposition. But now difficulties began to arise. The chief problem of the American officers was, of course, to get their forces in

¹ *Supra*, p. 78.

² Murat Halstead, who calls himself "Historian of the Philippine Expedition", says (*The Story of the Philippines and Our New Possessions*, Chicago, 1898, p. 144): "... the service which it (insurgent army) has rendered should not be underestimated. ... It constantly annoyed and harassed the Spaniards in the trenches, keeping them up at night and wearing them out with fatigue; and it invested Manila early in July so completely that all supplies were cut off and the inhabitants as well as the Spanish troops were forced to live on horse and buffalo meat, and the Chinese population on cats and dogs." For the views of some of the American officers, see *Autobiography of George Dewey*, pp. 248, 269; "Statement of Gen. C. A. Whittier, U. S. V." in *Senate Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 62, pp. 499-501; "Memoranda Concerning the Situation in the Philippines" by Gen. Greene in *ibid.*, pp. 423-424; and "Note of Explanation", evidently by Major Bell, in *Senate Documents*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., no. 208, p. 27. For a Spanish admission to the same effect, see letter of Governor-General Fermin Jáudenes to General Merriitt and Admiral Dewey on August 7, 1898, in *House Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 2, p. 54.

³ *Autobiography*, p. 248.

⁴ For accounts of the American expeditions, see Chadwick, *The Relations of the United States and Spain: The Spanish-American War*, vol. ii, pp. 369-396; LeRoy, *The Americans in the Philippines*, vol. i, pp. 219 et seq.

position for a decisive attack on the capital without formally joining with the Filipino troops, or allowing the latter to cooperate officially with them. Given the unique relations which then obtained between the two peoples, this was assuredly a most delicate task to accomplish. The situation was especially difficult because the American base of operations south of Manila was behind the insurgent line of trenches, and the approach to the city from this quarter and elsewhere was effectually barred. General Merritt, in command of the Philippine expedition, describes it at the end of July as follows:

. . . These troops (Filipino), well supplied with small arms, with plenty of ammunition and several field guns, had obtained positions of investment opposite the Spanish line of detached works throughout their entire extent; and on the particular road called *Calle Real*, passing along the front of General Greene's brigade camp and running through Malate to Manila, the insurgents had established an earthwork or trench within 800 yards of the powder-magazine fort. They also occupied as well the road to the right, leading from the village of Pasay, and the approach by the beach was also in their possession. This anomalous state of affairs, namely, having a line of quasi-hostile native troops between our forces and the Spanish position, was, of course, very objectionable, but it was difficult to deal with, owing to the peculiar condition of our relations with the insurgents. . . .¹

It soon became apparent, however, that an avenue of approach must be secured, and, after some negotiations, General Greene, who was instructed by General Merritt to secure by informal conference the withdrawal of the Filipino troops from the trenches in front of his brigade, finally suc-

¹ Merritt's "Report," August 31, 1898, in *House Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 2, pp. 47-48.

ceeded in gaining the consent of Aguinaldo to occupy these positions. Sometime later, some of the adjoining trenches further inland were also given up by the insurgents on General Anderson's request.¹ These trenches were occupied by General MacArthur's men a few days before the fall of Manila.

- With the landing of the American forces and their superior military equipment, the situation of the beleaguered capital became quite hopeless. Governor-General Augustin fully realized this and so informed the Madrid Government. For his pains he was released from duty on August 4 and ordered to turn the government over to Fermin Jáudenes, the next ranking officer. His successor, who was instructed to "preserve the Philippines to the sovereignty of Spain", soon found out that he had an impossible task in his hands. He governed only eight or nine days; then he surrendered Manila to the United States forces² after an attack by the Americans in which Filipino troops participated.³ The attack was in some respects a sham, for Jáudenes had agreed virtually to surrender after a show of resistance "for the sake of Spanish honor". LeRoy thinks that the capital was captured "by threat". However, the rank and file of the attacking forces, with the exception of Admiral Dewey,

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 62 *et seq.*; *Senate Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 62, p. 367; *ibid.*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., no. 208, p. 17.

² For the correspondence between the Spanish and American authorities prior to the fall of Manila, see "Report" of Gen. Merritt for August 31, *loc. cit.*, pp. 54-55.

³ LeRoy, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 243, 254 *et seq.*; Calderón, *Mis Memorias sobre la revolución filipina*, pp. 150 *et seq.* See also various telegrams between General Aguinaldo and the commanding officers of his advanced columns in Taylor, vol. iii, exhibits 106-109, 112, 46 MG-47 MG. A general description of the attack on Manila written by an eye witness, Mr. John F. Bass, as the battle was in progress is printed in *Harper's History of the War in the Philippines*, pp. 50-52.

General Merritt and a few others, did not know that an informal understanding existed between Dewey and Jáudenes. Admiral Dewey describes the situation as follows:

. . . André (the Belgian Consul in Manila) continued with General Jáudenes the negotiations begun with Don Basilio (Augustín). These progressed with varying success and, numerous side issues, but always with the stipulation on the part of the Spaniards that if they surrendered the insurgents should be kept out of the city. Finally, without making any definite promise, General Jáudenes agreed that, although he would not surrender except in consequence of an attack upon the city, yet, unless the city were bombarded, the Manila batteries would not open on our ships. Moreover, once the attack was begun he would, if willing to surrender, hoist a white flag over a certain point in the walled city from which it could be seen both from Malate and from the bay. . . .¹

The attack began a little after half-past nine in the morning when Dewey's ships opened fire on the fort in Malate, south of the walled city. Approximately an hour afterwards, the American troops occupied this fort. Shortly before half-past eleven the white flag was seen hoisted "on the appointed place on the southwest bastion of the city wall",² showing that the "threat" had worked. Meanwhile the Americans had taken not only Malate but also Ermita and penetrated into Pako at about the same time that the insurgent forces poured into these districts, in spite of General Merritt's attempt to prevent such an advance and of General Anderson's effort to intercept it.³ Late in the

¹ *Autobiography*, p. 274.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 278-279.

³ In the evening of August 12, General Merritt ordered General Anderson to notify General Aguinaldo that his troops should not enter Manila. Consequently Anderson sent Aguinaldo this telegram: "Do not let your troops enter Manila without the permission of the American

afternoon, the bases of surrender were agreed upon, and at half-past five the American flag was raised over Fort Santiago on the city wall. The next day, August 14, the final act of capitulation¹ was signed by a mixed commission of American and Spanish officers appointed *ad hoc*, and American occupation of the city of Manila began. In the negotiations, the existence of the Revolutionary Government and its claims were completely ignored.

Thus Manila fell, captured "by threat". It is perhaps futile to theorize whether the vastly superior fighting strength of the American forces or the untenable position to which the insurgents had reduced the invested capital had the greater share in preparing the Spanish mind to surrender; it is equally futile to speculate upon the possibility or probability of one or the other alone of the two forces capturing or failing to capture the city. The significant fact is that both these factors were at work, and that the revolutionists were largely responsible in expediting the city's downfall as the American forces were subsequently in bringing it about. In this respect, Dewey and Merritt only completed the task Aguinaldo and his men had begun. Moreover the insurgents, in the words of General Anderson, "considered the war as their war, Manila as their capital and Luzon as their country."² Hence they highly resented General Mer-

commander. On this side of the Pasig river, you will be under our fire." (Taylor, vol. iv, exhibit 739, 65 GR.) The receipt of this telegram was announced and its contents transmitted by General Noriel to General Aguinaldo in another telegram under the same date. (Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 103, 46 MG.) For a general discussion see Anderson, "Our Rule in the Philippines" in the *North American Review*, February, 1900; LeRoy, *The Americans in the Philippines*, vol. i, p. 239; John T. Macleod, *History of the Revolution of the Filipinos against the United States Government* (unpublished), pt. i, ch. xiii.

¹ Text in Merritt's "Report", August 31, 1898, *loc. cit.*, pp. 55-56; also in Halstead, *The Story of the Philippines*, pp. 182-183.

² "Our Rule in the Philippines" in *North American Review*, February, 1900.

riti's interdict and felt themselves greatly wronged at being excluded from participation in a victory they had prepared and helped to win.

On the other hand, General Merritt conducted himself in obedience to instructions from Washington. According to him, his "instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the Islands by the American land forces, and stated that 'the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants' ".¹ Consequently he conducted the military operations of August 13 without consulting Aguinaldo and without any reference to the situation of the Filipino troops. Moreover, he "did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader", until he should take the capital and be in a position to dictate terms should the "pretensions" of the former clash with his "designs".

Filipino "pretensions" did clash with American "designs". In the face of Merritt's assertiveness, impelled undoubtedly by the determined spirit of the President's instructions, this was to be expected, especially because of the undefined intention of the United States with respect to the future of the Archipelago,—a condition of affairs which, thus far, had animated the revolutionists with a composite feeling of trust, suspicion and fear. If it could be said that, given Dewey's generous friendship with them and Anderson's expressed desire for cooperation, the feeling ranged between trust and suspicion, then with Merritt's studied aloofness and undisguised assumption of authority, particularly both immediately before and after August 13, the feeling perhaps alternated between suspicion and fear. Indeed an outbreak of hostilities between the two forces on August

¹ Merritt's "Report", *loc. cit.*, p. 49. For instructions, see Chadwick, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 396-397.

13 was avoided only with great difficulty. The refusal of the American military authorities to permit joint occupation of Manila was necessary, doubtless, to prevent complications that a dual control might entail; but, at the same time, it aroused further suspicion and warned the Filipinos that American retention of the Philippines was not only possible but probable.¹ Thereafter it was manifest that the interests of the United States in the Philippines were not identical with those of the revolutionists. The insurgents accepted the inevitable, withdrew their forces from the capital, and bowed their heads before a *fait accompli*, even while they dared to hope that all might yet be well.²

The optimism of the insurgents was not altogether groundless, in spite of the unpleasant developments of August 13. As far as their cause went, the outlook certainly was not without promise, although somewhat gloomy. After all, the United States army of occupation held only the city of Manila and the town of Cavite, and it was stopped from further acquisition of territory by the proclamation of a truce between the United States and Spain.³ Therefore American participation in the war was virtually removed. Yet the continued presence of the United States forces in Manila afforded the revolutionists virtual protection from foreign encroachments and consequently worked to their advantage by giving them a free hand in the prosecution of their plans. The insurgents were not blind to the possibilities before

¹ H. Parker Willis, *Our Philippine Problem*, New York, 1905, p. 9.

² John Foreman, "Will the United States Withdraw from the Philippines?" in *National Review*, September, 1900, p. 52.

³ The protocol of peace between the United States and Spain was signed in Washington, D. C. in the afternoon of August 12 just before the fall of Manila (August 13), there being about twelve hours of difference between Washington and Manila time. See text of protocol in *Senate Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 62, pt. ii, p. 282.

them and, impelled by the growing fear of probable retention, they now sought to turn the scale in their favor whenever the final reckoning might come by strengthening their position in every possible way. They did this chiefly by: (1) convoking the national Congress; (2) propaganda; (3) "diplomatic" negotiations; and (4) extension of the insurgent authority to distant provinces.

THE MALOLOS CONGRESS AND ITS WORK

In the hope of making the Central Government more representative and of attracting to it the undivided support of the better educated class, the revolutionary Congress was convoked on the fifteenth of September at the town of Malolos. Although in accordance with the decree of June 18 the Congress was to be composed of representatives "elected" by the town chiefs, it soon became evident that not all the provinces could then send delegates because of the war conditions prevailing in some, of the successful preservation of Spanish power in others, and of the great distance from Malolos of many of them. Rather than delay the assembling of the Congress, it was decided to bridge over the difficulty by authorizing the President of the Revolutionary Government, as already stated, to appoint provisional representatives for such provinces as were unable to choose theirs.¹ The Congress that assembled on September 15, therefore, was composed of both appointed and "elected" deputies. Of the fifty delegates reported as present in the inaugural session,² thirty-five (probably thirty-

¹ *Supra*, p. 82. The appointment of representatives took place on September 4 and 10. See decrees giving list of appointees in Calderón, *Mis Memorias sobre la revolución filipina*, appendix, pp. 1-3.

² *La República filipina*, Sept. 16, 1898, gives a list of those present. Foreman (*The Philippine Islands*, ed. 1906, p. 469) says there were fifty-four delegates present, while Dean C. Worcester (*The Philippines Past*

seven) owed their position to appointment and thirteen to "election"¹ (although one of the thirteen was both appointed and "elected"). Some of the appointed representatives were chosen subsequently by their constituencies, but the rest held over, so that the Congress remained partly "elected" and partly appointed. Of the ninety-two representatives officially given later as members,² at least thirty-five were "elected". It is safe to assume at all events that less than one half of the representatives who met in Malolos owed their position to "election".

The Congress was formally opened at Barasoain church in Malolos by General Aguinaldo in his capacity as President of the Revolutionary Government. The inaugural session was attended, not only by the representatives present, but also by a number of high functionaries, civil and military, of the Filipino Government and by numerous spectators.³ The opening took place shortly after nine o'clock in the morning, Aguinaldo reading, both in Tagalog and Spanish,

and Present, ed. 1921, p. 264) gives the number as eighty-five. Malcolm (*The Constitutional Law of the Philippine Islands*, Rochester, N. Y., 1920, p. 110) evidently follows Worcester's figure.

¹ Compare the list of those reported present by *La República filipina* with the list of appointees in the decrees of September 4 and 10, and also with a later list of appointed and elected representatives printed in Taylor, vol. iv, exhibit 673, 31 GR-32 GR. The representative who was both appointed and elected was Hugo Ilagan. See *La Independencia*, Sept. 17, 1898.

² See list in *Constitución política de la República Filipina*, Barasoain, 1899, pp. 45-46. Another list, which is nearly identical with the one just mentioned, was presented by a Filipino commission to an American commission in a conference held between them on Jan. 29, 1899. The latter list is printed in *Senate Documents*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., no. 331, pt. iii, p. 2747. To find out those elected, compare either with the list of appointed and elected representatives printed in Taylor.

³ *La Independencia*, Sept. 16, 1898; *La República filipina*, Sept. 16, 1898.

his message¹ in which he announced the object of the Congress to be to frame a constitution which he defined as the "supreme expression of the popular will", and to draft the laws which were "to govern the political destiny of our fatherland." According to an eye witness, Francis D. Millet, the representatives were "exceptionally alert, keen, and intelligent in appearance, and, as a mass, much superior to the native as one sees him in ordinary life."²

It is generally admitted that the men who composed the revolutionary Congress were among the best that the Philippines could furnish. There were some, without doubt, whose training lacked much that was desirable, but the majority were men of high education. Of them "about forty were lawyers, sixteen physicians, five pharmacists, two engineers and one priest. The rest were merchants and farmers. Many of the representatives were graduates of European universities."³

The first three days of the session were devoted mainly to organization.⁴ On September 15, after the opening ceremonies were concluded, the Congress met under the presidency of Rianzares Bautista and appointed two committees, namely, a committee of five to go over the credentials of the delegates, and a committee of three to examine the report of

¹ Text in *ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1898; Calderón, *op. cit.*, appendix, pp. 3-5; Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, appendix, pp. 207 *et seq.*; Malcolm, *The Government of the Philippine Islands*, pp. 137-139.

² "The Filipino Republic" in *Harper's History of the War in the Philippines*, p. 71.

³ Jorge Bocobo, "Felipe G. Calderón and the Malolos Constitution" in *The Filipino People*, Washington, D. C., September, 1914.

⁴ *La República filipina*, Sept. 16, 17, and 19, 1898; *La Independencia*, Sept. 16 and 17, 1898. The reports on the activities of Congress printed by *La República filipina* are considered the most reliable source of information, written as they were by Pablo Ocampo, one of the secretaries of that body.

the committee on credentials. On September 16, the election of officers took place, resulting in the selection of the following: Pedro A. Paterno, president; Benito Legarda, vice-president; and Gregorio Aranea and Pablo Ocampo, secretaries. On September 17, after listening to an impassioned speech by its president,¹ the Congress proceeded to elect the "permanent commission of justice" as provided for in the decree of June 23. In the afternoon of the same day, it constituted its committees, of which there were eight, namely, (1) committee on congratulations (*felicitación*); (2) committee on message; (3) committee on internal regulations (*reglamento interior*); (4) committee on reception (*de recibo*); (5) committee on appropriations; (6) committee on festivities; (7) committee on style; and (8) committee to draft the constitution.

A significant act of the Congress was the "solemn ratification" of the independence of the Philippines. This took place on September 29. Aguinaldo at the head of a popular parade with Paterno and other high government functionaries "walked to the Congress House," Foreman says, "amidst the vociferous acclamations of the people and the strains of music."² There the formal ceremonies were held shortly before half-past ten in the morning, with Aguinaldo making a speech in Tagalog and Paterno, in Spanish.³ In his address Aguinaldo declared that there were no longer any Filipinos who desired annexation or autonomy, and that the whole country was now one in favor of independence. He

¹Text in *La República filipina*, Sept. 19, 1898; Calderón, *op. cit.*, appendix, pp. 6-8.

²*The Philippine Islands*, ed. 1906, p. 470. Contemporary accounts of the event are found in *La República filipina*, *La Independencia*, and *El Heraldo de la revolución*.

³Text of speeches in *El Heraldo*, October 2 and 6, 1898; Calderón, *Mis Memorias*, appendix, pp. 10-16.

referred to the Monroe Doctrine, which he said stood for the principle of "America for the Americans" and announced his adherence to a similar policy for the Archipelago, namely, "Philippines for the Filipinos." At noon a banquet, attended by about two hundred people, was held. In the evening, the festivities closed with a ball at Aguinaldo's residence. The day was declared by the revolutionary Congress a holiday in perpetuity.

Of the measures passed by Congress, two deserve discussion, namely, the act providing for a national loan, and the "political constitution." Regarding the first of these it may be said that, although the instructions of June 20, as already stated, declared in force all the local taxes under the Spanish régime, except those derived from cock-fighting and other games of chance, the expenses of the government, as it entered more fully into the discharge of its multifarious functions, multiplied and it became imperative that its resources be increased. Among the means adopted to this end was the sale of government bonds, a plan to this effect having been presented to Congress on October 4 by Benito Legarda in behalf of the Treasury Department.¹ Reported on favorably by a committee of three to which the plan had been referred, it was approved by Congress on October 18. After some delay, the act received Aguinaldo's signature on November 26.²

The act authorized the Revolutionary Government "to effect for the treasury of the nation an interior loan of 20,000,000 dollars (Mexican) to be redeemed in forty

¹ *La República filipina*, October 5, 1898. The passage of the measure is reported in the same paper for Oct. 19.

² Text in *El Heraldo*, December 1, 1898; Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 300, 90 MG. But see also a circular, dated Nov. 4, 1898, informing the provincial presidents of the forthcoming loan, in the latter, vol. iii, exhibit 279, 86 MG.

years after the date of issue." The method of redemption was left to the government to decide. The subscribers were to receive interest on the amount subscribed at the rate of 6% per annum, payable semi-annually or quarterly, if the condition of the treasury should permit. The same act authorized the government "to issue paper money of forced circulation to the value of 3,000,000 dollars to be redeemed in three years." This act was made the basis of a national loan subsequently floated by the government through the sale of bonds amounting to 5,000,000 dollars,¹ of which, according to Taylor, about 388,650 dollars were actually sold. Fortunately, no use had been made of the authority granted "to issue paper money of forced circulation".

By far the most important piece of legislation framed and passed by Congress was the "political constitution", now generally referred to as the "Malolos Constitution". The committee appointed to draft it was composed of nineteen persons, but the draft as submitted to Congress was practically the work of Felipe G. Calderón, a Manila attorney. For the purpose two plans were offered—one by Mabini, and another by Ricardo Regidor.² The Mabini plan, entitled *Programa constitucional de la República Filipina*,³ as well as that by Regidor, which was strongly supported by Paterno, were, according to Calderón, based on the Spanish republican constitution, and neither completely satisfied him. He therefore decided to draft a third one, "taking for model" he

¹ *Infra*, p. 168.

² T. M. Kalaw, *Las Memorias de Felipe G. Calderón in The Philippine Review*, Manila, January, 1919, p. 50.

³ Published in pamphlet form under the auspices of the Filipino Government in Cavite, 1898; copy in Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, appendix, pp. 90 *et seq.*; English translation in Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 18, 12 MG—20 MG; translation in Tagalog in separate pamphlet entitled *Panukalâ sa pagkakanâ ng republika ng Filipinas*, Cavite, 1898.

says, "in the part dealing with the organization of the government the constitutions of the South American republics, and with the legislative power in particular, the constitution of Costa Rica."¹ However, in an explanatory note (*exposición de motivos*)² submitted with the draft, he stated that the work was derived "not only from the French constitution, which had served as the basis, but also from those of Belgium, Mexico, Brazil, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Guatemala, considering these nations the most akin to our country."

The draft was reported to Congress by Calderón himself on October 8.³ Printed copies were distributed on October 21, but the discussion did not begin in earnest till October 25. The voting by article commenced on October 28 and lasted till November 29. In general, the amendments proposed were for the purpose of clarifying the diction or improving the arrangement rather than changing the fundamental principle or principles involved. There was one exception: the conflict that raged over the religious question.

As reported by the committee, Title III of the constitutional plan consisted of three articles: the first of these declared the Roman Catholic Apostolic religion to be that of the state; the second proclaimed religious toleration; and the third provided that no one should be disqualified from public service or excluded from the exercise of civil and political rights on account of religion.⁴ From this it is

¹ Kalaw, *Las Memorias de Felipe G. Calderón*, loc. cit., p. 50

² Text in Calderón, *Mis Memorias*, appendix, pp. 16-18.

³ *La República filipina*, Oct. 9, 1898. The periodic reports on the activities of Congress printed by this paper are very useful in this connection; most of them are reprinted in Calderón, *Mis Memorias*, appendix, pp. 18-99.

⁴ Text of original articles in Calderón, *Mis Memorias*, appendix, pp. 71-72.

evident that the committee as a whole, certainly Calderón for one, although accepting religious toleration, did not believe in religious freedom, i. e. the complete separation of church and state. But there were many delegates who strongly stood for absolute religious liberty; in fact, one of the most prominent members of the committee on the constitution (Tomás G. del Rosario), was early known to take this attitude. That these men were in earnest in their divergent beliefs and would not easily compromise was revealed in the session of October 25, when Arcadio del Rosario, one of the deputies, squarely opposed the proposed union of church and state, which Calderón felt immediately called upon to defend.¹ To preserve harmony and calm excited feelings, it was agreed on October 28 to postpone the discussion of the article in question.

But when, on November 22, the religious question again came up for discussion, the struggle was resumed. The session hall was packed, there being a general admixture of women in the audience. The contest was bitter and dragged on for a few days. The speeches were impassioned and long,² one of the deputies having been reported to have spoken for approximately five hours. Those who were in favor of religious liberty argued that the adoption of any religion as the religion of the state would mean essentially protection of one cult and discrimination against others; hence, they said, it was a restriction on individual liberty. Moreover, they (Tomás del Rosario, in particular) tried to show that the trend of the world's progress was toward the emancipation of the state from ecclesiastical tutelage. Those advocating the union of church and state, on the other hand, argued that the state could no more exist without religion

¹ *La República filipina*, Oct. 26, 1898.

² *Ibid.*, November 24, 25, 26, 27 and Dec. 1, 1898; *La Independencia*, Nov. 30, 1898.

than an individual in whom it was innate, and that, in the case of the Philippines, the religion of the state should be the Roman Catholic, which was the religion of the Filipino people or nearly all of them. Calderón, in particular, bewailed the stand of those who advocated religious freedom, saying that such a thing was, "philosophically considered, an impossibility,—a historical absurdity." He explained that religious toleration and the separation of church and state were two different things, and believed that it would be a political suicide, "absolute nonsense," to institute the latter in the Philippines where, according to him, the only bond of union that drew the people together was the Catholic Church. He thought that "the strongest and the best governed nations of the world" had established churches and pointed to the examples of France, England and Russia. He asserted also that the Filipinos were Catholic in customs and usages, and that customs and usages determined the laws and not vice-versa.

The vote on the question took place on November 29.¹ What Congress really did was to accept an amendment proposed by Tomás G. del Rosario and others. The first vote resulted in a tie: 25 for and 25 against the amendment,—one of the deputies, Pablo Tecson, abstaining from voting. Paterno, as presiding officer, refused to break the deadlock, and a second vote was decided upon. This time Tecson voted and his vote resolved the tie, resulting in the acceptance of the amendment. As amended, Title III was reduced to one article as follows: "The state recognizes the freedom and equality of religions, as well as the separation of church and state."

After further slight alterations, mainly in the section entitled "Transitory Provisions", the whole document was

¹ *La República filipina*, Dec. 3, 1898.

declared adopted, and then sent to Aguinaldo for executive approval. Calderón is authority for the statement that "all the members of Congress" desired to have a republic proclaimed before the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris, and, therefore, they had hoped that Aguinaldo would sanction the constitution without delay.¹ In this, they were greatly disappointed.

To understand the complication that now arose, it would be well to remember the relations between Aguinaldo and Mabini at this time. The latter as the former's chief adviser, was highly instrumental in shaping the policy of the government. His influence on Aguinaldo was undeniable and he was often spoken of by his enemies as the "black chamber of the President" (*cámara negra del Presidente*). Being greatly in favor, from the beginning, of a strong executive, which he thought was indispensable for the safety of the "ship of state" in those turbulent days, Mabini naturally opposed an instrument that greatly weakened the power of the President and, according to Calderón, regarded the legislature as "the synthesis of popular sovereignty and the genuine repository of the highest prerogative of the nation."² He argued that the Malolos Congress was neither a constituent assembly nor a legislature, but merely an advisory body. Hence, he thought that it should limit its activities to advising the President as to the best means of strengthening the military organization and raising money for its support instead of adopting a constitution and passing laws.³ His position was clearly stated by himself in a document dated December 13 which reads in part as follows (Taylor's translation):

¹ Calderón, *Mis Memorias*, appendix, p. 99.

² *Mis Memorias*, appendix, p. 17.

³ Mabini, *La Revolución filipina*, ch. ix.

That (constitution) passed by Congress is not acceptable at this time for two reasons: 1. Because the constitutional guarantees in favor of individual liberties cannot be maintained for the present, since this is the very moment when the necessity of the predominance of the military element is indicated; and 2. Because it would not be advisable to openly establish the separation of the church from the state at this critical time, giving rise to the withdrawal of the supporters of the religion of the state.

Nor would it be advisable that said constitution should govern in what relates to the organization and operation of the three powers. The ship of state is threatened by great dangers and terrible tempests, and this circumstance in my opinion renders it advisable that the three powers be to a certain extent combined for the present in a single hand, so that she may be guided with the force necessary in order to avoid all reefs.¹

Around Mabini, a man of exceptionally strong character despite his physical disability (being a paralytic), gathered all those who believed in strengthening the executive, or rather preventing Congress from gaining a position of supremacy. These men, who numbered among them the militarists, formed a group of "absolutists" ² and tried to block the promulgation of the constitution. Against this group was another composed mainly of representatives of Congress, "the constitutionalists", who urged the immediate proclamation of the republic under the proposed constitution.

The position of the "absolutists" was greatly strengthened by a sudden reorganization of the cabinet, which was officially announced on January 2, 1899. According to Mabini,³

¹ Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 320, 95 MQ. See comment on Taylor's translation *supra*, p. 35 (footnote).

² Kalaw, "Constitutional Plan of the Philippine Revolution" in the *Philippine Law Journal*, Manila, December, 1914, p. 215; Malcolm, *The Government of the Philippine Islands*, p. 129. See also Mabini to Aguinaldo, January, 1899, in Taylor, vol. iii, exhibits 349, 350, 2 KU-3 KU.

³ *La Revolución filipina*, ch. ix.

the reorganization was decided upon at the receipt of a belated announcement from Arellano that it would be impossible for him to perform the duties of the office of the Secretary of Foreign Relations. While this was undeniably true, it would be well, nevertheless, to remember that the retiring cabinet was "constitutionalist" in sympathy and had disapproved of Mabini's "absolutist" ideas,¹ while the new one with Mabini at the head was, with possibly one exception, made up of the President's personal supporters.² Its advent at this juncture was probably not accidental but calculated to further the interests of the executive in the pending conflict over the constitution.

To this development Congress, the bulwark of "constitutionalism," remained obdurate. Though somewhat weakened by the defection about this time of some of the "learned" (*ilustrados*), most of whom were "constitutionalists", from the Revolutionary Government, it maintained, nevertheless, its spirit unbroken. That the situation was extremely critical was shown by the fact that Aguinaldo's message to Congress, recommending certain amendments to the constitution, which was read before that body by Gracio Gonzaga, Secretary of *Fomento* in the new cabinet, on January 3³ (although the message was dated January 1), drew from a congressional committee, to which it was referred, a lengthy and hostile rejoinder.⁴ The temper of the

¹ *Ibid.*, ch. ix.

² The members of the new cabinet were: Mabini, President and Foreign Affairs; Teodoro Sandico, Interior; Mariano Trias, Treasury; Baldomero Aguinaldo, War; and Gracio Gonzaga, *Fomento*. *Vide* text of decree reorganizing the cabinet in *El Heraldo*, January 4, 1899; see also *La Independencia*, Jan. 4, 1899; Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 355, 4 KU.

³ *La República filipina*, January 4, 1899. For text of message, see Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, appendix, pp. 230 *et seq.*; Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 352, 3 KU.

⁴ Text in Calderón, *Mis Memorias*, appendix, pp. 99-113; Kalaw,

"learned" constitutionalists was well shown in a rather sarcastic comment the committee made on one of the proposed amendments. It said: "This amendment, as it is, is an enigma and the committee does not believe it serious to speak further of it." On the whole the proposed amendments recommended changes in those sections of the constitutional project that restrained or sought to tie the hands of the executive, and urged the postponement of the application of Title III. None of the proposed amendments was acceptable.

Meanwhile the relations between the American troops and the Filipino Government had become very strained, especially after the publication on January 4 of General Otis' "benevolent assimilation" proclamation,¹ an emasculated version of President McKinley's instruction of December 21, 1898. This "conservative" proclamation, though less assertive than the communication from Washington, "created a bad impression" among the revolutionists, who now became convinced that a conflict was inevitable. Before the common danger, party strife was called off and ill-feeling subsided. "Absolutists" and "constitutionalists" became more conciliatory, and, after a long conference on January 18² between Aguinaldo, Paterno and Joaquin Gonzalez, the situation greatly improved. The next day, Aguinaldo sent a message to Congress,³ announcing the de-

Documentos constitucionales, appendix, pp. 240 *et seq.* This paper, according to Calderón, was prepared by himself at the request of the members of the Congressional committee.

¹For text of McKinley's instructions and of Otis' proclamation, see *Senate Documents*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., no. 331, pt. i, pp. 776-778. A facsimile of the latter as issued in English, Spanish and Tagalog is reproduced in *Harper's History*, p. 100. See also Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 253 *et seq.*

²*La República filipina*, Jan. 19, 1899.

³Text in *ibid*, January 22, 1899.

signation of Gracio Gonzaga and Teodoro Sandico to appear before that body for the purpose of pointing out certain articles "whose execution would be inconvenient at this time", and urging the representatives to find some way of altering said articles even provisionally while the "abnormal conditions of the country" prevailed. As a result a compromise was reached and, on January 20, Congress took up some of the amendments proposed by the executive and adopted them as articles 99, 100 and 101 of the project.¹ On January 21, Aguinaldo proclaimed the constitution in effect, and commanded "all the authorities, civil as well as military, of whatever class or rank, to keep it and cause it to be kept, complied with and executed in all its parts, because it is the sovereign will of the Filipino people."²

With the acceptance of the Malolos Constitution, the major work of the Congress was accomplished. Whether it had or not the powers of a constituent assembly is not so important as the fact that it assumed and was generally conceded such powers. That it used them to advantage is now generally admitted. The instrument that it adopted "did conform", Malcolm says, "to many of the tests of a good Constitution" and "did faithfully portray the aspirations and political ideals of the people."³ Then, too, by the assemblage of the Congress there were brought into the council of the Revolutionary Government men of superior education and wide experience.

¹ *Ibid.*, January 22, 1899; also special number issued the same day. The date of the adoption of these amendments as additional articles is a little in doubt, the accounts in the *República filipina* being indefinite as to date, but the Constitution is officially dated as of January 20. Article 55 (No. 2) was amended at the same time.

² *El Heraldo de la revolución*, January 22, 1899.

³ *The Government of the Philippine Islands*, p. 152.

REPUBLICAN PROPAGANDA

The attempt to secure for the Revolutionary Government the greatest active support and popular acceptance through propaganda was already apparent in the summer of 1898,¹ but it did not become more or less systematic till the fall. Briefly speaking, it may be said that the propaganda sought to exalt militant nationalism, to arouse the public mind against foreign rule, to infuse absolute adherence to the Filipino Government and undivided loyalty to Aguinaldo, and to indoctrinate the masses with a belief that the Philippine Republic alone could best secure for the Filipinos peace and happiness. The means employed were various.

¹For example, Mabini's "Decalogue", printed in July, 1898, as a part of his *Programa constitucional de la República Filipina*, under the auspices of the Revolutionary Government, was frankly propaganda literature. A good English translation of this interesting document is found in Jorge Bocobo, "Apolinario Mabini" in *The Filipino People*, August, 1913, pp. 4-8. The "Decalogue" reads in part as follows:

"Fourth. Thou shalt love thy country after God and thy honor and more than thyself: for she is the only Paradise which God has given thee in this life, the only patrimony of thy race, the only inheritance of thy ancestors and the only hope of thy posterity; because of her, thou hast life, love and interests, happiness, honor and God.

"Fifth. Thou shalt strive for the happiness of thy country before thine own, making of her the kingdom of reason, of justice and of labor; for if she be happy, thou, together with thy family, wilt likewise be happy.

"Sixth. Thou shalt strive for the independence of thy country; for only thou canst have any real interest in her advancement and exaltation, because her independence constitutes thine own liberty; her advancement, thy perfection; and her exaltation, thine own glory and immortality.

"Seventh. Thou shalt not recognize in thy country the authority of any person who has not been elected by thee and by thy countrymen: for authority emanates from God, and as God speaks in the conscience of every man, the person designated and proclaimed by the conscience of a whole people is the only one who can use true authority.

"Eighth. Thou shalt strive for a Republic and never for a Monarchy in thy country: for the latter exalts one or several families and founds a dynasty; the former makes a people noble and worthy through reason, great through liberty, and prosperous and brilliant through labor."

The Revolutionary Government not only encouraged the publication of several newspapers (1898-1899) by private individuals, but also founded an official organ. Chief among the former were two dailies: *La República filipina* and *La Independencia*. The government organ, a bi-weekly paper, which came out regularly from September, 1898, to the middle of 1899, was called successively *El Heraldo de la revolución*, *Heraldo filipino*, *Indice oficial* and *Gaceta de Filipinas*. The very names given them leave little doubt as to their mission. Their editorials, moreover, revealed clearly enough the nature of the undertaking. For example, the first editorial of *El Heraldo* reads in part as follows:

Certain things are defined by their name, and such is the case with *El Heraldo de la Revolución*. Not only is it its object to make energetic citizens, decided and ever prompt in obeying the orders of the supreme head of our newly-born Republic, but it is its mission, moreover, to make the beautiful light of liberty radiate even to the hut of the humble laborer and to have everyone breathe the same atmosphere, pervaded with the spirit of independence, so that, saturated with the same idea and animated by the same thought, we may all labor together in behalf of our dear fatherland, the Philippines, of this land of promise, the wonder-world (*encanto*) of the Far East, garden of Malaysia, beloved of its own people and coveted by foreigners. . . .

Consolidate, then, our territory, gloriously redeemed, and sustain the institutions of the newly born Philippine Republic with the force of righteousness and, if necessary, even with the force of arms until the country shall rest with quiet repose in the possession of its legitimate aspirations. . . . ¹

In these papers, moreover, there were printed carefully prepared articles, sometimes in serial form, but always with

¹ *El Heraldo*, September 29, 1898.

the same aim in view. One bore the caption "Republican Catechism" (*Catecismo republicano*), and another, headed "A Mother's Letters" (*Cartas de una madre*), was written by Felipa Sangkapuluan, impersonating the Philippines, to her boy, Patricio, representing a loyal son of the Islands. The nature of these articles, which were composed in both Spanish and Tagalog, as were nearly all those printed in the more important papers, is clearly illustrated by the following quotations.

(a) From the "Republican Catechism":

Is the Philippine insurrection against the Spanish Government just? Yes, because the Spanish Government badly administered our country whose liberties it had sold ignominiously to the friars.

Are we ready for independence? Undoubtedly. We already have sufficiently enlightened men who can govern us and make our laws, and our towns, because of their eminently pacific character, do not lack the good sense to understand the advantages of independence.

What is meant by the independence of a country? It is the freedom to govern itself with its own laws. . . .

What is meant by a republic? It is that form of government in which the person or persons who make the laws are elected by the people. It is the opposite of that which existed under the Spanish domination, when those who came to rule us were appointed by the king of Spain and therefore did not understand us, or know our necessities, and consequently could not satisfy them, or like us.

Is the republic good for the Philippines? Yes, because since the President and other authorities are elected by us, we know beforehand that they can govern us well.¹

(b) From "A Mother's Letters":

¹ *Ibid.*, October 2, 1898.

Woe unto him who, because of indecision or foolish scruples, should desert his post while others struggle for his (country's) honor and independence, thereby giving everyone reason to call him traitor and shamefully point out his family as that of the traitor.

Consequently, I hope, my dear Patricio, that as far as it is in your power, you will do all you can to avoid so great a disgrace, undertaking the return trip as soon as your broken health shall permit, in order to occupy the post of honor which the fatherland reserves for you among the defenders of its sacred name. Were my weakness to permit that I, in spite of age and my sex, should shoulder a gun, I would have done so and taken your place for the sake of the fatherland; but, in times of war, young men are needed, not women or old men.¹

Moreover the insurgent government attempted to utilize in its behalf the great prestige of the Filipino clergy. In fact a decree, issued on July 26, virtually instructed all the Filipino priests serving as curates to arouse the patriotism of their parishioners and to exhort them from the pulpit, and even at the confessional, "to make them realize that, in order to secure stability for our independence, they should respect authority and obey unconditionally the Revolutionary Government of the Philippines, recognizing as its most worthy President and as the only supreme authority in the Philippine Islands the Honorable Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy. . . ." ² Another document having the same purpose was that addressed on October 28 by Father Gregorio Aglipay,³ then "Military Vicar-General" (*Vicario General*

¹ *Ibid.*, December 25, 1898.

² See decree of July 26, 1898, in *El Heraldo*, October 6, 1898.

³ Father Aglipay subsequently became one of the leaders in the guerrilla warfare against the United States and the head of the Independent Philippine Church, more popularly called the Aglipayan Church, "the most important schism from Catholic ranks in the Philippines."

Castrense) for the Filipino Government, to "my dearest brethren of the clergy" in which he besought them to work in harmony with the revolutionists. Such appeals could not have fallen on barren soil, since the native secular clergy was highly discontented and even hostile-minded because of the Spanish Government's persistent championship of the friars. Apart from the patriotic motive, the Filipino priests had good reason to be in sympathy with the revolutionary organization, which had given them curacies by the forcible removal, through captivity,¹ of the friars, the former incumbents.

Again, revolutionary societies in the form of clubs or "committees" were organized, sometimes secretly, in order to cooperate with the Filipino Government in furthering the latter's interests. Of these societies, the best organized were those at Manila where it was hoped they could be of great use in offsetting American influence. As actually organized, they consisted of the so-called "popular committees" established in the various suburbs under a "central committee" to direct the work of the local branches. To be a member of the "central committee" and, presumably, of any of the "popular committees", one had to be "a Filipino, over 21 years of age, of good conduct, in favor of independence and of the constituted government", and to "take oath of allegiance to our cause".² Through these committees which according to Aguinaldo, were to function as if they were the regularly established municipalities,³ the Revolutionary

¹ The names of the friars held in captivity by the Filipino Government are found in the complete list of Spanish prisoners in L. Moreno Jérez, *Los Prisioneros españoles en poder de los tagalos*, pp. 191-206. The list printed in Ulpiano Herrero, *Nuestra prisión en poder de los revolucionarios filipinos*, Manila, 1900, pp. 868-877, is incomplete.

² See unsigned draft entitled "Bases for the Committee" in Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 265, 81 MG.

³ Aguinaldo to Flores, Sept. 7, 1898, in *ibid.*, vol. iii, exhibit 232, 75 MG.

Government sought, with some degree of success, to keep the masses of Manila within the fold. The main object of these bodies is well set forth in a letter sent by the members of the board of directors of the central committee to the President of the Revolutionary Government on November 20, 1898. The letter reads in part as follows (Taylor's translation) :

. . . the popular committees as well as the central committee have been established under your auspices and of those of your government, with the sole end in view of educating and instructing the people socially and politically in order to make, in this way, governmental action more effective. . . .

. . . we fulfill a duty of gratitude in coming, in their name and on their behalf, to offer to you and to your Government our disinterested, unconditional and unlimited assistance in any case in which your Government and yourself may deem it opportune.¹

Finally, the revolutionists spared no pains in their persistent campaign for greater popular support and sympathy. Every occasion was seized for the holding of some sort of patriotic manifestation, like civil processions and military parades. National heroes² were acclaimed and certain events in Philippine history commemorated. Excuses were found for the display of the Filipino flag and the playing of the "national march" in these gatherings. Sometimes these festivities were directly under the auspices of the government. Quite often they were staged through private initiative; but generally they were attended by some high civil or military functionaries who aroused popular enthusiasm by their presence or by appropriate addresses as well.³

¹ Text in *ibid.*, vol. iii, exhibit 294, 89 MG.

² For example, December 30, the day Rizal was executed, was declared by the Revolutionary Government in a decree of Dec. 20 a national holiday. See decree in *El Heraldo*, Dec. 25, 1898.

³ An incident of this kind took place in Manila on November 1, 1898. On this, All Saints' Day, the Filipinos, following a long established

“DIPLOMATIC” ACTIVITY

Propaganda on behalf of the Filipino Government was conducted not only at home but also abroad. The need for an effective foreign campaign was early appreciated by the revolutionists, and a scheme to meet this necessity was announced in the decree of June 23, and later embodied in a decree of August 10,¹ creating the “revolutionary committee” at Hongkong. Though not generally known, it seems evident that the latter decree which, besides creating the committee, also made certain appointments to this body, was either not issued, or, if issued at all, immediately set

religious practice, congregated in the cemeteries, decorated the graves, and prayed for the departed. Such an occasion was selected by no less a person than Paterno, president of the Congress, to make an address before those assembled in one of the Manila cemeteries. After some preliminary remarks, the speaker dramatically told his audience that the spirits of the dead heroes and martyrs were there listening. Then, turning abruptly to his imaginary audience, he continued his speech as follows:

“Glorious heroes and martyrs of the Fatherland! We have come to tell you that all is changed in the Philippines. The doors opened by you have permitted us to see the beautiful dawn of the sun of liberty. The shadows of the world of slavery are fleeing before the brilliant rising of the day of our rights. The era of the exploitation of man by man has closed, giving rise to the emancipation of the Filipinos and to the unshaken (*firme*) independence of our beloved people.

“Your lamentations have awakened the whole nation. Over Fort Santiago, where the flag of the Monarchy once waved, now floats the emblem of the Republic. Before, everything looked up to distinction; now everything tends to equality. Yesterday, caste (*origen*) and rank were necessary; now, virtue. Then, it was useful to have the inhabitants divided into classes and races; now, anything that divides, destroys...

“We have come to demonstrate to you the existence of the fatherland and of the newly constituted government....

“We have come to make manifest to you our sincere gratitude. We have come to declare that the memory of this revolution never shall be lost in posterity...promising to die before tolerating any tyrant. We will all succumb, even as you did, before we consent to foreign-made laws.” *Vide* text of speech in *El Herald*, Nov. 6, 1898.

¹ Text in Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 98, 45 MG.

aside.¹ At any rate, another decree, which reenacted the main provisions of its predecessor, with the exception of the clauses dealing with the appointments, was given out on August 24,² and a third decree, empowering Galicano Apacible, Faustino Lichauco and Crisanto Lichauco to discharge temporarily the duties of the "revolutionary committee", was issued on September 26,³ "in compliance with the decree of August 24 last." The committee was to be composed of a board of five directors, and "members" of indeterminate number. There were to be a number of "correspondents" or foreign agents also who were authorized to represent the government abroad under certain limitations. The duties of the committee, including the "correspondents", were: to carry on foreign propaganda; to conduct "diplomatic negotiations with foreign governments", and to negotiate the purchase and direct the shipment of arms and ammunition, and all needed supplies from foreign countries.

Although the "revolutionary committee" was never established with the elaborate machinery provided for in the decree of August 24, some sort of organization devoted to the insurgent cause was effected, and the interests of the Filipino Government were taken care of. Indeed, there had always been in Hongkong a group of Filipinos who imposed on themselves similar obligations. But after August this group may be said to have acquired official standing, becoming a sort of bureau of the insurgent government, with Galicano Apacible⁴ in charge. A feature of the foreign

¹ Aguinaldo to Agoncillo (Respe), August 30, 1898, in Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 217, 72 MG.

² Text in *ibid.*, vol. iii, exhibit 210, 71 MG.

³ Text in *ibid.*, vol. iii, exhibit 262, 80 MG.

⁴ Apacible left Manila for Hongkong at the end of August aboard the steamer "China", the same vessel in which Agoncillo and his secretary, Sixto López, made the trip to the United States. See Halstead, *The Story of the Philippines*, pp. 73-74.

service was the "diplomatic" representatives or agents, detailed to certain countries, e. g. Agoncillo to the United States and later to France, and Ponce to Japan. In fact, on November 23, a "commission" of ten, presided over by Agoncillo was formed, "charged with the duty of informing the civilized world. . . of the capacity of the Filipinos to govern themselves, as well as of working for the recognition by foreign powers of the independence and of the government of the Philippines".¹

The activities of the Hongkong committee and those of the foreign "envoys" were, properly speaking, propaganda rather than diplomacy. However, the work undertaken by Felipe Agoncillo in Paris and in Washington, D.C. in the fall and early winter of 1898-1899 was, in some respects, more than mere propaganda. Briefly speaking, Agoncillo, the same person who had approached Consul Wildman a year before in Hongkong,² undertook to represent the Revolutionary Government in Washington and in Paris, where the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain was then being negotiated. Instructed to secure the recognition of the Filipino Government and of Philippine independence,³ he arrived in Washington, from Hongkong on September 27, 1898. With the help of General F. V. Greene, he obtained an audience with the President on October 1, but nothing of importance was taken up during the interview, which was understood to be purely a call of courtesy.⁴

¹ Decree of Nov. 23, 1898, in Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 297, 89 MG. An attempt to reorganize and enlarge the commission was made on Jan. 25, 1899, but in vain. See Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, pp. 34 *et seq.*

² *Supra*, p. 51.

³ Aguinaldo to Agoncillo, Aug. 26 and Aug. 30, 1898, in Taylor, vol. iii, exhibits 212 and 217, 71 MG-72 MG.

⁴ *La República filipina*, November 19, 1898.

Failing to secure recognition in Washington, he proceeded to Paris in the hope of obtaining a hearing from the American Peace Commission. Although he also failed in this, he decided to remain in the French capital and follow the progress of the peace negotiations. He was bitterly disappointed of course with the Philippine provisions of the treaty of peace signed on December 10,¹ and on December 12, addressed a protest to "Their Excellencies, the Presidents and Delegates of the Spanish-American Commission."² Then, he returned to Washington, determined to work against the ratification of the treaty by the United States Senate and to resume the task of trying to secure the recognition of his government. To these ends, he directed to the Department of State, between January 5 and February 4, 1899, at least six communications,³ of which that of January 30 deserves more than passing attention.

The "memorial" of January 30 was addressed to "The Senate of the United States", but it was sent to the Secretary of State for transmission to that body. It was a long document, repeating in substance the important points set forth in the protest against the peace treaty and those in a document of January 24. Its own summary reads as follows:

1. The United States, not having received from the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands authority to pass laws affecting them, its legislation as to their welfare, I respectfully submit, possesses no binding force as against my people.

¹Text in English and Spanish in *Senate Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 62, pt. ii, pp. 3-11.

²Text in Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 526, 53 KU-54 KU; Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 235 *et seq.*

³*Congressional Record* (June 3, 1902), vol. 35, pt. vi, p. 6217. For communication of January 30, see a pamphlet entitled *Memorial to the Senate of the United States, accompanying letter from Sr. Felipe Agoncillo to the Secretary of State, dated January 30, 1899, with the laws of the Philippine Republic and a map of the Islands*; also, Máximo M. Kalaw, *The Case for the Filipinos*, New York, 1916, pp. 64-78.

2. The American authorities herein cited demonstrate that the Philippine revolution was never more threatening than immediately before the breaking out of the Spanish-American War . . . ¹

3. The purpose of the revolution was independence, and understanding this, the United States encouraged the revolutionists to believe their desires would attain fruition . . .

4. The Philippine Republic was entitled to receive from the United States recognition as an independent nation before the signing of the protocol with Spain, that Government knowing that Philippine independence had been proclaimed in June, a government *de facto* and *de jure* established, laws promulgated, and Spain's further domination impossible . . .

5. The American Government for months has had in its possession, as herein shown, evidence of the actual independence of the Filipinos.

6. Spain could not deliver possession of the Philippines to the United States, being herself ousted by their people, and in fact at the present moment the United States hold only an entrenched camp, controlling one hundred and forty-three square miles, with 300,000 people, while the Philippine Republic represents the destinies of nearly 10,000,000 souls, scattered over an area approaching 200,000 square miles.²

¹The "authorities" referred to was Consul-General Williams who reported to the State Department on March 28, 1898, that the "rebellion (was) never more threatening to Spain". This statement was somewhat exaggerated, but it was true that the country was really never at peace since the beginning of the revolt in 1896, not even after the signing of the pact of Biacnabato.

²These figures are in round numbers, and do not agree with those in the body of the "memorial" which are:

	<i>Under U. S. Control</i>	<i>Under Filipino Control</i>	<i>Under Spanish Control</i>
Population	300,000 souls	9,386,000 souls	305,000 souls
Territory	143 sq. m.	167,845 sq. m.	51,830 sq. m.

These sets of figures are manifestly incorrect. The population of the Philippines, according to the 1903 census, was 7,635,426; the total area

7. Spain, having no possession (except minor garrison posts) and no right of possession in the Philippines, could confer no right to control them.

8. American purchase of public buildings,¹ etc., in the Philippine Islands was ineffective, because the Islands, having been lost by Spain to the Philippine Republic, the last-named Government had already by conquest acquired public property.

9. Secretaries of State of your country (including Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Pinckney)² have denied the right of an ally of America to acquire by conquest from Great Britain any American territory while America was struggling for independence. The United States Supreme Court has sustained this view. We deny similarly the right of the United States to acquire Philippine territory by cession from Spain while the Filipinos were yet at war with that power.³

is given generally as 115,026 sq. m. Without doubt the difficulty in obtaining accurate data regarding the country's area and population then was responsible for the error. However, the fact remains that at the time the "memorial" was written, the American forces held only the city of Manila and the town of Cavite, while the Spanish forces retained only certain points in Mindanao and Palawan. The rest of the Archipelago, with the exception of the interior of northern Luzon and of Mindanao and the portions occupied by the Mohammedan population—these regions were never effectually controlled by Spain—was, as hereafter shown, either directly or nominally ruled by the revolutionists.

¹ Referring to the provision in Article VIII of the treaty of peace regarding "buildings, wharves, barracks, etc."

² Thomas Pinckney, to whom reference is made, was not a Secretary of State, but a special envoy to Spain.

³ On the point the body of the "memorial" has this to say: "... Mr. Thomas Jefferson, under date of March 18, 1792, wrote as follows: 'Spain was expressly bound to have delivered up the possession she had taken within the limits of Georgia (during the Revolutionary War as an ally [*sic*] of the United States) to Great Britain, if they were conquests on Great Britain, who was to deliver them over to the United States; or rather, she should have delivered them to the United States themselves, as standing *quoad hoc* in the place of Great Britain: and she was bound by natural right to deliver them to the same United States on a much stronger ground, as the real and only proprietors of those places which she had taken possession of in a moment of danger, without having

had any cause of war with the United States, to whom they belonged, and without having declared any: but, on the contrary, conducting herself in other respects as a friend and associate.... It is still more palpable that a war existing between two nations as Spain and Great Britain, could give to neither the right to seize and appropriate the territory of a third, which is even neutral, much less which is an associate in the war, as the United States were with Spain.'

"Again Mr. Pinckney, on August 10, 1795, wrote to the Duke of Alcudia... as follows:

'But it has been said (referring to the contention of Spain that she was entitled to retain territory within the limits of the United States, the possession of which was obtained by her during the war against Great Britain) that Spain had pretensions for passing the limits above mentioned by the right of conquest, her troops having, during the war, seized a certain portion of territory beyond that limit; but the answer to this pretension is... that the territory conquered must have belonged, before the war, either to the United States or to Great Britain. If it belonged to the United States, it is very clear that Spain could have no right to make conquests on a nation with whom she was not at war, and I will not, for a single moment, admit an idea so disrespectful to Spain as to imagine that she could pretend to be the friend of the United States; to have succeeded them in the war, to have even lent them money for maintaining it; at the same time she was depriving them of their property.'

"As will be seen... the cases cited are... parallel with that before us. Spain was, during the American Revolution, engaged in warfare with Great Britain, from which country the United States was seeking independence, as were the Filipinos in the recent war with Spain, and she had by her arms obtained possession of portions of the United States. Her right to them was denied successfully by America. The only possible difference between the cases is that in the first, possession was claimed by virtue of conquest, and as to the Philippines, the United States claims possession by virtue of cession from an expelled power; but whether the apparent title be based upon conquest or cession it is clearly shown by Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Pinckney that it is contrary to the law of nations for one nation engaged in a common cause with another to despoil its associate....

"That the view taken by Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Pinckney was the correct view is shown by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of *Hartcourt v. Gailliard*, 12 Wheaton 523:

'War', says the Supreme Court, 'is a suit prosecuted by the sword and where the question to be decided is one of original claim to territory, grants of soil made *flagrante bello* by the party that fails can only derive validity from treaty stipulation'... meaning in the case before the Supreme Court, treaty stipulations between England and America, and meaning as to the present case treaty stipulations between the Philippine Islands and Spain."

From Agoncillo's declarations, it is clear that he, like Aguinaldo, stood strongly for Philippine independence. He could not do otherwise, for he was a stanch believer in that policy above every other and was instructed moreover to labor to this end. But did Agoncillo's and Aguinaldo's attitude in this matter represent the opinion of the revolutionists? Did it reflect faithfully the wishes of the masses? In other words, was Agoncillo's mission in harmony with the desires of the Filipinos?

To comprehend the Filipino frame of mind, it will be necessary to understand the complicated situation that then obtained. Apart from the unorganized or inactive section of the population, the influence of which assumed no definite form, the people at the time may be said to have fallen into three main groups: the liberals; the conservatives;¹ and the masses. The liberals, who were in control of the government, were men of intelligence and, generally, of considerable education and moderate means. As a body they believed in absolute independence. The conservatives, who with varying enthusiasm joined hands with the liberals in running the government, were men of property and of higher education. Just as hostile to Spain as the rest of the revolutionists, they were disposed to accept some sort of protectorate, preferably under the United States. The masses were inarticulate, especially in matters of political theory. However, judged from the way in which they supported the Filipino Government by fighting within the ranks of the revolutionary army and by general obedience to its laws, it would be fair to assume that their sympathies were with those actually in control.

In shaping the attitude of the Filipinos toward independence, the respective positions of the first two groups were the dominant factors; for the masses, after all, were follow-

¹ Malcolm, *The Constitutional Law of the Philippine Islands*, p. 109.

ers, rather than, leaders of public opinion. Given the support of the military elements and of the masses, the liberals were able to conduct the government and to determine its policy of independence. As already shown, the government formally proclaimed independence of the Philippines on three different occasions: first, on June 12, in Cavite, under the auspices of the Dictatorship; then, on August 1, at Bacoor, at the convention of the municipal presidents; and finally, on September 29, in Malolos, under the auspices of the Congress.¹ Then, too, on August 26, 1898, Aguinaldo instructed Agoncillo, then in Hongkong, as follows: "You must bear in mind that the policy of the government is to obtain absolute independence",² and on January 2, 1899, the Mabini cabinet announced, in a message to Congress, that "it will treat with foreign powers for the recognition of the independence of the Philippine Islands."³ That Aguinaldo was directly or indirectly connected with these declarations would hardly alter the fact that they were official acts of a constituted government carried on peacefully with the apparent concurrence of its functionaries and the support of all, or nearly all, the revolutionists.

Yet as early as August, 1898, Major Bell, in a report to General Merritt, stated that what the revolutionists "would like best of all would be a Filipino republic with an American protectorate";⁴ and General Greene, writing on September 30, 1898, reported that the men of "property, education and intelligence" were half-hearted in their support of the Filipino Government and that "their ideal is a Philippine

¹ *Supra*, pp. 65, 86 and 98.

² Aguinaldo to Agoncillo, August 26, 1898, in Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 212, 71 MG.

³ Text in *El Heraldo*, Jan. 4, 1899; *La República filipina*, Jan. 4, 1899; Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 354, 3 KU.

⁴ *Senate Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 62, pt. ii, p. 380.

Republic under American protection.”¹ Later the Schurman Commission declared that “there can be no doubt that an American protectorate over their so-called ‘Philippine Republic’ is the ideal of the Tagalog insurgent leaders.”² These statements and others of similar character, coming as they did from men of responsible position, served to confuse the situation in the minds of many and gave rise to grave doubts as to what after all were the real wishes of the Filipinos.

The truth was, that the revolutionists, aware of possible foreign complications and influenced by the conservative minority in their midst, did think of a protectorate as a possible form of government for the Philippines. Aguinaldo, Mabini, Agoncillo and others seemed to have considered this very seriously, but only as a sort of second choice, in case the policy of independence should fail. The avowed program of the Filipino Government, therefore, remained until the outbreak of hostilities with the United States in February, 1899, primarily one of independence. For example, Aguinaldo, in a communication to Agoncillo on August 26, declared it to be “absolute independence”, but added that, should this prove impossible of attainment, the Filipinos would then “think of protection or annexation”; and on January 16, 1899, Mabini, then president of the Council of Secretaries (cabinet), wrote Apacible that, in order to leave it with free hands in dealing with unforeseen events, the government had no desire to adopt formally a policy of seeking a protectorate; but limited its program to independence under certain conditions to be agreed upon later.³ Hence, it would seem that there was some ground

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 424.

² *Report of the Philippine Commission*, 1900, vol. i, p. 103.

³ Mabini to Apacible, Jan. 16, 1899 (copy in the collection of T. M. Kalaw).

to believe that the revolutionists, including Aguinaldo and Mabini, generally considered "irreconcilables" (*irreconcilables*), were disposed to accept some measure of protection from the United States, in spite of their avowed policy of independence.

The protectorate that the revolutionists had in mind was so unique that it baffled General Greene, who thought that the revolutionists did not have "clearly defined ideas at all"¹ about the kind of protectorate which would be acceptable. However, a perusal of some of the letters that had crossed between functionaries at Malolos and foreign "envoys", and of a few other pertinent documents, would show the arrangement contemplated. When Agoncillo and Apacible, on August 1 and 2 respectively,² used the phrase "independence under American protectorate", in speaking of Cuban and Philippine affairs, both men made particular reference to Secretary Day's note of July 30, 1898, to the Duke of Almodovar del Rio, thus leaving little room for doubt as to what they meant, namely, "aid and guidance".³ Then a high government functionary in Malolos (probably Aguinaldo) urged Agoncillo, in the draft of a letter dated Nov-

¹ *Senate Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 62, pt. ii, p. 424.

² Agoncillo to Aguinaldo, Aug. 1, 1898, in Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 147, 58 MG; Apacible to Mabini, Aug. 2, 1898, in *ibid.*, exhibit 148, 58 MG-59 MG.

³ The pertinent portion of Secretary Day's note is as follows:

"Your excellency in discussing the question of Cuba intimates that Spain has desired to spare the island the dangers of premature independence. The Government of the United States has not shared the apprehension of Spain in this regard, but it recognizes the fact that in the distracted and prostrate condition of the island aid and guidance will be necessary, and these it is prepared to give.

"The United States will require: First, the relinquishment by Spain of all claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba and her immediate evacuation of the island." See *Senate Documents*, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., no. 62, pt. ii, pp. 273-274.

ember 25, 1898, and addressed to the latter in Paris, to have "our independence acknowledged under the temporary, external protection of the United States."¹ The communication makes it clear that the "protection" was to be temporary and limited to external affairs. Again, a more explicit statement is found in a proposed memorial to the President of the United States, dated November, 1898, and containing, among other things, these propositions: (1) the Philippines to constitute an independent republic under the protection of the United States; (2) the protecting nation to demand of Spain the abandonment of the Philippines, to help the Filipinos in securing the recognition of their independence by the powers and, for a limited period of time, to aid them in the maintenance of the same against foreign aggression; (3) the governments of the United States and of the Philippines to appoint a commission composed of representatives from both countries to meet in Washington for the purpose of determining the duration of, and the compensation for, the protection, and to make such other agreements as may be necessary; and (4) the American Government to authorize the Military Governor of the Philippines to come to an agreement with the Filipino Government on a *modus vivendi*.² These sources of evidence would seem to indicate that the revolutionists insisted on the recognition of the government set up by them as a condition *sine qua non*, and were not willing to accept anything short of complete independence, in internal affairs, at least.

It is seen, then, that Agoncillo had before him a task that would tax the ability of the most experienced diplomat, and he certainly was not that. He was to secure the recognition of his government and the independence of his country by the government of the United States, whereas to most people

¹ Draft in Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 275, 84 MG-85 MG.

² Text in *ibid.*, exhibit 524, 51 KU.

at the time the Philippines was but a "geographical expression". The fact that he might accept a protectorate, of the kind that he himself had spoken, could not help him; for, knowing the avowed policy of the government to be that of independence, he could not consistently negotiate for a protectorate. At all events, such negotiations would presuppose recognition of the insurgent government, something which was unlikely to be accorded.

It is well to remember that the policy of the McKinley administration toward the Philippines, although for a while undefined, gradually gravitated toward acquisition. The President himself, who at first "felt a natural revulsion against the acquisition of a vast unknown territory thousands of miles away,"¹ was soon convinced that the urge of "new duties and responsibilities" brought on by the Spanish-American War pointed to "an adventurous departure on untried paths". Thus, in July, he was undecided as to what to do; in September, he thought that "the United States cannot accept less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the island of Luzon"; in October, he instructed the American peace commissioners as follows: "The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible, and the former must therefore be required";² in December, it "was pretty well understood" that it was his purpose "to make a treaty by which without the assent of their inhabitants, we should acquire the Philippine Islands."³

There were several potent reasons for the President's decision. They have been conveniently summarized as follows:

¹ Charles S. Olcott, *The Life of William McKinley*, Boston, 1916, vol. ii, pp. 62-63.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 61-63, 96-97, 107-109; Chadwick, *The Relations of the United States and Spain: The Spanish-American War*, vol. ii, pp. 450-473.

³ George F. Hoar, *Autobiography of Seventy Years*, New York, 1906, vol. ii, p. 312.

He talked with General Greene and became convinced that to leave the Philippines to Aguinaldo would mean to abandon them to anarchy, and that to return them to Spain would mean to condemn them to further oppression. He found all the members of his cabinet but two in favor of keeping the islands, and Senator Gray the only one of the peace commissioners who favored unconditional withdrawal. He felt the pressure of the commercial interests, eager to open new markets for our surplus production and to share in the imminent parceling of the Far East among the great powers. He travelled across the continent in his visit to the Trans-Mississippi Exposition (October 10-22), keeping his ear "very close to the ground", and caught the ground-swell of approval for every reference in his speeches to the fulfillment of our responsibility to the people of the Philippines. Above all, and by his own solemn testimony, he received "guidance" in answer to his prayers, bidding him to take the whole archipelago, "to educate the Filipinos and uplift and civilize and Christianize them."¹

Given these conditions, it is easy to understand why Agoncillo was bound to fail. The "case for the Filipinos" was only one of several interests that were seeking to engage the attention of the administration, and it should be said that some of these interests touched American life much more closely than the insurgent cause. Agoncillo, therefore, was not recognized; neither was he given a hearing at Paris. Instead, the United States peace commissioners demanded the cession of the Archipelago, and the treaty of peace yielded it. The outlook of Agoncillo's mission was gloomy enough from the beginning; but it became nearly hopeless after the signing of the treaty. True, there was strong opposition to it in the Senate; but, as was quite reasonably pointed out, a failure to approve it would mean the useless

¹David S. Muzzey, *The United States of America*, vol. ii, Boston, 1924, p. 322.

resumption of war.¹ Then, too, the unfortunate rupture between the American and the Filipino forces on February 4 "removed the last doubt in the minds of many, who now felt that the national honor was involved and that the country could not withdraw from the islands in the face of an uprising."² The treaty, therefore, was approved, and whatever dubious chance of success Agoncillo might have had came to an end.

EXTENSION OF REVOLUTIONARY AUTHORITY TO DISTANT PROVINCES

More positive in result than the propaganda at home and abroad was the military aid extended by the revolutionists of central Luzon to their countrymen in the more distant provinces. It took the form of expeditions sent by the Filipino Government for the purpose of establishing its control over those regions. Although planned as early as the end of June, it was not till the beginning of August, that the first of the main expeditions was dispatched. The Filipino Government then, besides having the capital besieged by its troops, also had its authority established in central Luzon: north of Manila as far as Pangasinan and Nueva Écija; and south, as far as Tayabas. The time was therefore deemed opportune for the extension of its control elsewhere.

This first expedition, under the command of a young officer, Manuel Tinio, was detailed to operate in the Ilocos region, in north-western Luzon. It started its march to the north from San Fernando de la Unión, then already

¹ Olcott, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-139. See also an interesting study on the ratification of the peace treaty by the Senate in José S. Reyes, *Legislative History of America's Economic Policy toward the Philippines* (in the Columbia University Studies in History, etc., vol. cvi-2), ch. ii.

² John H. Latané, *America as a World Power*, p. 77.

under insurgent control. The expedition met no serious opposition, for the Spanish forces retreated at its approach; ¹ and Tinio, between August 7 and 17, occupied the important towns of Bangar, Tagudin, Vigan and Laoag.² At Bangui, a coast town in Ilocos Norte, the Spanish detachments, numbering in all from two to three hundred men, finding themselves cut off, surrendered. By the end of August the control of the Ilocos provinces, including Abra, had passed to the Filipino Government.

The next important expedition was that sent to the Cagayan valley, in north-eastern Luzon, under the command of Colonel Daniel Tirona. It was made up of six companies conveyed by the insurgent transport "Filipinas" to Aparri, at which port it arrived on August 25.³ Operations against this town were begun immediately: a company was posted at the village of Linao, another at Kalamaniugan, and a third at the town of Lal-lo, formerly the seat of a diocese, so that Aparri was completely isolated. The Spanish detachment, seeing that the people, hitherto considered "loyal to Spain, would not fight against their fellow Filipinos" and believing further resistance useless, capitulated.⁴ With Aparri in their hands, the expeditionary troops occupied the important coast towns; then, on August 31, they also took Tuguegarao.

¹ LeRoy, *The Americans in the Philippines*, vol. i, pp. 326-327.

² Luís Moreno Jérez, *Los Prisioneros españoles en poder de los tagalos*, pp. 5-6.

³ The decree conferring on Tirona the command of the expedition was issued on August 10 (Taylor, *Report on the Organization for the Administration of Civil Government Instituted by Emilio Aguinaldo*, p. 38); the steamer "Filipinas" which transported the troops left Manila Bay on August 12 (Macloed, *History of the Revolution of the Filipinos*, ch. xi).

⁴ See "act of capitulation" in Graciano Martínez, *Memorias del cautiverio*, Manila, 1900, appendix i.

The main towns in the province of Isabela were likewise taken possession of, including Ilagan, the provincial capital. On the same day (September 14) that Ilagan was occupied, Bayombong, the capital of the province of Nueva Vizcaya, capitulated to another force of revolutionists under Major Delfín Esquivel.¹ Thus the entire Cagayan valley, as well as the Batanes islands, off the north coast of Luzon, which were also occupied at this time, passed into insurgent hands.

The extension of the authority of the Filipino Government to the Bicol region, in south-eastern Luzon, came about in a different manner. In Ambos Camarines and Albay conditions had never been satisfactory since 1896, and the people in the chief towns of Daet, Nueva Cáceres and Albay were ready to join the revolt. In Daet and Nueva Cáceres feeling ran high, so much so that the Spanish officials and residents of the former abandoned it in August, while those of the latter were besieged and disarmed in September by local revolutionists.² A provisional government was formed, and "the Philippine Republic began to rule" the province. Albay and Sorsogon followed the example of Ambos Camarines and set up their own local governments. That established in Albay, on September 22, which was patterned after the scheme decreed on June 18, immediately notified Aguinaldo of its constitution, declaring its "most sincere adhesion to the Republican Government of the Philippines" and announced its readiness to turn the control of affairs over to the representative of the Central Government on his

¹ J. M. Leyba to Emilio Aguinaldo, Sept. 27, 1898, in *El Heraldo*, Oct. 20, 1898; also, Leyba to Secretary of War of the Revolutionary Government, Sept. 27, 1898, in Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 482, 39 KU.

² *La República filipina*, October 6, 9 and 20, 1898; *El Heraldo*, Oct. 6, 1898. See also LeRoy (*The Americans in the Philippines*, vol. i, pp. 338-339), who gives the revolt in Nueva Cáceres as of June.

arrival.¹ When Vicente Lukban, therefore, arrived in October at the head of an expedition, his mission was accomplished without any difficulty, and, in a few weeks, the Bicol provinces were thoroughly committed to the revolution.

The islands adjacent to southern Luzon came under insurgent control at different times. Northern Mindoro was early the objective of a small expedition from Batangas,² and, on July 2, the town of Calapan, after a siege of thirty-one days, was occupied by the revolutionists. Marinduque, lying close to the Tayabas coast but belonging to Mindoro, organized itself about this time, and, in pursuance to a petition by its inhabitants, it was authorized by the Revolutionary Government on July 20 to constitute itself an independent province.³ From Marinduque and the Tayabas coast, small expeditions were sent to the island of Masbate, which, on November 9, became, with the near-by island of Ticao, a "politico-military district" of the insurgent government.⁴ The Romblon group, i. e. Romblon, Tablas and Sibuyan islands, early in September, "was already in the hands of the Bisayans who inhabit this group, aided, however, by a few Tagalog soldiers from the mainland of Luzon."⁵

As in Luzon and the adjacent islands, the authority of the Filipino Government was extended readily to the Bisayas proper. Here however, with the exception of Panay and Negros, little or no fighting occurred between Filipinos and Spaniards. General Diego de los Rios, who had been appointed by the Spanish Government "governor and cap-

¹ Anacleto Solano *et al.* to Aguinaldo, Sept. 28, 1898, in *El Heraldo*, Oct. 13, 1898.

² LeRoy, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 320.

³ *Ide* decree of July 20, 1898, in Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 72, 41 MG.

⁴ See decrec of Nov. 9, 1898, in *El Heraldo*, Nov. 13, 1898.

⁵ LeRoy, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 341

tain-general" of Bisayas and Mindanao, found in October, 1898, that all was not well with the territory of his command, where he discovered secret plots even among the native soldiers he considered loyal, and he, therefore, decided to order the concentration of his troops in Iloilo and in Cebu.¹ Later, in December, after the signing of the treaty of peace at Paris, he withdrew from these points, and retired to the distant outpost of Zamboanga, where he managed, for some months, to maintain a semblance of Spanish rule. His withdrawal from these places was the occasion for the open assumption of control by local revolutionary authorities, which then generally existed in one form or another.

Leyte and the near-by island of Samar which had been reached by emissaries from Masbate and southern Luzon as early as August, was ripe for trouble even before the virtual evacuation by the Spanish in October. Thereafter troops were sent from Luzon, and General Vicente Lukban was ordered to take charge of affairs.² On January 1, 1899, he issued a long proclamation³ addressed to the "Citizens of Samar and Leyte" calling on them to stand united and to live in peace under the protection of the new-born Republic. But even before this time, the people of Tacloban, capital of Leyte, had constituted a provisional government and raised the Filipino flag, declaring their solemn adherence to the Philippine Republic and their loyalty to Aguinaldo and pledging their cooperation for the furtherance of the ideals of the new régime.⁴ What had occurred in Leyte, also took place, in a general way, in Samar, Cebu and Bohol.

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 341-342.

² LeRoy, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 340 *et seq.*

³ Text in Taylor, vol. v, exhibit 1318, 58 HK.

⁴ *Vide* record of a mass meeting of December 16, 1898, in Taylor, vol. v, exhibit 1367, 79 HK.

However, while the revolutionary party in Cebu, where a local government had been established on December 25,¹ was quite strong, that in Bohol was comparatively weak at this time—a circumstance due, perhaps, to the fact that only a few rifles had found their way thither and no armed expedition had reached the island.²

In Panay island the revolutionary movement began as early as July or August, when a "regional committee" was established at Molo,³ a suburb of Iloilo. The Panay revolutionists not only conducted a propaganda to stir the people to action, but also sent, in September, agents to Luzon to purchase arms and to ask the aid of the Central Government at Malolos,⁴ and, on November 17, organized a "provisional revolutionary government" at Santa Barbara.⁵ As a matter of policy and in response to the request made, expeditionary troops were sent from Luzon: first from Cavite to Antique

¹ See decree of Aguinaldo dated January 24, 1899, confirming the election of Luís Flores as provisional "provincial president" in Taylor, vol. v, exhibit 1387, 90 HK. See also an incomplete document reporting municipal elections to have been held on Feb. 19, 1899, in *ibid.*, exhibit 1388, 90 HK.

² LeRoy, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 184. After the outbreak of hostilities with the United States, however, the revolutionary movement gained considerable strength in Bohol. See Foreman, *The Philippine Islands*, ed. 1906, pp. 528-529.

³ López *et al.* to Aguinaldo, Dec. 5, 1898, in Taylor, vol. v, exhibit 1198, 5 HK. See also Venancio Concepción's unpublished work entitled *Apuntes y diario de operaciones de la guerra hispano-filipino-americana*, notebook 1.

⁴ See minutes of meeting held December 12, 1898, in Taylor, vol. v, exhibit 1199, 6 HK-7 HK; also letter of R. López *et al.* to Aguinaldo, Dec. 5, 1898, in *ibid.*, exhibit 1198, 5 HK-6 HK.

⁵ *Vide* minutes of Nov. 17, 1898, in *ibid.*, exhibit 1190, 1 HK; also Concepción, *Apuntes y diario de operaciones*, notebook 1. For the reorganization of the "provisional revolutionary government" and the establishment of the "council of the federal state of Bisayas", see minutes of Dec. 12 already cited.

late in September under Leandro Fullon, then from Batangas to Capiz about the middle of November under Ananias Diokno, commander-in-chief of the expeditionary forces to Panay. The following month, when General Miller was ordered by General Otis to proceed to Iloilo harbor, more reenforcements were hurried by the Central Government to Panay.¹ Meanwhile, the "provisional revolutionary government", later reorganized as the "council of the federal state of Bisayas", had put in the field its troops under the supreme command of Martín Delgado. About the end of November, these commands—Fullon's in Antique, Diokno's in Capiz, Poblador's (a subordinate officer of Delgado) in the district of Concepción,² and Delgado's in Iloilo—had virtually freed Panay island from Spanish control. In the beginning of December, all that was left in the island to Spain was the town of Iloilo, which, on December 24, was abandoned finally (the Spaniards sailing to Zamboanga) in the hands of its mayor, Vicente Gay, who promptly turned it over to the revolutionists the following day.³ The last week of December, 1898, therefore, saw the Filipinos undisputed masters of the three provinces.

¹ *Senate Documents*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., no. 331, p. 487; *La República filipina*, Dec. 14, 1898; LeRoy, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 343, 396-397; see also draft of instructions to Diokno and Fullon in Taylor, vol. v, exhibit 1186, 99 GV. For a record of Gen. Miller's relations with the Iloilo revolutionists, see "Report of R. P. Hughes, Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding Visayas Military District" in *House Documents*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., no. 2, pt. iii, pp. 322 *et seq.*

² Full records of the occupation by the insurgents of the various towns of the district of Concepción and the establishment therein of municipal governments patterned after the scheme decreed on June 18 are to be found in the "Poblador MS" loaned by Honorio Poblador, the General's brother, to the author.

³ Minutes of Dec. 22, 1898, in Taylor, vol. v, exhibit 1203, 9 HK; LeRoy, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 391; Foreman, *The Philippine Islands*, ed. 1906, p. 511.

The loyalty of the Panay revolutionists to the Filipino Government is sometimes doubted; but there are documents¹ to show that the men who composed the "council of the federal state of Bisayas" not only recognized the authority of the Central Government, which, according to them, was "that of the whole Philippines", but also acclaimed Aguinaldo and the Filipino flag. There was an unmistakable desire on their part for a federal union, to be composed of the three regions of Luzon, Bisayas and Mindanao, instead of a centralized state, which the functionaries in Luzon favored and finally embodied in the Malolos constitution; but beyond this desire they did not go. That they were sincere in their adherence to the Filipino Government was shown best in their repeated refusals to allow General Miller to land troops at Iloilo without previous authorization from Malolos, inasmuch as this, they said, "involved the integrity of the entire republic." In the words of Roque López, president of the "council of the federal state", "the supposed authority of the United States began with the treaty of Paris, on December 10, 1898," but "the authority of the Central Government of Malolos is founded in the sacred and natural bonds of blood, language, uses, customs, ideas, sacrifices, etc." Further on he adds: "we insist in not giving our consent to the disembarkation of your (Miller's) troops without an express order from our Central Government at Malolos."²

¹ A good part of Taylor, vol. v, is taken up with reprints of these documents.

² R. López to Gen. Miller, Jan. 9, 1899, in *House Documents*, 56th Cong, 1st Sess., no. 2, pt. iii, p. 329. Toward the end of January, the Iloilo authorities sent a commission to Malolos to ascertain from the central government how the Bisayan provinces should be permanently constituted and to treat of other matters. Concepción, one of the commissioners, gives an account of the trip and interview with Aguinaldo in *Apuntes y diarios de operaciones*, notebook 1.

The people of Negros island, which lies south-east of Panay, were drawn into the insurgent ranks mainly through the infiltration of revolutionary ideas from Iloilo. Although a revolutionary committee had been established early at the town of Silay, the actual uprising did not begin until after the receipt, on November 3, of a letter from Roque López, giving news of the successful course of the war in Iloilo.¹ Encouraged by the example of this province, the revolt began on November 5 under the leadership of Aniceto Lacson and Juan Araneta, the town of Silay being the first to raise the Filipino flag. On November 6, Bacolod, capital of West Negros, surrendered,² and, the following day, the insurgent leaders, to whom the Spanish governor had just turned over the control of affairs, established a "provisional revolutionary government".³ East Negros followed the example of its sister province, raised the standard of revolt, and organized, toward the end of the same month, its own "revolutionary government", although that established at Bacolod, especially after its reconstitution on November 6 into what was often called the *gobierno cantonal de la isla de Negros*,⁴ made pretenses at governing the entire island. At all events, the whole island came under the rule, in one form or another, of the local revolutionists.

The insurgent leaders in West Negros, who made up the "provisional revolutionary government", were, beyond

¹Text in C. R. Fuentes, *Apuntes documentados de la revolución en toda la isla de Negros*, pp. 40-42.

²*Vide* "acts of capitulation" of Bacolod and Silay in *ibid.*, pp. 60-63, 76-77.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 98-100.

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 117-125, gives the "minutes" of the session of the "provisional revolutionary government" on Nov. 26, when it was decided to proclaim the "cantonal government" and to call a "congress" of representatives from the different towns. For instructions regarding the elections of representatives (*diputados*), see *ibid.*, pp. 143-147.

doubt, half-hearted in their adherence to the Central Government. They flew the Filipino flag, informed Aguinaldo and Roque López of the establishment of the "provisional revolutionary government", and apparently assumed that their organization, both before and after the promulgation of the "cantonal government", was but a part of the Philippine Republic;¹ yet, at the same time, they acted with extreme independence, going even as far as sending to General Miller at Iloilo bay on November 12 a communication inviting protection.² While they never proclaimed a separate republic, as is sometimes wrongly assumed, their relation to the Central Government up to March, 1899, when Colonel James F. Smith was sent by General Otis to Bacolod as military governor of Negros, was purely nominal. Believing as they did in a confederation, rather than a centralized republic, their loyalty, if it could be so called, to the Filipino Government has always been open to serious doubt. What has been said regarding West Negros, however, does not apply with equal force, if at all, to East Negros.

In the rest of the Archipelago, the revolutionary movement was reflected with varying strength or weakness at various times. In the province of Misamis, in northern Mindanao, a "provisional provincial government" under José Roa was established in January, 1899.³ In Surigao, on the north-eastern coast of the same island, rival factions prevented the organization of a strong government for the

¹ Fuentes, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 127-129, gives text of communication, and pp. 163-164, speaks of the appointment of a committee on Dec. 15, to greet (*saludar*) the "representatives" of American authority at Iloilo bay. For a statement of subsequent relations between the insurgents of West Negros and the American officers, see *Harper's History of the War in the Philippines*, pp. 231 *et seq.*

³ José Roa to President, Revolutionary Government, Jan. 26, 1899, in Taylor, vol. v, exhibit 1427, 6 MG.

province. The same conditions existed in Cottabato, which was abandoned by the Spaniards in January, 1899, and in Zamboanga, wherein the actual outbreak of hostilities against the Spanish troops did not occur till May. In the island of Palawan, an insurgent party, which had early taken Puerto Princesa, the capital, and the towns on the north-east coast, set up some sort of revolutionary government in November or December, 1898, but the greater part of the island was never brought under its control.¹ The non-Christian population (i.e. pagan and Mohammedan) of Mindanao, and the Moros of the Sulu islands, as well as most of the pagan mountaineers in northern Luzon, were not affected by the revolutionary movement, and, throughout the months of revolt in the rest of the Archipelago, retained the semi-independent status they always had enjoyed under the Spanish rule.

AGUINALDO AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER

From the foregoing discussion, it is clearly to be seen that the authority of the Filipino Government was extended over an increasing area until the greater part of the Archipelago, i. e. nearly all the provinces inhabited by the Christian population,² came under its control. By January, 1899, certainly before the outbreak of hostilities with the United States in February, the territory occupied by it stretched, roughly speaking, from northern Luzon to northern Mindanao. It included the entire island of Luzon, except the

¹ Documentary materials for Surigao, Cottabato, Zamboanga and Palawan are very scarce; but see Taylor, vol. v. exhibit 1429, 6½ MG; Foreman, *The Philippine Islands*, ed. 1906, pp. 529 *et seq.*; *Harper's History*, pp. 237 *et seq.*

² According to the Census of 1903, the population of the Philippines was as follows: Christian, 6,987,686; Mohammedan and pagan, 647,740; total, 7,635,426.

city of Manila and the town of Cavite, which were occupied by the American troops; the church of the town of Baler, which was defended by a small detachment of Spanish soldiers;¹ and the mountain fastness of the interior, which was inhabited by the pagans. It included also all the islands between Luzon and Mindanao, except the greater part of Palawan, which was settled largely by non-Christians, and West Negros, the loyalty of which was open to serious doubts. In Mindanao, the province of Misamis may be considered a part of it, but Surigao and Cottabato drifted into chaos after the Spanish evacuation. The rest of the island and the Sulu group, except the towns of Zamboanga and Jolo,² which were held by the Spaniards, were in the hands of their Mohammedan and pagan possessors, who enjoyed, as formerly, a semi-independent status.

Over this extensive dominion, Aguinaldo and his associates governed or endeavored to govern with firm hand. Highly conscious of the responsibility they assumed, they tried hard to enforce obedience and maintain order. That they succeeded in accomplishing the first of these objects is generally conceded; but opinions differ with respect to the outcome of the second.³ However, it is fair to assume that comparative quiet prevailed, although it is true that dissatisfaction existed at times in various places. Unfortunately for the Central Government, some of the men sent

¹ The Baler detachment surrendered to the revolutionists in June, 1899. For an account of the siege, see Saturnino Martin Cerezo, *El Sitio de Baler*, Madrid, 1911.

² Zamboanga and Jolo were the last points held by the Spaniards; the first was abandoned to the local revolutionists in May, 1899, the second turned over directly to the American troops.

³ For a favorable account, *vide* James H. Blount, *The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912*, New York, 1912; for an adverse one, Dean C. Worcester, *The Philippines Past and Present*, New York, 1921.

to the more distant provinces were prone to rely, in enforcing obedience, on the authority they had rather than on tact, and they committed abuses that made them very unpopular and turned the local leaders against them. But the discontent was never so great as to cause actual resistance to the government.

That the conditions which obtained under the Philippine Republic were not anarchic is shown by the testimony of two American naval officers, Paymaster W. E. Wilcox and Naval Cadet L. R. Sargent,¹ who made a trip through central and northern Luzon in the autumn of 1898. Even if what they said regarding northern Luzon might be inapplicable to the entire extent of insurgent territory, it was true of the principal portion at least. Cadet L. R. Sargent states:

It was the opinion at Manila during this anomalous period in our Philippine relations, and possibly in the United States as well, that such a state of affairs must breed something akin to anarchy. I can state unreservedly, however, that Mr. Wilcox and I found the existing conditions to be much at variance with this opinion. During our absence from Manila we traveled more than 600 miles in a very comprehensive circuit through the northern part of the island of Luzon, traversing a characteristic and important district. In this way we visited seven provinces, of which some were under the immediate control of the Central Government at Malolos, while others were remotely situated, separated from each other and from the seat of government by natural divisions of land, and accessible only by lengthy and arduous travel. As a tribute to the efficiency of Aguinaldo's government and to the law-abiding character of his subjects, I offer the fact that Mr. Wilcox and I pursued our journey throughout in perfect security, and returned to Manila with only the most pleasing recollections of the quiet

¹ "Report of Tour Through the Island of Luzon" in *Senate Documents*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., no. 66, pp. 24-44. See also the articles published by them and reprinted in *ibid.*, pp. 1-24.

and orderly life, which we found the natives to be leading under the new régime.¹

Hero worship aside, it seems clear that Aguinaldo and his associates were able, not only to extend insurgent control over a widely scattered territory, in spite of the scanty means at their command, but also to attain a considerable amount of stability for the government they set up. The month of January, 1899, may be given as the time when the authority exercised by the revolutionists was at its best, and the territory controlled by them at its widest extent. That was the month when Aguinaldo reached the zenith of his power. To quote Taylor:

The power of Aguinaldo was at its height in January, 1899. Luzon was in his hands, and the great island of Panay had recognized his government. . . . Except in Negros and the greater part of Mindanao, the Sulu archipelago, Manila, and Cavite, the decrees of Aguinaldo were obeyed, and, although this obedience may not have been implicit, yet these decrees were held as expressing the will of the supreme power. They were the expression of the will of the government which claimed supremacy.²

¹ "The Backwoods Filipino", originally published in *The Outlook*, Sept. 2, 1899.

² *Report on the Organization for the Administration of Civil Government Instituted by Emilio Aguinaldo and his Followers in the Philippine Archipelago*, p. 15.

CHAPTER IV

THE "REPUBLIC"

THE CONSTITUTION

WITH the promulgation of the Constitution, which took place on January 21, 1899, but was formally celebrated on the twenty-third, the Filipino Government changed its form for the second time, ceasing to be "revolutionary" and becoming "republican". Although the government instituted by Aguinaldo and his associates was essentially republican from the beginning, the leading revolutionists had refrained, at least officially, from calling it so, believing as they did that a republic, to be a true one, must be endowed with a written constitution.¹ When the Malolos Constitution was promulgated finally, therefore, the event was looked upon as

¹ This idea was suggested by the statement in the decree of June 23, 1898, that the Revolutionary Government proposed, as one of its objects, the establishment of a "real republic", implying that the Filipino Government as then organized was not a republic, or at least, not a complete one, lacking as it did a written constitution. Mabini had the same idea in mind when he declared, in a document of Dec. 13, 1898, that "the proclamation of a republic presupposes a constitution at least similar to those acknowledged in other nations." (See text in Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 320, 95 MG). Moreover, Aguinaldo suggested the same thought when he said in his address to Congress on the occasion of the promulgation of the Constitution: "We are no longer insurgents, we are no longer revolutionists, that is, armed men ready to destroy and annihilate the enemy. From now on, we are republicans, that is, men of law, with whom all countries may fraternize with mutual respect and affection. No longer is there anything lacking in order that we be recognized and admitted as a free and independent nation."

something quite auspicious, and it was celebrated with great pomp and ceremony. Aguinaldo was escorted to the session hall of Congress immediately after the representatives in open session had sworn fidelity to the Constitution, and there he took the oath of office as President of the Republic. Then he and Paterno made appropriate addresses; and although Congress was adjourned thereafter, the ceremonies were continued at the President's residence, where the "Republic" was formally proclaimed to the people who thronged the streets. The celebration closed with a military review.¹

The newly promulgated instrument² proclaimed that "the political association of all Filipinos" constituted a "nation," called the Philippine Republic, the sovereignty of which resided exclusively in the people. It defined the government of the Republic, which was declared "free and independent," as one that should be "popular, representative, alternative³ and responsible," and exercised "by three distinct

¹ For the decree announcing that the President would take the oath of office on Jan. 23, 1899, see *El Heraldo*, Jan. 22, 1899; the official program of the celebration is printed there also. *La República filipina* Jan. 24, contains a good description of the ceremonies. The addresses of Aguinaldo and Paterno are found in *El Heraldo*, Jan. 26, 1899, and in *La República filipina*, Jan. 24, 1899; English translations are given in Taylor, vol. iii, exhibits 410, 409, 19 KU.

² For text in Spanish, see *El Heraldo*, Jan. 22, 1899; Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 262 *et seq.* English translations are found in *Senate Documents*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., no. 208, pt. i, pp. 107-119; Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 401, 14 KU-18 KU; and *Report of the Philippine Commission*, 1900, vol. i, exhibit iv. For a Tagalog version, see *Heraldo filipino*, Jan. 26 and 29, and Feb. 2 and 5, 1899. The Filipino Government published an "official edition" in pamphlet form of the original Spanish.

³ The meaning of the term "alternative" is not clear. In the discussion of the project, one of the deputies (Ferrer) asked just what was meant by an "alternative government". Calderón explained, or tried to explain, that an "alternative government" was one in which "anyone can alternate in the Presidency of the Republic, or in power". See *La República filipina*, Oct. 29, 1898.

powers, called the legislative, the executive and the judicial." It provided, however, that two or more of these powers could not be vested in "one person or corporation"; neither could the legislative be entrusted to a single individual.¹

The legislature provided for was unicameral and was called the Assembly of Representatives. The members, who were to be elected for a term of four years, were to represent the whole nation, and not exclusively the locality which chose them. They were exempt from prosecution or molestation for opinions expressed or votes cast in the performance of their work, and from "imprisonment, detention or apprehension," unless authorized by the Assembly or the permanent commission.² The Assembly which the President of the Republic was to convoke yearly, on the fifteenth of April, was to hold sessions of three months' duration at least; but it could meet also at other times for the performance of certain functions, or when summoned to meet in extra session. Its approval was, of course, necessary before any legislative proposal submitted to it either by the representatives themselves or the President of the Republic, could become law. It could criticize the Council of the Government (cabinet), and interpellate any of its members, who were jointly responsible to it for general policy, and individually for their personal acts. Moreover, it acted as a judicial tribunal to impeach the President of the Republic, the members of the Council, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Attorney General (*Procurador Gen-*

¹ But one of the "transitory provisions" (Art. 99) empowered the executive, while the struggle for independence continued, to determine "by means of decrees," when the Assembly was not in session, all "questions and difficulties not provided for by the laws" which might arise; but such decrees were to be brought to the knowledge of the permanent commission and of the Assembly on its convocation.

² A committee of the Assembly. *Vide* Constitution, arts. 54-55.

eral) for crimes committed against "the security of the state." Also, it formed, with the extraordinary representatives,¹ the Constituent Assembly, which was charged with the duty of electing the President and empowered to amend the Constitution. When not in session, some of its powers were assumed by the permanent commission.

The executive power was vested in the President of the Republic, elected in the manner described for a term of four years and eligible for reelection. There being no Vice-President, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, when the office of the President became vacant through death or resignation, was empowered to assume it until a new President was selected by the Constituent Assembly. The President, who was irresponsible except in case of high treason, was to exercise the executive power vested in him through a Council of the Government composed of a President (Premier) and seven Secretaries.² Among the chief powers granted him were the following: to supervise and insure the execution of laws; to command the army and navy; to direct the diplomatic and commercial relations with other countries and, with the previous consent of the Assembly, to declare war and approve treaties; to appoint the members of the Council; and to grant pardons. Moreover, he had the right, with the concurrence of a majority of the representatives, to dissolve the Assembly, but in this case he was directed to order new elections within three months; also, to initiate legislation, and to approve all legislative measures or reject them through a suspensive veto.

The judicial power was vested in a Supreme Court and

¹ The Constitution does not define who the "extraordinary representatives" were to be.

² They were to be in charge of the portfolios of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Finance, War and Navy, Public Instruction, Public Communications and Works, and Agriculture, Industry and Commerce. See art. 73.

in other courts "prescribed by the laws." The Supreme Court was headed by a President (Chief Justice), who, like the Attorney General, was to be chosen by the Assembly with the concurrence of the President of the Republic and the Council of the Government. The organization and membership of the courts were to be governed by special laws. There was to be only "one system of law for all citizens" throughout the Republic.

Although the Constitution created "three distinct powers" or departments of government, "called the legislative, the executive and the judicial," and prohibited the investiture of two or more of these powers in "one person or corporation," its framers obviously had intended to set up an omnipotent legislature. To this end, it was provided that the President of the Republic, who was elected by the Constituent Assembly, of which the representatives were members *ex officio*, was to exercise his powers through the Secretaries, who were made responsible to the Assembly, thus establishing a parliamentary, rather than a presidential government. That this was the deliberate intention of Calderón, author of the Constitution, he later admitted, saying that the Congress as created was "the supreme power (*poder omnímodo*) in the whole nation," "the synthesis of popular sovereignty."¹ Moreover Aguinaldo, Mabini and other revolutionary leaders certainly understood the Constitution in this light,² and the Mabini cabinet, in obedience to this principle, was subsequently forced to resign by a hostile Assembly.³

Certain things, such as the organization of the courts, the government of provinces and municipalities, and the ques-

¹ *Mis Memorias*, pp. 239-240, also appendix, p. 17.

² Mabini to Aguinaldo, Jan. 14, and Jan. 24 (?), 1899, in Taylor, vol. iii, exhibits 386 (10 KU) and 415 (21 KU).

³ *Infra*, p. 157.

tion of suffrage, were very briefly dealt with in the Constitution. The deputies to the Malolos Congress, however, intended to pass the supplementary laws that might be necessary. To this end the Congress appointed on January 24 a committee "to frame the organic law for the judiciary", and, a week later, another "to formulate the law concerning the provincial and municipal régime," and a third to draft "the electoral law";¹ but further serious labor to this effect was halted early in February by the outbreak of hostilities between the American and the Filipino forces.²

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The main issues confronting the Filipino Government from January, when the "Republic" was proclaimed, to November, when the troops were disbanded preparatory to military reorganization on a guerilla basis, concerned relations with the Americans. Before the outbreak of hostilities the principal problem was how to prevent the rupture which both sides saw was coming. After the outbreak the chief concern of the Filipinos was to secure what Mabini termed "honorable peace." To this end Mabini and Paterno, after him, labored, but in vain.

As already stated, the publication on January 4 by General Otis of President McKinley's instructions of December 21 preceding, though in an amended form, created quite a stir at Malolos,³ where ill-feeling against the United States

¹ *La República filipina*, Jan. 26 and Feb. 2, 1899.

² There was some attempt to organize the judiciary along the line indicated by the Constitution. *Infra*, p. 160.

³ A proclamation issued by Aguinaldo on Jan. 5, and another on Jan. 8, but immediately recalled, show the intensity of feeling at Malolos at this time. For text of these proclamations, see Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 256 *et seq.*; *House Documents*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., no. 2, pt. ii, pp. 77-79; *Harper's History*, pp. 60, 101. The proclamation of Jan. 5 is reproduced also in *El Heraldo*, Jan. 5 (supplement), and Jan. 8, 1899, and in *La Independencia*, Jan. 9, 1899.

was already pronounced as a result of General Miller's attempt, beginning December 28, to land troops at Iloilo. Anti-American feeling, moreover, increased when the full text of the President's instructions, which constituted a declaration of American sovereignty over the entire Archipelago, was received at Malolos from Iloilo, where it had been released by General Miller.¹ The apparent discrepancy between the two documents when noted greatly strengthened the military party, already in the ascendant, and for a while there was real danger that the radical element among the revolutionists would gain the upper hand and precipitate a conflict. Saner counsels, however, prevailed, and it was decided in the end to continue the negotiations already proposed for the establishment of a *modus vivendi*.

Briefly, at the request of the revolutionists, it was arranged in a preliminary interview between General Otis and a commission from Malolos that an American commission, appointed by Otis, and a Filipino commission, appointed by Aguinaldo, were to meet and confer, to use Otis' words, "with regard to the situation of affairs and to arrive at a mutual understanding of the intent, purposes, aims and desires of the Filipino people and the people of the United States, that peace and harmonious relations . . . may be continued."² The commissions, duly appointed and instructed, held six conferences, beginning January 9 and ending January 29, and careful records of their meetings were kept in English and Spanish.³

¹ "Report of R. P. Hughes, Brigadier-General, U. S. V." in *House Documents*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., no. 2, pt. iii, p. 330.

² *Harper's History*, pp. 102-103. *Vide* appointment of Torres, Argüelles and Flores as commissioners in Taylor, vol. iii, exhibits 587 and 590, 69 KU.

³ For text of records, see *Senate Documents*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., no. 331, pt. iii, pp. 2712 *et seq.*

A perusal of these records reveals at once the difficult situation confronting both commissions, which was essentially the same that confronted the two peoples. In the first place, neither side was willing to recognize the existing facts: the Americans refused to acknowledge the existence of the Filipino Government, treating the Filipino commissioners, for purposes of these conferences, as merely General Aguinaldo's personal representatives; on the other hand, the Filipinos refused to admit American sovereignty, arguing that "the cession of sovereignty by Spain to the United States was made on a basis which did not exist" and insisting that sovereignty issued directly from the Filipinos themselves and was inalienable. In the second place, neither side was in a position to offer a concrete program of government which might be used, at least, as a probable basis for mutual concessions. The American commissioners could go no farther than to declare that the United States intended to establish a most liberal form of government, saying, however, that "the Government of the United States could offer no guarantee for its future conduct to an oppressed people, save that afforded by its liberal Constitution, its history, its traditions and its conduct in the past." In turn, the Filipino commissioners, bound as they were by Mabini's restrictive instructions,¹ limited themselves to repeating that "the aspiration of the Filipino people is independence, with the restrictions resulting from the conditions which its government may agree upon with the American when the latter agrees to recognize officially the former." Each side remained firm in its attitude; both adhered to their respective programs to the end. The conferences therefore dragged on without any tangible result and, when the commissions adjourned *sine die*, the relations between

¹Vide text in Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 592, 70 KU.

the two peoples were just as strained as before, if not more so.

The attempt to preserve "peace and harmonious relations" failed, and under the circumstances any such attempt was bound to fail. Then, more than ever before, was it clear that American "designs" were in conflict with Filipino "pretensions". True, both authorities were anxious, trying hard, in fact, to prevent a conflict; but how? Meanwhile both parties were preparing for the worst, knowing that a rupture might occur any time.¹

The rupture took place in the evening of February 4, at San Juan del Monte,² a suburb of Manila, and it soon spread all along the northern line and to a less extent along the southern. "By ten o'clock at night," LeRoy says, "the American troops were engaged for two miles from the Pasig River north and west, and were pressing the insurgents out, preparatory to a more vigorous advance in the morning."³ As daylight came the following morning, the American fleet began its deadly work, shelling the insurgent positions north and south of the city. From the beginning, it was an unequal struggle. In less than two months Malolos, the insurgent capital, was occupied by the American forces.

¹ LeRoy, *The Americans in the Philippines*, vol. ii, pp. 1 *et seq.*

² The first shot was fired about 8:30 by a Nebraska private (Grayson) and not by the Filipinos, as is sometimes assumed. See Otis' testimony in *House Documents*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., no. 2, pt. ii, p. 92. According to American testimony, the Filipinos deliberately provoked the rupture; this, however, is denied by the Filipinos. For the American view of the matter, see Otis' report already cited; for the opposite view, see statements by Trias and others in Taylor, vol. iv, exhibit 818, 33 MM-35 MM. Following the rupture, Aguinaldo formally declared war against the United States. See text of declaration in *Heraldo Filipino* Feb. 5, 1899 (supplement); reproduced in *Harper's History*, p. 123. For English version, see Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 422, 22 KU.

³ LeRoy, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 5.

The first two or three months of warfare, disastrous as it was to Filipinos arms, did not break down the spirit of the leading revolutionists. There was decided determination to cover up defeats, and present a brave front. In an effort to prevent the demoralization of the army and keep up its fighting spirit, appeals of the most passionate kind were made to it and to the country at large. Two such appeals were contained in the preamble to a decree of February 13, 1899, subscribed to by Aguinaldo, and a manifesto issued by Mabini on April 15. These documents read in part as follows:

(a) Bear in mind that you have contracted a debt of national honor; in the press, from the tribune, and in your feasts and gatherings, you have loudly proclaimed your love of liberty and have solemnly promised before the civilized world that you would fight for it unto death. . . . The hour has come; your country is in danger and it is necessary for the Philippine people to fulfill their promises. . . .¹

(b) And because war is the last resource which remains to us for the salvation of the fatherland and our national honor let us fight while there remains to us an atom of strength; let us acquit ourselves as gallant men, now that to the present generation are reserved the battle and the sacrifices. It matters not if we die in the midst or at the end of the painful journey; the generations to come, while praying over our tombs, will grant us tears of love and gratitude, not of bitter reproach.²

Meanwhile the Philippine Commission, appointed by President McKinley in January and headed by Jacob Gould Schurman, assembled at Manila on March 4.³ Coming as

¹ See text in Taylor, vol. iv, exhibit 602, 3 GR.

² Text in *ibid.*, vol. iv, exhibit 634, 16 GR-17 GR.

³ The members of this Commission, generally referred to as the Schurman Commission, to distinguish it from a later one headed by William H. Taft, were: Jacob G. Schurman, Gen. Otis, Admiral Dewey, Charles Denby and Dean C. Worcester. Mr. Denby arrived on April 2.

they did a month after the hostilities had begun, the members of the Commission found that the task ahead of them was not an easy one. They were to be the "bearers of the good will, the protection, and the richest blessings of a liberating rather than a conquering nation"; but they were without power to alter the temporary government instituted by the United States military authorities, which was to continue "until Congress shall determine otherwise." Their work seemed to be primarily one of study and recommendation, "in order to facilitate the most humane, pacific and effective extension of authority throughout these islands."¹ As directed by their instructions, the Commission issued on April 4 a proclamation, which was a declaration of American sovereignty over the Philippines, and at the same time an attempt to conciliate the insurgents by promising "an enlightened system of government, under which the Philippine people may enjoy the largest measure of home rule and the amplest liberty, consonant with the supreme ends of government and compatible with those obligations which the United States has assumed toward the civilized nations of the world."²

Mabini, though evidently little impressed by the Commission's proclamation and by its promises of a liberal government, which he characterized as "a clever and ingenious scheme" which, when carefully examined, amounted to "nothing in practice,"³ was compelled nevertheless to

¹For text of instructions to the Philippine Commission, see *Report of the Philippine Commission*, 1900, vol. i, exhibit II; Worcester, *The Philippines Past and Present*, ed. 1921, pp. 975 *et seq.*

²*Vide* text of proclamation in *Report of the Philippine Commission*, 1900, vol. i, pp. 3-5; Worcester, *op. cit.*, pp. 977-980; Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 286 *et seq.*; *Harper's History*, pp. 154-156.

³Mabini's attitude is well reflected in his manifesto of April 15, answering the Commission's proclamation. Familiar with Spanish

assume the initiative in seeking an armistice preparatory to the establishment of what he called "honorable peace." Taking advantage of the Commission's conciliatory overtures, he sent two emissaries¹ on April 28 through the American line at Apalit, Pampanga, to request the American authorities at Manila for an armistice of three weeks. After conferences with General Otis and with the Commission, the men reported back to San Isidro in Nueva Écija, then the insurgent capital, returning to Manila early in May for another conference.

In these interviews Colonel Argüelles stated that the Filipino Government was ready to make "peace with honor," and to this end solicited an armistice of three weeks—later extended to three months—"in order to enable it to consult the opinions of the people concerning the government which would be most advantageous, and the intervention in it which should be given to the North American Government, and to appoint a commission with full powers to act in the name of the Filipino people."² Colonel Argüelles saw General Otis, Military Governor of the Philippines, and the

methods in the past, he was chary in accepting promises. "We were the equals of the Spaniards before the laws of Spain," he pointed out, "but we in no case obtained justice without recourse to vile and underhand means and without incurring an interminable series of humiliations." Moreover, it is well to remember that the United States in 1899 did not have the splendid record of liberality in governing an alien race that it now possesses. Mabini's attitude, which was shared in by many of his countrymen, was therefore not illogical. For text of Mabini's manifesto, see Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 291 *et seq.*; Taylor, vol. iv, exhibit 634, 16 GR-17 GR.

¹ Col. Manuel Argüelles and Lt. J. Bernal; later, Bernal's place was taken by Capt. Zialcita.

² For instructions to Argüelles, together with Mabini's communication to the Philippine Commission under date of April 29, 1899, see *Report of the Philippine Commission*, 1900, vol. i, exhibit iii; Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 297 *et seq.*

members of the Philippine Commission as well. While very little satisfaction was obtained from the former, who declined to grant an armistice and demanded that the insurgents lay down their arms,¹ assurances were had from the Commission regarding America's intention to grant a most liberal form of government.² More than these assurances, neither General Otis nor the Commission could give, as neither had the authority to do so.

The failure of Mabini's emissaries to secure an armistice brought matters to a crisis at the insurgent capital, where for some time discontent against his leadership had been growing. Mabini's well known hostility to any semblance of congressional supremacy or dictation in government had made him *persona non grata* to many members of the Assembly, and the delay in the convocation of that body, which according to the Constitution should be "on the 15th of April at the latest," was attributed by his enemies to his opposition. Moreover his vigorous policy, which implied the continuance of warfare unless "an honorable peace," i. e. one that would pledge the recognition of Philippine independence, was obtained, and his strict adherence to this policy, which he said "can be changed only when I lose the

¹ Part of Otis' dispatch, reporting to Washington his action, is printed in *Harper's History*, p. 174.

² Schurman's despatch to Hay, dated May 4, speaks of the conferences and of the plan of government outlined to Argüelles, as follows: "Executive department, chief executive, governor-general, appointed by President of the United States, with cabinet of several heads of departments, appointed by the governor-general. He shall have absolute veto over legislature. House of representatives elected by the people; suffrage limited by property or education; judiciary strong and independent; judges mainly appointed by the President of the United States." This plan of government, which Schurman recommended for the approval of the President, was approved by the latter in substance, but with one important omission: the proposed house of representatives. *Vide Senate Documents*, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., no. 208, pp. 155-156.

confidence of the President and I fall,"¹ earned for him the name of "irreconcilable". This "irreconcilability," actual and imaginary, of his was now pointed out by his enemies as the real cause for the failure of the negotiations just closed. Then, too, the repeated reverses suffered by the Filipino troops, as well as the financial difficulties, which became very grave at this time partly due to the abandonment of large sums at Malolos, greatly undermined his influence, and hastened his downfall.²

Mabini's opponents, the "pacifists" (*pacíficos*) as they now began to be called, demanded the resignation of the cabinet; but Mabini, who adhered to his principles to the last, was defiant, yielding only to the extent of announcing to Aguinaldo that he and his colleagues were ready to resign whenever the latter became convinced that "other persons are better qualified to bring about the country's happiness."³ Two days after this announcement, the Assembly opened,⁴ and it was at once seen that that body was strongly inclined toward conciliation and peace. In the session of May 6 the few representatives present "unanimously resolved to enter into an understanding with General Otis, upon the basis of the proclamation of autonomy offered by the Schurman Commission," and to request Aguinaldo "for the substitu-

¹ See unsigned letter, certainly Mabini's, addressed to Apacible and Santos and dated April 18, 1899, in Taylor, vol. iv, exhibit 721, 51 GR-52 GR.

² Buencamino to Agoncillo *et al.*, May 8, 1899, in *ibid.*, vol. iv, exhibit 726, 53 GR.

³ *Vide* communication signed by Mabini, Baldomero Aguinaldo, Gonzaga and Sandico to Emilio Aguinaldo, May 3, 1899, in a pamphlet entitled *Mensaje, San Isidro, 5 de Mayo de 1899*; also in Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 300 *et seq.*

⁴ *Vide* Aguinaldo's message to the Assembly in the pamphlet cited; also in Kalaw, *op. cit.*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 302 *et seq.*

tion of the Mabini cabinet by one which should inspire in the American Government absolute confidence."¹ Thus, while Mabini did not really lose the confidence of Aguinaldo, he fell just the same, forced out of office by a hostile legislature.

On May 7 Paterno, the recognized leader of the "pacifists," was requested by Aguinaldo to form a cabinet. The following day the personnel of the new Council was announced.² At the same time Paterno publicly declared the

¹ What transpired in the session of May 6 is described by one of the representatives present, Dr. José Albert, in a letter to James A. LeRoy, who transcribed in *The Americans in the Philippines*, vol. ii, pp. 89-90, the following pertinent portion of it: "It was unanimously resolved to enter into an understanding with General Otis, upon the basis of the proclamation of autonomy offered by the Schurman Commission. A copy of this resolution was delivered to President Aguinaldo by the Secretary of the Interior and the writer (Albert); in the said resolution there was contained, moreover, a request for the substitution of the Mabini cabinet by one which should inspire in the American Government absolute confidence in the securing of a peaceful arrangement. Aguinaldo, having expressed his agreement, immediately set out on the same day for Kabanatuan, where Mabini was, to inform him of the resolution of Congress. In view of this resolution, Mabini wrote a letter, declining the post of President of the Council of Ministers, and declaring that he resigned only at the demand and by the will of Congress and President, not having done so before in order that history might not set him down as a coward in the face of the very grave situation of the Philippine Republic." But see also a letter of Aguinaldo to Mabini, May 7, 1899, in the *Indice Oficial*, May 13, 1899, and the statement made by Buencamino as quoted in Schurman, *Philippine Affairs*, New York, 1902, pp. 9-10. That Aguinaldo did see Mabini in person regarding the cabinet crisis, is testified to by the latter himself in *La Revolución filipina*, ch. x.

² The new Council was composed of the following: Pedro A. Paterno, President; Felipe Buencamino, Foreign Affairs; S. de las Alas, Interior; Mariano Trias, War and Navy; Hugo Ilagan, Treasury; A. Velarde, Education; Máximo M. Paterno, Communications and Public Works; and León M. Guerrero, Industry, Agriculture and Commerce. See letter of Aguinaldo to Paterno, May 8, 1899, approving personnel, in Taylor, vol. iv, exhibit 654, 23 GR.

"political program" of the new government to be: "to secure peace by worthy and honorable means"; to work for the prosperity of the country and "to maintain its individual and political liberties"; and to regulate the governmental expenditures on the basis of the strictest economy.¹

The Paterno "peace cabinet," which according to Mabini offered "to work for an autonomous form of government similar to that of Canada,"² proposed to send to Manila a committee of seven headed by Buencamino, Paterno's right-hand man. However, due to the sudden intervention of General Luna, a pronounced "irreconcilable," as were most of the military officers, the committee broke up, and it became necessary to appoint another. As finally despatched on May 18, the second committee was composed of four members, two civilians and two military men.³ This committee conferred with the Philippine Commission on May 19 and, as the insurgent emissaries of April had done, discussed with its members the permanent form of government the United States intended to establish in the Philippines, and argued for the necessity of an armistice to enable the Filipino Government to consult popular opinion regarding the course it should follow.⁴ Although the Commission, on this occasion, was able to furnish the Filipino committee a definite plan of government—the same which President McKinley had cabled Dr. Schurman on May 5⁵—little or

¹ For text of "political program," see *ibid.*, vol. iv, exhibit 724, 53 GR.

² Mabini, *Contestaciones y consideraciones*, p. 11.

³ The members of the second committee were: Gracio Gonzaga, Alberto Barretto, Gen. Gregorio H. del Pilar and Capt. Lorenzo Zialcita. See LeRoy, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 90, wherein the personnel of the first committee is also given.

⁴ *Vide* report of their interview with the Philippine Commission in the *Report of the Philippine Commission*, 1900, vol. i, pp. 116-127.

⁵ *Supra*, p. 155 (note 2).

no positive result came out of the interview, inasmuch as the former insisted on the surrender of the Filipino troops as a condition *sine qua non* to all readjustments.

Quite likely Paterno's policy, which according to him was "to secure peace by worthy and honorable means," precluded the idea of independence, which he studiously refrained from mentioning in his "political program" (manifesto of May 8). Apparently, however, the peacemaker of Biacnabato did not intend to purchase peace with the United States Government at the price of unconditional surrender. Perhaps, he did not dare, knowing that the army would not listen to such a proposal. Disappointed with the failure of his emissaries to secure an armistice, he seems to have become convinced of the futility of making peace without submission. He, therefore, abandoned his peace program and in a manifesto of June 2 announced that he and his colleagues in the cabinet were ready to struggle for the preservation "of our republican institutions, national independence and the presidency of Don Emilio Aguinaldo." The manifesto closed with the words: "To war, then, beloved brothers, to war."

Due partly to this sudden change in the policy of the cabinet, and partly to the expectation of a Democratic victory in the United States presidential election of 1900 (which the revolutionists took for granted would result in the immediate reversal of American policy in the Archipelago),¹ the insurgent government, from mid-summer of 1899, made fresh attempts to bolster up its falling organization and

¹As is well known, the Democrats pronounced imperialism the "paramount issue" of the election. See Edward Stanwood, *A History of the Presidency*, vol. ii, ch. i; M. M. Kalaw, *The Case for the Filipinos*, ch. vi. See also Aguinaldo's proclamation of Aug. 31, 1899, in Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 340 *et seq.*, or in Taylor, vol. iv, exhibit 692, 40 GR-41 GR.

showed unmistakable signs of greater and renewed war activities. The return to the former policy of firmness, essentially the same which had cost Mabini the premiership, was reflected in various ways, at home and abroad.

In pursuance of the new policy, an effort was made to live up, or to appear as living up, to Article 4 of the Constitution.¹ For this reason the Assembly, which had been convoked at San Isidro on May 6 but had to be adjourned finally for lack of a quorum, many representatives either being unable to attend because of the disturbed conditions caused by the war, or choosing to give up further connection with the Filipino Government, was convened again at Tarlac early in July. To prevent the reoccurrence of the difficulty experienced at San Isidro, Aguinaldo, in a decree of July 7, appointed additional representatives, raising the quota of representation as follows: for provinces classified as first class in the insurgent budget law of 1899,² four representatives; for second class, three; for third class and remaining provinces, as provided for in the decree.³ By this means he accomplished the double purpose of continuing the Assembly⁴ and of having nearly all of its active members subservient to his policies. For this reason, also, another attempt was made to proceed with the organization, long interrupted, of the judicial department along the lines indi-

¹This article prescribes three distinct departments of government.

²Printed under the title of *República de Filipinas: Presupuestos generales de gastos e ingresos del estado para el año de 1899*, Barasoain, 1899. A part of the budget is printed in a separate pamphlet entitled *República de Filipinas: Presupuestos generales de gastos e ingresos locales para el año de 1899*.

³Text in Taylor, vol. iv, exhibit 673, 30 GR *et seq.*

⁴The Assembly in its session of July 14 elected a new set of officers, Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista being chosen president. See Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, p. 43.

cated in the "judiciary law" of the preceding March, and an order to this effect was issued on August 4.¹ In support of the plan, the Assembly in its session of August 23 promptly elected Mabini Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and Gracio Gonzaga, Attorney General.² However, little or nothing in this direction was accomplished beyond the partial organization of a superior court at the seat of the insurgent government.³

Moreover, there was an apparent determination on the part of the executive to tighten somewhat the bonds of government so as to secure greater solidity and union. This was difficult to accomplish then, engaged as the Republic was in an unequal struggle and with communications effectively blocked in many places. Yet it was at about this time (early in July) that Leyte was taken finally from the control of General Lukban and placed as a separate politico-military command under a better-liked military leader.⁴ It was also at this time (late in September) that the so-called "council of the federal state of Bisayas" was done away with and replaced by a "politico-military government" under General Delgado, and the "superior council" for

¹ *Vide* decree of Aug. 4, 1899, in Taylor, vol. iv, exhibit 686, 37 GR. The judiciary law of March 7, 1899, provided for the establishment of one Supreme Court and six Superior Courts. See text in *ibid.*, vol. iv, exhibit 621, 9 GR.

² Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, p. 44.

³ Taylor, vol. iv, exhibit 955, 80 MM.

⁴ Lukban, who at first was military commander of Camarines, Samar and Leyte, was named on April 7, 1899, politico-military governor of Samar, thus limiting his jurisdiction to within that island. However, it appears that this arrangement was not carried out till early in July at the receipt by Lukban of an order (dated June 2) directing him to turn the government of Leyte over to Col. Mójica. *Vide* Taylor, vol. iv, exhibits 1249 (28 HK-29 HK) and 1321 (58 HK-59 HK).

Panay was created for the sake of greater harmony and better defence of the entire island.¹

The return to Mabini's policy of independence, which under the existing conditions meant war, was accompanied by a revival of general agitation for its attainment. In the first place, the propaganda in the United States, which had been abandoned temporarily immediately after the outbreak of hostilities in February, was resumed and conducted with vigor, as was the propaganda carried on at other points. Galicano Apacible, who was at the head of the Hongkong agency, was directed to turn that office over to General Riego de Dios and to proceed to the United States, while Agoncillo was to remain in Europe.² In the second place, pamphlets setting forth Philippine culture and conditions in a favorable light, and arguments in behalf of independence were printed and distributed. Examples of these were Buencamino's manifesto of August 20, 1899, addressed "To the Honorable Members of the United States Senate and House of Representatives," and printed by the *Comité Central Filipino en el Extranjero*, Antonio Regidor's *To the Press of the United States: Civilized Condition of the Philippines*, printed without date by the "Philippine Islands Committee in Europe," and Aguinaldo's *Reseña verídica de*

¹ The "council of the federal state of Bisayas" was ordered dissolved by a decree of April 27, 1899; but this decree remained a dead letter, till Sept. 21, when Gen. Delgado (who had been appointed by the central government politico-military governor of Iloilo) finally decided to take control. Thereupon the members of the "council of the federal state" met and formally declared the "council" abolished. For decree of April 27, 1899, see Taylor, vol. v, exhibits 1249, 28 HK; for Delgado's assumption of authority, *ibid.*, exhibit 1264, 37 HK; for minutes of the meeting of the "council," *ibid.*, exhibit 1266, 38 HK. The record of the creation of the "superior council" for Panay is in *ibid.*, exhibit 1275, 42 HK.

² See letters of Buencamino dated Aug. 27 and Sept. 12, 1899, in Taylor, vol. iv, exhibits 742 (68 GR) and 744 (70 GR-72 GR). The second letter, though begun on Sept. 12, was added to on Sept. 29 and 30.

la revolución filipina printed in September in the government printing office at Tarlac and reprinted abroad in English translation.¹ Finally a last attempt was made in September to win the sympathy of General Otis by sending him a Filipino delegation headed by General Alejandrino, ostensibly to deliver formally to him certain American prisoners set free by executive clemency, but really to invite him "to accept the beautiful mission of pacifier of this war, by securing from the Government at Washington a generous and spontaneous declaration of our independence, as was recently done with regard to Cuba."²

The position of the leading revolutionists about this time regarding independence was essentially the same that they had uniformly maintained up to the advent of the Paterno cabinet, namely, "independence under American protection," meaning by "protection" aid and guidance in external affairs. Their attitude is well shown in a document of the period, in the handwriting of Buencamino which, in setting forth certain conditions that were deemed necessary for the pacification of the country, enumerates the following:

(a) Official recognition by the Congress (House of Representatives) and Senate of the United States of the Philippine Republic as a free and independent nation.

(b) Treaty of alliance with the United States on the basis of the most favored nation.

¹ For Buencamino's manifesto, see *Senate Documents*, 56th Cong., 1 Sess., no. 66, pp. 44-52, or Kalaw's *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 326 *et seq.*; Regidor's pamphlet, which is very rare (there is a copy in the Newberry Library, Chicago), was printed without the author's name, but bears the initials A. R.; Aguinaldo's *Reseña* is easily obtained, but see English version in the *Congressional Record*, vol. 35, pt. viii, p. 440.

² The Alejandrino "mission," though planned at the end of August was not despatched till a month later. It remained in Manila two days and had conferences with Gen. Otis. See Taylor, vol. iv, exhibits 986, 987, 988, 92 MM-94 MM.

(c) Naval protection for ten years, on the basis of five men-of-war of the United States, under the command of an Admiral, who will be the Protector and at the same time the chief of the Philippine fleet under the orders of the Philippine Government.

(d) The Philippine Government will contribute to the Treasury of the United States an annual sum of—in consideration of the naval protection during the continuance thereof.¹

These exertions proved to be ineffective in warding off the fate that awaited the Philippine Republic. Already the conservatives, who had once sat in Congress at Malolos, had ceased to cooperate with those in control of the government, and further defection occurred as the situation in the revolutionary camp became increasingly precarious. Moreover, internal discord set in from time to time. Although it never reached threatening proportions, it is commonly believed to have been at the bottom of the death of General Luna.² Above all the irresistible drive conducted by the American troops forced the insurgents to retire and seek safer and less exposed positions. Malolos, the seat of the Filipino Government, was occupied by the Americans on March 31, and San Isidro, where the government was next established, on May 18; while Tarlac, the next capital, was abandoned by the revolutionists early in November. On November 12, Aguinaldo, after holding a council at Bayambang, issued an order disbanding the troops and directing their reorganization into guerrilla bands, which were to operate as directed through their respective commanders.³

¹ Text in Taylor, vol. iv, exhibit 989, 94 MM.

² Luna was treacherously killed in Kabanatuan on June 5, 1899. See diverse views regarding his death in Taylor, vol. iv, exhibit 893, 57 MM-58 MM; Concepción, *Apuntes y diario de operaciones*, notebooks 2-3; Mabini, *La Revolución filipina*, ch. x. Mabini's view as stated in *La Revolución filipina* is contradicted by himself in a letter, dated July 25, 1899, to Apacible and Ikkis, a copy of which is in the Kalaw collection.

³ For text of order, see Taylor, vol. iv, exhibit 951, 76 MM.

FISCAL SYSTEM

The Philippine Republic not only established a civil government, "provided for trial by due process of law of both civil and criminal cases," and raised and equipped armies, but also "laid and collected taxes and customs duties." As a whole, the Spanish fiscal system was retained. All taxes under the Spanish régime, with some exceptions, were continued, and a few additional sources of revenues were created. In fact the budget (*presupuesto*) for the year 1899, approved by Congress and promulgated by Aguinaldo on February 19, followed very closely its Spanish model, whenever not in conflict "with the laws and decrees in force."¹

The budget appropriated 6,324, 729.38 dollars² for the general, and 704,602 for the local, expenses; and estimated the revenues payable to the Central Government at 6,342,407 dollars, and those to the local, at 826,900. By far the largest sum set aside, namely, 4,977,654.38 dollars, was that appropriated for the expenses of the army and navy department, which was, of course, in charge of the conduct of the war. The remaining departments received the following allotments: Foreign Affairs, 89,040 dollars; Interior, 203,550; Treasury, 354,380; Public Instruction, 35,468; Communication and Public Works, 361,366; and Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, 21,688. The sum set aside for the offices of the President of the Republic, the Congress and the Supreme Court was 281,583 dollars. Of the 704,602 dollars appropriated for local expenditures, 302,156

¹ *Vide República de Filipinas: Presupuestos generales de gastos e ingresos del estado para el año de 1899*, Barasoain, 1899; *República de Filipinas: Presupuestos generales de gastos e ingresos locales para el año de 1899*, Barasoain, 1899. See also Taylor, vol. iv, exhibits 751-752, 76 GR et seq.

² All sums given in connection with the discussion of the financial system are in Mexican dollars.

were to go to public instruction; 173,254 to local services; 55,160 to health and charitable institutions; 50,000 to public works; 52,000 to leases; 40,352 to prisons; and the rest to cemeteries and miscellaneous expenses. Of the estimated receipts corresponding to the Central Government, 4,050,000 dollars were to be derived from the graded war tax imposed on all persons between the ages of eighteen and sixty, and ranging from one dollar for women to one hundred for all men "controlling or managing a capital in money or property to the value of over 25,000 dollars."¹ The remaining sources of general revenues were classified as direct taxes, which were expected to yield 1,016,757 dollars; indirect taxes, 432,050; and special taxes, 843,600.² The sources of local receipts were similarly classified as direct, indirect and emergency taxes.³

¹ Soldiers and military employees in active service, those physically and mentally incapable of performing labor, and the poor were exempted.

² According to exhibit "B" of the budget, the direct taxes were: city tax; industrial and commercial tax; Chinese poll tax; arrears of all kinds not collected to the end of 1898. The indirect taxes were: export duties, fines, surtaxes, etc. enforced by the customs officials. The special taxes included: fees collected in courts by state representatives; post-office-box rent; unclaimed property; tax on mines and forest products; sale of stamped paper; sale of adhesive stamps of various kinds; sale of lands and buildings; income from labor performed by prisoners; income from opium; income from friar lands restored to the state; sale of printed books and of the *Heraldo filipino*.

³ According to exhibit "D" the direct local taxes were those derived from bridges, ferries and fords; weights and measures; fisheries; carriages, carts, tramways and horses (except those employed in agricultural work); certificates and transfer of large cattle; pounds; 50% of the fees of formal interments, etc. The indirect local taxes included fees for civil trials; public markets; lease of municipal property; theatrical performances, horse races and other public entertainments; licenses for feasts; tax of one *céntimo* per pound of beef, pork, mutton, etc. The emergency taxes were such fees as were derived from the registry of property, of births and deaths, and of marriages.

The estimated income of the government, when compared with that of the Spanish budget for the fiscal year 1896-1897, shows a falling-off of 36 per cent. The difference would have been greater, if the Filipino Government had not created other sources of revenues, such as the war-tax, which replaced the Spanish poll (*cédula*) tax, the tax on formal interments and on festivals, and that on beef, pork, mutton, etc. Low as the estimate was, the actual receipts brought in a total sum much less than that expected. According to Taylor the amount in cash from May 31, 1898, to September 10, 1899 (thereafter no record of any accounts seems available), was 2,586,733.48 dollars.¹ Accepting this

¹ Taylor gives the following table of cash receipts (in Mexican dollars) of the Filipino Government arranged in provinces:

Untraceable	711,992.74	Romblon	29,966.78
Pangasinan	204,448.02	Isabela	20,019.50
Cagayan	198,061.73	Cavite	18,609.62
Albay	176,687.55	Morong	14,326.79
Union	153,998.70	Mindoro	13,311.48
Laguna	111,339.61	Masbate	11,243.17
Samar	106,466.01	Bataan	9,236.81
Manila	89,915.73	Nueva Vizcaya	6,221.58
Bulacan	89,013.27	Panay	4,476.03
Leyte	87,719.74	Abra	3,967.00
Batangas	74,058.18	Batanes	3,528.52
Ilocos Norte	73,192.03	Cebu	3,351.52
Tarlac	58,625.76	Mindanao	3,108.10
Nueva Écija	51,196.06	Benguet	1,076.00
Ilocos Sur	51,669.21	Babuyanes Islands	953.50
Pampanga	51,051.71	Negros	834.00
Tayabas	44,407.40	Infanta	684.00
Sorsogon	39,251.00	Lepanto	351.25
Zambales	36,432.38	Marinduque	198.00
Camarines	31,743.00		
		Total	2,586,733.48

See his *Report on the Organization for the Administration of Civil Government Instituted by Emilio Aguinaldo and his Followers*, p. 56; but see also his larger work (cited elsewhere as Taylor), vol. iv, exhibit 779, 11 MM *et seq.*

estimate as the best obtainable, though undoubtedly not representing the total collected, not probably even the total in cash collection, it will be seen that the actual receipts corresponding to the year 1899 alone must have been far below what was set in the budget. This heavy drop was attributed principally to the abnormal conditions produced by the war, resulting sometimes in the seizure by American authorities of sums in transit, and to the inexperience of many, and the dishonesty of some, of the officials.

Of the various ways resorted to by the Filipino Government in raising revenue, three deserve some mention, namely, the national loan; the contribution of war; and the customs and tonnage duties. They will be taken up *seriatim*.

The floating of the national loan antedated the proclamation of the "Republic," having been announced by Aguinaldo on November 30, 1898, in a decree which provided for the sale of government bonds to the amount of 5,000,000 dollars.¹ The bonds were of two kinds: "Series A", and "Series B", the first being divided into 25,000 bonds of 100 dollars each, and the second into 100,000 bonds of 25 dollars each. They were to bear interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, payable semi-annually, and were to be redeemed in forty years, beginning December 1, 1898. The redemption was to be gradual—a number of bonds selected by lot to be cancelled every year. As originally announced, the subscriptions were to be open during the entire month of December, the payments made as follows: 40% of the amount subscribed within eight days; 30% during the first two weeks in February, 1899; and the remaining 30% at a time to be fixed by the government, which should not be sooner than forty days after February 15. However, the time for the subscription, as well as for the payments, was later extended. Although the full amount called for was

¹ For text of decree of Nov. 30, 1898, see *El Heraldo*, Dec. 1, 1898.

never raised, about 388,650 dollars, according to Taylor, were collected up to September, 1899, from this source from at least seventeen provinces, with Albay heading the list with 100,000 dollars and Sorsogon and Pangasinan nearly tying for second place.¹ That some of the foreign houses such as "Mendezona and Co." and "Inchausti and Co." (Spanish firms), and "Smith, Bell and Co." (British), subscribed to the loan is shown by the drafts issued in payment of subscriptions made by them or their agents.²

The so-called "contribution of war," a tax imposed "on the well-to-do," was created by the decree of June 20, 1898. There being no definite schedule of assessment, it was apparently collected quite irregularly by agents appointed *ad hoc*. The contribution was paid either in cash or in kind. The cash collection alone from this source, up to February 27, 1899, amounted to 385,332.53 dollars,³ there being no figure available for the total cash collection thereafter. That many paid in kind is shown by the long reports on file among the captured insurgent papers, detailing what had been turned over to the collecting agents. Thus the firm of Smith, Bell and Co. sent the Filipino Government about three hundred sacks of rice "as voluntary contributions of war" during the months of February and March, 1899.⁴ That war contributions were collected till late in the year 1899 was evident from General José I. Pawa's communication to Aguinaldo under date of October 28, informing the latter of a remittance of 220,000 dollars for the province

¹ Taylor, vol. iv, exhibit 799, 15 MM. An attempt to float a foreign loan was made in July, 1899, but without result. See act authorizing it in *ibid.*, vol. iv, exhibit 771, 9 MM.

² Taylor, *Report on the Organization for the Administration of Civil Government Instituted by Emilio Aguinaldo*, p. 65.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78, 80-81.

of Tayabas.¹ Indeed there were in that month twenty-five collecting agents for contributions of war in the provinces of Manila, Bulacan, Laguna, Batangas, Bataan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Morong, Ilocos Norte and Sur, Pangasinan, Cagayan, Isabela, Zambales, Albay, Capiz and Antique.²

The clearest statement regarding the customs duties levied on foreign and domestic trade is contained in a decree of October 17, 1898, which ordered the collection of: (1) 'a duty of 5% ad valorem on all products imported directly from abroad; (2) a duty of 15 % ad valorem on all products exported; and (3) a duty of 5% ad valorem on all merchandise "transported for coastwise trade," whether shipped by land or water.³ Subsequently, however, the 5% duty on merchandise shipped by land was abolished. Still later the duties on export and coastwise trade were fixed at 10% ad valorem, and the import duty suspended for the year 1899. At any rate, customs duties, and some sort of tonnage duties as well were certainly collected at ports controlled by the Filipino Government, specially in southeastern Luzon, in Leyte and, for sometimes, in Iloilo. The following selected abstracts of certain documents on file among the captured insurgent records more than prove this point:

Tabaco, Albay Province, Dec. 1, 1898, General Vito Belarmino reports that he has collected the 5 per cent charge for pilotage and customs duties from four vessels: "Elcano", "Venus", "Serafin" and "Toyo Maru"; total collection amounting to 3,043.48 dollars.

Tabaco and Legaspi, Albay Province, Dec. 30, 1898, E.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

² *Ibid.*, p. 78.

³ *Vide* text of decree in Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 433, 25 KU. See also exhibits 432 and 277, 25 KU and 86 MG. For modifications of the customs regulations, see *ibid.*, vol. iii, exhibit 439, 26 KU; and the budget law for 1899.

Aguinaldo informs his Secretary of the Treasury that the military commander of Albay Province informs him that he has turned into the provincial treasury since Dec. 11, 1898, 7,405.41 dollars, received from customs duties.

Tacloban, Leyte, Jan. 5, 1899. V. Lukban, commanding in Leyte and Samar, forwards to the President of the Philippine Republic 2,302.31 dollars, amount collected as customs duties on cargo of the vessel "Julia", belonging to Smith, Bell and Co.

Manila, Jan. 25, 1899. John T. Macleod, manager of the "Compañía Marítima" of Manila applies to the "President of the Revolutionary Government" at Malolos for five licenses for the steamships "Union," "Salvadora," "Brutus," "España" and "Elcano" to engage in coastwise trade between the ports under the control of the Filipino Government. He forwards by bearer of letter 1,506.68 dollars in payment of tonnage duties on said vessels.

Legaspi, Albay, Feb. 10, 1899. The steamers "Santander" and "Kongsee" pay duties amounting to 6,588.10 dollars, and port charges of 573.03 dollars.

Cabanatuan, Feb. 25, 1899. Japanese ship "Hokoku Maru" pays 4,100 dollars customs dues, to be paid by Smith, Bell and Co.'s agents at Cebu.

Albay, March 11, 1899. An agent for Smith, Bell and Co. pays a duty of 2,759.60 dollars on tobacco shipped from Albay in the steamer "España".¹

Similarly the Filipino Government derived revenue from other sources, such as documentary, postage and telegraph stamps; leases of lands and buildings; forest and fishing rights; opium contracts; registration of property; registration of births, marriages and deaths; slaughter of cattle; fines, etc.² Although there were cases of seizures and pay-

¹ Taylor, *Report on the Organization for the Administration of Civil Government Instituted by Emilio Aguinaldo*, pp. 56 et seq.

² Taylor, vol. iii, exhibit 446, 27 KU-28 KU; vol. iv, exhibit 779, 11 MM-12 MM.

ments of taxes under protest recorded, it is fair, nevertheless, to state that as a whole the collection of the taxes mentioned was conducted in an orderly fashion and payments therefor were made ungrudgingly by those affected. To use Taylor's words:

The officials appointed by the government of Aguinaldo were recognized as representatives of a government, of the government of the Archipelago outside of Manila, not only by the people of the Islands, but by the foreign merchants domiciled in Manila and trading to the other parts of the Islands. This recognition is shown by applications by the managers and authorized agents of such houses to trade, by their payment of customs duties at ports held by the insurgents to their authorized officials, not as a forced contribution of war or an exaction, but as a duly laid customs duty acquiesced in by the payer.¹

DOWNFALL OF THE REPUBLIC

With the abandonment of Tarlac early in November and the disbandment of the Filipino troops immediately thereafter, organized resistance was broken. At the same time the attempt to maintain a civil government had to be given up. Aguinaldo, "with a small party of ministers and officers," retired further north, slipping past his pursuers, and from Candon plunged into the mountain fastnesses of Lepanto and Bontoc.² Outwardly the Filipino Government was no more, and on November 24 General Otis reported to Washington: "Claim to government by insurgents can be made no longer under any fiction. Its treasurer, secretary of the interior, and president of congress in our hands; its

¹ Taylor, *Report on the Organization for the Administration of Civil Government*, pp. 16-17.

² For details of Aguinaldo's wandering, see Concepción, *Apuntes*, notebook 4; Villa's "Diary" in *Senate Documents*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., no. 331, pt. iii, pp. 1896-2060.

President and remaining cabinet officers in hiding, evidently in different central Luzon provinces; its generals and troops in small bands scattered through the provinces. . . ."¹

In spite of the destruction pictured by Otis, resistance to the authority of the United States did not cease. The Filipino troops, which had been disbanded in November, were redistributed and guerilla warfare set in. This mode of fighting continued in the larger islands till 1901 and 1902. Between May 5, 1900, and June 30, 1901, alone there were, according to General MacArthur, who had succeeded General Otis as Military Governor of the Philippines, 1026 "contacts" between the American and the Filipino forces. As a whole, the guerilla warfare was supported by the people. General MacArthur says:

Wherever throughout the Archipelago there is a group of the insurgent army, it is a fact beyond dispute that all the contiguous towns contribute to the maintenance thereof. In other words, the towns, regardless of the fact of American occupation and town organization, are the actual bases for all insurgent military activities, and not only so in the sense of furnishing supplies for the so-called flying columns of guerillas, but as affording secure places of refuge. Indeed, it is now the most important maxim of Filipino tactics to disband when closely pressed, and seek safety in the nearest *barrio*—a manœuvre quickly accomplished by reason of the assistance of the people, and the ease with which the Filipino soldier is transformed into the appearance of a peaceful native. . . . The success of this unique system of war depends upon almost complete unity of action of the entire native population. That such unity is a fact is too obvious to admit of discussion; how it is brought about and maintained is not so plain. Intimidation has undoubtedly accomplished much to this end; but fear as the only motive

¹ *Annual Reports, Secretary of War, 1900, vol. i, pt. iv, pp. 208 et seq.*

is hardly sufficient to account for the united and apparently spontaneous action of several millions of people.¹

That such an unequal struggle, however, could not be kept up much longer without serious detriment to the people at large was apparent to all, and many of Aguinaldo's former associates—civilian and military—who had been captured or had already surrendered, held a meeting in Manila under the leadership of Paterno and Buencamino in May, 1900, and resolved to work for peace.² Although this move was condemned by Aguinaldo and by the "Filipino Republican Committee in Madrid,"³ it showed, nevertheless, that an increasing number of revolutionists were now willing to abide by the inevitable and accept American sovereignty as a *fait accompli*. The peace movement gained more converts, and in December the Federal Party, which stood unqualifiedly for American sovereignty, was organized. In collaboration with the Taft Philippine Commission, which had been appointed by the President of the United States earlier in March, this party contributed largely to the restoration of peace.

As the peace movement gained more ground, guerrilla activities became less and less. Slowly open resistance subsided, as one military leader after another was captured or surrendered. Panay was pacified in February, 1901; Cebu and Bohol in December. Aguinaldo was captured in March,⁴

¹ MacArthur's report, Oct. 1, 1900, in *House Documents*, 56th Cong., 2nd Sess., no. 2, pt. iii, pp. 61-62.

² Felipe Buencamino, *Documentos referentes a las gestiones hechas por el... para la cesación de la guerra actual en Filipinas*, Manila, 1900, p. 8; Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, p. 53.

³ See Aguinaldo's manifesto of July 22, 1900, and that of the "Filipino Republican Committee in Madrid" dated Aug. 1, 1900, in Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, appendix, pp. 399 *et seq.*

⁴ See *Relato del General Aguinaldo sobre la tragedia de Palanan* in *ibid.*, pp. 472 *et seq.*; Frederick Funston, *Memories of Two Wars*, New York, 1914, pp. 384 *et seq.*

and took the oath of allegiance to the United States in April. Peace was restored in Samar after the capture of General Lukban in February, 1902, and in central Luzon after the surrender of General Malvar in April. With the surrender of Malvar, guerrilla warfare came to an end.¹

¹ See Malvar's proclamation, May 6, 1902, declaring the war at an end in Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, p. 59.

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

BECAUSE of the meagreness of documentary sources before 1898, and because the sources, both before and after that year, are still largely scattered and have not been worked over systematically, it is extremely difficult to make a study of the political ideology of the Filipinos during the nineties with any degree of completeness. There is, moreover, an additional difficulty in the fact that such ideas as had been propounded regarding the nature and form of government and its relation to the individual and to society remained to a large extent mere political theories, bare statements of principles and policies, little tried out in practice and hardly enriched by the process of interpretation. The Filipinos had scant opportunity and time to devote to political experimentation, having been given very little share in the administration in *ante bellum* days, and kept busy in the field during the brief existence of the Philippine Republic. Nevertheless a brief survey of their political ideas will be attempted.

The history of Filipino political theory from 1892 to 1900 is easily divisible into two periods, namely, the pre-revolutionary, and the revolutionary. Each period had two schools of thought: the "assimilist" and the *Katipunan*, and the "absolutist" and the "constitutionalist", respectively. The

first school was best represented by Rizal and Del Pilar; the second was led by Bonifacio and Jacinto; the third had its greatest exponent in Mabini, and the fourth was ably advocated by such men as Calderón and Paterno. Aguinaldo, who really belonged to no particular group, an actor rather than a thinker, a soldier rather than a philosopher, was nevertheless the recognized leader in turn of the *Katipuneros*, the "absolutists" and the "constitutionalists".¹

For the general purposes of the present survey the "assimilists", who really flourished in the late eighties and held the field much to themselves until the rise of the *Katipunan*, may be left out altogether. However, it might be well to repeat here that the chief reform they demanded was the closer union, the "assimilation", to use their own word, of the Archipelago with Spain—an arrangement which they believed would inevitably raise the Filipinos from the rank of colonials to the category of Spanish nationals and open to them the enjoyment of all rights and privileges pertaining thereto. Accordingly they would have to be adjudged loyalist in sentiment, and perhaps largely royalist also. By this it is not meant that they never thought of the possibility of political separation from Spain at some distant date; but they did not advocate, at least not openly, a measure so extreme. Instead they dutifully warned Spain of the probable consequences of its misrule.²

Diametrically opposed in political theory to the above group were the *katipuneros*, whose rallying-cry was revolution and national independence. Though belonging to the pre-revolutionary period, having founded their society in

¹ The terms "absolutist" and "constitutionalist" are misnomers: for the former believed in constitutions as much as the latter, while the "constitutionalists", though opposing the "absolutism" of the executive, stood for that of the legislature.

² Vide José Rizal, *Filipinas dentro de cien años*, or *El Filibusterismo*.

1892 and catechized thousands of people into their way of thinking before 1896, they had a compelling influence over a large part of the population, particularly in central Luzon, till 1897. Briefly, their program of action was to win over to their views as large a portion of the population as possible, provoke a revolution and establish some sort of a republic. Called into being for the avowed purpose of putting an end to the Spanish régime in the Islands, the *Katipunan* stressed destruction rather than reconstruction. To that end, and following in the footsteps of the "assimilists", the *katipuneros* labored hard to combat the influence of the clergy, the strongest pillar of the Spanish colonial edifice in the Archipelago.

What may be called the political ideology of the *Katipunan* is perhaps best understood by a study of the writings of Emilio Jacinto, the "brains" of the society, and in particular his *Light and Darkness (Liwanag at Dilim)*. This work, written in Tagalog and still unpublished, embodies Jacinto's political creed. According to Epifanio de los Santos, who printed a synopsis of it in his article on "Emilio Jacinto,"¹ it has the following section headings: "Light and Glitter", "Liberty", "All Men are Equal", "Love", "People and Government", "False Belief", and "Work". Of these topics the second, third and fifth are pertinent to the discussion in hand. Under the caption of "Liberty", Jacinto defines that word to mean the natural right of an individual to think and to do as he pleases, provided that, in so doing, he harm no one. He says that "liberty comes from Heaven", and is "the attribute of a man from the moment he is born", although "the majority of peoples" are subjugated by tyrants, and "bear the heavy chains of servitude". With respect to equality, he says: "All men are equal; the origin of all is the same. Christ said: You

¹ *The Philippine Review*, June, 1918, pp. 412 et seq.

are all equal; you are brothers".¹ Further on he adds that equality and authority are by no means contradictory to each other; for although all men are equal, he who is raised to a position of authority by his fellow equals should be respected by all.

Jacinto's ideas as to the relation between the government and the people may be set forth in translation from his own words as follows:

. . . in every community and society there is need of a head, of one who has power over the rest for direction and good example, and for the maintenance of unity among members and associates, and who will guide them to the desired goal. . . .

This head is called the government, and he who is called upon to exercise its power, the governor.

The object of all government is the people, and the security and welfare of the people must be the aim of all its laws and acts . . . the power of the ruler was not given to him by nature . . . all power, in order to be reasonable and genuine, must be exercised for the benefit of the people from which it emanated.

Briefly we must not recognize the superiority of the ruler as an attribute attached to him by nature. The obedience and respect due him are derived from the power conferred upon him by the people themselves, a power which is the integration of all the powers of the people.

For this reason he who obeys the power conferred by the people obeys the people and identifies himself with the will of all the citizens that compose the people. . . .

The laws must therefore be obeyed and respected, as the expression of the popular will, and not the will of those who govern, as they are merely charged with carrying out those same laws. . . .

¹ The *Primer* has the following to say regarding equality: "Poor, rich, ignorant, wise; all are equal and are true brothers. . . . Whether our skin be black or white, we are all born equal; superiority in knowledge, wealth and beauty are to be understood, but not superiority by nature".

The welfare of the people is the sole purpose of all the governments on earth. The people is all: blood and life, wealth and strength, all is of the people. . . .

We have seen that the people, in order to exist and progress, need a head or government whom it is the duty of the people to grant, for its maintenance, subsidies or taxes which must be imposed and invested only with the manifest consent of the tax-payers.

From the ideas of their chief leaders, more particularly of Jacinto and Bonifacio, and from their activities, it is plain that the *katipuneros* desired an actual republic, and idealized certain principles which may be expressed in the familiar phrase "liberty, equality and fraternity". Regarding the kind of republic wanted, or the machinery of government it was to have, little or nothing was said. It is to be presumed, however, that the intention was to have the *Katipunan* organization serve as the machinery or agency of government. That such was the plan of the more prominent leaders at least, is shown by the conversion, soon after the outbreak of hostilities in August, 1896, of the supreme council into a "ministry" presided over by Bonifacio;¹ and by the unwillingness of a faction among them to admit the necessity of establishing a "revolutionary government", as was done in Tejeros. With respect to the principles of "liberty, equality and fraternity", which the *Katipunan* leaders obviously borrowed from the French Revolution, if not also from Freemasonry,² much was made of them,

¹ The supreme council as reorganized was composed of a president, five "ministers" (state, war, *gobernación*, justice and finance), a general secretary and a general treasurer. See affidavit of Pio Valenzuela in Retana, *Archivo*, vol. iii, pp. 384-385. See also Reyes, *La Religión del Katipunan*, p. 31.

² Both Bonifacio and Jacinto read widely about the French Revolution, while Rizal, Del Pilar and other forerunners of the revolt, who were idolized by the *Katipuneros*, were all Masons.

however vaguely they may have been apprehended by the majority. These ideas, together with that of popular sovereignty, lay at the root of Jacinto's political creed, and they were prominently set forth, in the familiar phraseology, in two of Aguinaldo's earlier manifestoes.¹ "Equality" in particular made a powerful appeal to the members of the society, composed as it was almost wholly of men from the lower classes.

From the standpoint of political ideology, the revolutionary period may be said to have begun with the establishment of the Tejeros revolutionary government. While it is true that the "republic" then created hardly existed, i. e. actually maintained undisputed control over any given territory, and its promoters found it convenient soon after to seek refuge in the mountains of Biacnabato, still the "government" then constituted was really the forerunner of the Filipino Government of 1898 and 1899. Although the former had never been developed to any such appreciable degree as the latter, yet it more closely resembles its successor in spirit and mechanism than its *Katipunan* predecessor. As a whole the revolutionists, like the *katipuneros*, believed in the overthrow of Spanish rule in the Islands and in the founding of a Filipino republic, and similarly idealized liberty and the brotherhood of all Filipinos; but, unlike their predecessors, they placed as much emphasis on the constructive as on the destructive functions of the revolution, and actually devoted their talent and energy as much to the first objective as to the second. Unlike the *katipuneros*, also, the revolutionists talked less of equality; and the government they established, though popular, was far from democratic. In general they were disposed to favor the maintenance of an all-powerful

¹Dated October 31, 1896. See text of manifestoes in Kalaw, *Documentos constitucionales*, pt. ii, p. 8, and in the appendix, p. 2.

executive, who, till the Congress met at Malolos, was actually dictator. This tendency among them, which formed the basic principle of the "absolutist" school of thought, met little or no opposition before the members of Congress began to draft the Constitution; for, till then, all the governing was done by the executive, and all the serious political theorizing, by Apolinario Mabini, first among the advocates of executive supremacy. From that time, however, there arose among the delegates a group of men, the "constitutionalists", who inclined toward the exaltation of the legislative instead. The influence of this group on the administration as then carried on was slight; but they succeeded in providing the Republic with a constitution, which, though less hostile to the executive than Calderón's original plan, tended nevertheless to reduce that office to comparative impotence.

What may be called the political ideology of the "absolutist" school in particular, is best reflected in the political creed of Apolinario Mabini. Believing passionately as he did in Philippine independence, he early appealed to his countrymen to strive to secure and preserve it, to establish a republic, and to refuse to accept any authority for the Philippines which did not derive its powers from the Filipinos themselves. Moreover, he counselled them to live in Christian brotherhood and to cultivate their especial aptitudes, so that they could render greater service to their fellow men.¹ Thus he sought to propagate, not only the notions of independence and a republic, but those of popular sovereignty and the brotherhood of all Filipinos as well. His ideas of liberty included freedom of speech, the press and association; the security of property, inviolability of the home and immunity of correspondence; religious liberty;

¹ See his *Decalogue*, part of which is given *supra*, p. 109.

the right to choose any profession or occupation; and protection from arbitrary arrest and confinement.¹ However, he expressly pointed out that liberty did not mean license.²

With respect to the mechanism of government, Mabini held to the theory of the separation of powers: legislative, executive and judicial. Like the "constitutionalists", his ideal government seems to have been one in which the legislative should be the final authority; for according to him that particular power should be to the government as reason is to the individual, and consequently should direct the executive and the judiciary in the same manner that reason dictates the will and the conscience of men.³ But convinced as he was of the absolute necessity for a strong executive in view of the prevalence of war conditions, he bent all his efforts towards the maintenance of what essentially was executive autocracy. Thus in his constitutional plan, as well as in the decree of June 23, 1898, of which he was the author, he provided for an executive who, not only was to share, and did share, with the legislative the right to initiate laws, but was also to have, and did have, the power of veto—a dominant figure in the administration, who, though irresponsible while in office, was given nevertheless the right to name all department secretaries and, of course, to dismiss them. In his constitutional plan, moreover, Mabini empowered the chief executive to appoint all provincial heads and to select all municipal chiefs.⁴ True, in the decree of June 18, 1898, (also drafted by him), he prescribed the election of the municipal chiefs and the selection of the provincial heads

¹ See *Programa constitucional de la República Filipina*, Title I.

² T. M. Kalaw, *El Ideario político de Mabini*, Manila, 1915, pp. 3-4.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

⁴ From a list of three names furnished by the municipal councils. See Title VI, sec. 86.

by them; but, at the same time, he provided that such elections and selections, to become effective, had to be confirmed by the chief executive.

On the other hand the political ideas of the "constitutionalist" school are to be found embodied in the Malolos Constitution. According to that instrument, the "constitutionalists", like the "absolutists", believed in an independent Filipino republic and similarly acclaimed the theory of popular sovereignty. In it, moreover, they enumerated, in much the same way Mabini did in his constitutional plan, certain personal and civil rights considered by them fundamental, of which the most important are the following: freedom of thought, association and petition; religious liberty; inviolability of domicile and correspondence; protection from arbitrary detention, persecution and deportation, and from arbitrary taxation; security of property, and equality before the law.¹

It should be remembered, moreover, that the "constitutionalists", in their effort to secure for the legislature the dominant position in the administration, bestowed on that body the power to override the President's veto and to create a "permanent commission" which was to sit when it was not in session,² and instituted ministerial responsibility. Believing as they did that the legislature should be the "synthesis of popular sovereignty", the "constitutionalists" conferred on it such ample powers that, in the words of Calderón, "it fiscalized the executive and the judiciary in all their acts".³ However, aside from their

¹ *Vide* Constitution, Titles I, II, III and IV.

² The Schurman Commission says of the "permanent commission" that it was "to keep a watch upon the chief executive, the members of his cabinet, the chief justice, and other high officials of the government". See *Report of the Philippine Commission*, 1900, vol. i, p. 92.

³ *Mis Memorias*, p. 239.

departure on this point, the "constitutionalists" held much the same political ideas as the "absolutists".

GENERAL TENDENCIES

From what has been discussed, it would seem that, as a whole, the drift of Filipino political theory and practice from 1896 to 1900 tended toward three main directions. They may be indicated as follows: republicanism, constitutionalism and centralization. These will be taken up *seriatim*.

In the first place, all revolutionists, including the *Katipuneros*, idealized a republic. There never was an attempt, throughout the whole period of the Filipinos' struggle for liberation, to found for the Islands anything but a republic.¹ The *katipuneros* again and again acclaimed its advent, and started the revolution hailing it. The "governments" founded at Tejeros and at Biacnabato were republican. So was the Filipino Government proper, in spite of the fact that it was not officially designated as such until after the promulgation of the Malolos Constitution. Indeed, republicanism, which to them did not necessarily mean democracy, may be said to have inspired all Filipino political thought and action during the entire period.

In the second place, there was a pronounced tendency among the leaders to draft constitutions, for the Filipino revolutionists felt that they must have not only a republic but a constitution as well. Thus constitutional plans of varying length and minuteness came and went in rapid succession. There was the constitution drafted mainly by Edilberto Evangelista, a graduate of the University of Ghent, and adopted, according to Epifanio de los Santos, shortly before the Tejeros convention; there was the *con-*

¹ The reported assumption of a vice-regal title by one of the revolutionary chiefs in Cavite province need not be taken seriously in this connection.

stitución provisional de la República Filipina promulgated at Biacnabato; there were the organic decrees of June 18, 20 and 23, 1898; and finally there was the *constitución política de la República Filipina*, often referred to as the Malolos Constitution. There were other drafts or plans, such as those by Mariano Ponce, Mabini and Paterno, which had never been promulgated under any pretense. As if these were not enough, there were also schemes of regional government, exemplified by Jacinto's *Regional Council* (*Sangguniang Hukuman*) and the so-called "constitution of the general executive committee for central Luzon". Others may have been omitted in this enumeration; but the ones mentioned are sufficient to show that the general attitude of the revolutionists seems to have been to regard the existence of a written constitution as one of the first conditions for the successful operation of a government.

Finally, there was a marked attempt to institute a highly centralized government for the Philippines. The organization of the *Katipunan* was intended to have that character, presided over as it was by a "Supreme One" (*Supremo*), although apparently it did not always work out so in practice. The so-called "republic" set up at Biacnabato, according to its constitution, concentrated all powers of government in a "supreme council" composed of six men: the president, the vice-president, and the secretaries of interior, war, finance and foreign relations. The Filipino Government from its inception in May to June 23 was in name and in fact a dictatorship. Thereafter it ceased to be so in name, but continued to be so in fact, at least till the Congress assembled and the rising tide of "constitutionalism" warned the President to be more careful. At any rate its organization took on a highly centralized form, based up to the promulgation of the Constitution wholly on the decrees of June 18, 20 and 23, and partly thereafter.

Indeed, the Constitution itself, which provided that the "organization and powers of the provincial and municipal assemblies shall be governed by their respective laws", bestowed on the Central Government the right of "intervention" in local matters, "in order to prevent the provincial and municipal corporations from exceeding their powers, to the prejudice of general and individual interests". That there was comparative unanimity among the revolutionists in this policy was shown by the fact that "absolutists" and "constitutionalists" alike agreed in the concentration of powers in the central government, differing only as to which department thereof should be paramount. True, the Panay and Negros revolutionists seem to have revealed a preference for a less centralized organization, but their attitude in this respect found no evident support elsewhere.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it may be said that the Filipinos' struggle for liberation, far from being an isolated episode forced by Aguinaldo and his associates on an unwilling populace, appears to have been the natural outcome of a growing determination on the part of the Filipinos to obtain improvements for their country. The movement was conducted at first solely in behalf of certain reforms considered by the leaders essential to the general welfare, and only became revolutionary as the conviction grew among them that their efforts not only went unheeded but were even wrongly interpreted. In the beginning, as is generally the case with any movement at its inception, it was alike local and partisan in character; then gradually extended over an ever-widening area and culminated in the establishment of the Philippine Republic. Thereafter the movement is best represented by the history of the Filipino Government itself which was essentially the record of what Foreman called the "war of in-

dependence". From that record it would seem unwise to draw inferences with regard to the capacity or incapacity of the Filipinos for governmental administration. After all, the Philippine Republic was "born of a revolution" and "lived in an atmosphere of revolution", and there was little chance "for calm reflection and deliberate action". Yet to its credit must be assigned the fact that, beset by war as it was from all sides, it took nevertheless all possible steps leading to civil government and constitutional rule.

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COLLECTIONS

The search for materials will be greatly facilitated by going first to the large collections. In the United States the archives of the Department of War and the Library of Congress will be found most useful. The Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department has in its keeping a good many of the records of the defunct Philippine Republic captured during the insurrection and all other documents that had fallen into the hands of the American Army. These papers, written generally in Spanish and Tagalog and collectively known as the "Philippine Insurgent Records", constitute a respectable library of original sources.

There, too, and in the Library of Congress as well, one may consult, by securing a special permit therefor, the galley proofs of John R. M. Taylor's *Philippine Insurgent Records*, which prints as exhibits many of the captured documents referred to. These two collections undoubtedly lead all others in this country for the period since the American occupation of the Philippines. Important sources are available also in the Newberry Library (Ayer Indian Collection) at Chicago, and in the New York Public Library in New York City.

In the Philippines, the *Filipiniana* Division of the Philippine Library in Manila is a veritable mine of all sorts of documents and rare books. It is considered "the richest collection of *Filipiniana* in the world" and has on its shelves most of the books, pamphlets and periodicals formerly belonging to the famous collection of the *Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas* of Barcelona, and to the private libraries of two Manila collectors, Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera and José C. Zulueta. Moreover, some of the rarest works, often in manuscript, may be found in the private collections of Epifanio de los Santos, a well known Filipino historian, and of Teodoro M. Kalaw, another Filipino author of high repute. Mr. Kalaw's collection is particularly strong in papers relating to the life and work of Apolinario Mabini.

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